

Dominion India in World-Perspectives Economic and Political

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FOREWORD

Most of the systematic works of Professor Benoy Sarkar are out of print, for example, *The Equations of World-Economy* (1943), *Villages and Towns as Social Patterns* (1941), *Social Insurance Legislation and Statistics* (1936), *The Sociology of Population* (1936), *Imperial Preference vis-à-vis World-Economy* (1934), *The Political Institutions and Theories of the Hindus* (Berlin 1922), *The Folk-Element in Hindu Culture* (London 1917), and *The Positive Background of Hindu Sociology* (three volumes, Allahabad 1914-26). Regrettably enough, some of his very substantial works like *Creative India* (1937) and *The Political Philosophies Since 1905*, Vol. II, in three parts (1942), published as they were at Lahore, have been lost on account of the disturbances in the Punjab during 1947-48.

- It is therefore a happy idea of the publishers to bring together under one cover some of the latest papers and lectures of Professor Sarkar, especially those published since the end of World-War II (1939-45) or rather since the establishment of the Dominions of India and Pakistan (August 1947). I am exceedingly thankful to the publishers and feel greatly honoured for their asking me to write a few lines about the author, who was my teacher at Bengal National College (National Council of Education, Bengal) during 1907-10 and subsequently introduced me to Purdue University, U.S.A. in 1911.

In 1940 a bulky volume entitled *The Social and Economic Ideas of Benoy Sarkar* was issued by my friend Professor Banerjee Dass, B. S. Ch. E. (Illinois) of Jadavpur College of Engineering and Technology with the cooperation of thirteen authors and with a preface by Dr. Narendra Nath Law, Editor, *Indian Historical Quarterly*, at present, the Sheriff of Calcutta. The observations of the *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* (Philadelphia) about this book are as follows: "An embodiment of the almost legendary versatility of the Bengali intellectual, Professor Benoy Sarkar ranges over fields not only in economics and sociology but also in political

science, philosophy, religion, art, history and education. He stresses the capacity of Indians for material progress and the capacities of Occidentals for mystic and metaphysical achievements. He favours an international policy which will supply India with foreign capital for her industrialization."

In regard to the *Equations of World-Economy* the *Economic Journal* (London) writes as follows: "This like all of Sarkar's work breaks right away from traditional patterns of economic writing and tries to develop an original technique for the problems in hand. He seeks here to examine the limitations and possibilities for the expansion of Indian economy. He lays down a curve of progress :

India (1885)=England (1800-15)=Germany (1848)

India (1905)=England (1815-30)=Germany (1850-60)

India (1940)=England (1839-48)=Germany (1865-70)

He then goes on to ask how far technical, political and economic trends are opening or closing the lag of India on European industries, and what is the outlook for the future."

A recent publication is *Benoy Sarkarer Baithake* (In Meetings with Benoy Sarkar), a Bengali book in two volumes (1942-45). It is a record of interviews with the Professor held by six scholars and authors from November 1931 to May 1945. They deal with the most diverse topics of Bengali culture, economy and politics as developed in the twentieth century.

Another recent work is *Education for Industrialization* (1946). It is an analysis of the forty years' work of Jadavpur College of Engineering and Technology (1905-45).

It is on the eve of Professor Sarkar's visit to the United States in response to the invitation of the Institute of International Education (New York) in collaboration with the Watumull Foundation (Los Angeles) for lectures in American Universities that the present work is going to be published. This will be his second or rather third voyage of lectures in the U. S. A. Be it observed, therefore, that in the course of his fourteen years of travels and investigations in Egypt, China, Japan, Europe and America (1914-25, 1929-31) he has

had contacts with many Universities of the world (Columbia, Clark, California, Harvard, Paris, Berlin, Munich, Leipzig, Dresden, Stuttgart, Kiel, Innsbruck, Geneva, Rome, Padua and Milan) in the capacity of a Visiting Professor.

He speaks and writes in French, German and Italian in addition to Bengali, Hindi and English. His articles and lectures have been published in the *American Political Science Review*, *Indian Journal of Political Science*, *Indian Journal of Economics*, *Annals of the American Academy*, *International Journal of Ethics* (Chicago), *Journal of International Relations* (Clark University), *Giornale degli Economisti e Rivista di Statistica* (Rome), *Annali di Economia* (Milan), *Revue de Synthèse Historique* (Paris), *Revue Internationale de Sociologie* (Paris), *Allgemeines Statistisches Archiv* (Jena), *Neumanns Zeitschrift für Versicherungswesen* (Berlin), *Seances et Travaux de l'Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques* (Paris), *Mitteilungen Vereins deutscher Ingenieure* (Berlin), *Political Science Quarterly* (New York), etc.

Professor Sarkar was a President of the International Congress of Population (at Rome) and a Vice-President at Berlin and Paris. He is an honorary member of the *Institut Oriental* (Prague), *Komisja Orientalistyczna* (Warsaw), *Hobbes Gesellschaft* (Berlin), *Academia Asiatica* (Tehran), *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Soziologie* (Cologne). He is, besides, an active member at Calcutta of the *Alliance Française*, the *English-Speaking Union* and the Rotary Club, as well as the President of the Iran Society. The impact of all these international scientific and social contacts is to be found in his researches and publications. They are essentially world-economic, world-political and world-cultural in contents, each of which is marked by topics of comparative statistics and comparative analysis. In every one of his publications there is an attempt to place India in world-perspectives.

The inspiration and guidance offered by Professor Sarkar to numerous intellectuals, researchers, authors and educationists is well known. I should not fail to add that many businessmen in diverse fields—manufacture, machine-building, banking, insurance, transportation, export-import, and agriculture,—have been started on their careers,

thanks to his intimate association with merchants, industrial leaders and publicists.

It is but proper to mention with pleasure that he has been the Hony. Economic Adviser to our Indo-Swiss Trading Co. Ltd., Indo-Europa Trading Co., Jalpaiguri Electric Supply Company Ltd., Bangiya Jalajan Samiti (Bengal Inland Steam Navigation Co. Ltd.), Mayurbhanj Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd., and Mayurbhanj Potteries Ltd. since the inception of each.

Some of the social contacts of Professor Sarkar during 1948 are indicated below :

- 4 January. President at the Burma Independence Celebration of the *Abhinava Bharati* (a Marwari Association of Culture).
- 7 January. President at the Mahabodhi Society's reception to Minister Bandaranaike of Ceylon.
- 12 January. President at the monthly *Eur-Asia's* reception to Dr. Probodh Bagchi, Professor of Indian History and Culture at the National University of Peiping, China.
- 17 January. President at the lecture on East and West delivered at the Ramakrishna Mission Institute of Culture by Principal A. R. Wadia of Gwalior.
- 18 January. President at the Reunion of Old and Present Boys of Vidyamandir (College) of the Ramakrishna Mission at Belur.
- 25 January. Lecture at the inauguration of the *Bangiya Vijnan-Parishat* (Bengali Academy of Science): "Ramendrer Path na Jagadish-Prafullar Path?" (The Way of Ramendra Trivedi or of Jagadish Bose and Prafulla Ray)?
- 29 February. Lecture at the opening of the Home of the Ramakrishna Mission Institute of Culture at Russa Road: "Man and His Duties as the Gospel of Vivekananda."
- 26 March. Lecture at Calcutta Literary Conference of the Taltala Public Library: "Formless Bengal and the Fluid Bengali."

- 29 March. Lecture at Mahabodhi Society: "Beni Barua as a Maker of Young Bengal."
- 9 April. Lecture at Calcutta University Post-Graduate Commerce Seminar: "Hindi in the Bengali Strategy of *Delhi Chalo* (March on to Delhi)."
- 10 April. Lecture at the Arya Samaj, Burrabazar: "The Six Gifts of the Arya Samaj: 1. Religious Reform, 2. Social Reform, 3. Suddhi (Re-Hinduization) 4. Sangathan (Organization), 5. Sanskrit language, 6. Hindi."
- 17 April. Lecture at Great Eastern Hotel under the auspices of Gramophone and Radio Corporation Ltd: "Regional Autarchy Undesirable in Dominion India."
- April. Preface in Bengali to Professor Kastur Lalwani's *Arthashastrer Rup-rekha* (The Morphology of Economics).
- 19 April. Interview in the *Hindusthan Standard*: "Satis Mukherjee, a Father of the Bengali Revolution."
- 5 May. Lecture before the Japanese Mission under American Command at Buddhist Temple: "Japanese-American Collaboration the Sheet-Anchor of Japanese Prosperity and Progress."
- 5 June. Addressing the Czechoslovak Technical Mission at the World-Economic Institute of Calcutta University.
- 11 June. Lecture at Santi Institute under the auspices of *Atmonnati Samiti* (Self-Improvement Society): "The Future of Bengalis."
- 12 July. President at the public meeting organized by India Tomorrow Club at Curzon Park in order to offer homage to the memories of Brigadier Usman and Captain Rajendra Sen, who fell in Kashmir.
- 20 July. Interview with the United Press of India: "India's Balances Already Scaled Down."
- 23 July. Evidence before the Agrarian Reforms Committee of the Government of India.

- 27-29 August. President at the Economic Convention on Inflation organized by the *Khoj Parishat* (Research Institute) under the auspices of the Socialist Party of India.
- 1 September. Lecture at Rotary Club, Howrah : "The Man-Power of West Bengal."
- 2 September. Interview with the United Press of India : "Government's Anti-Inflationary Measures."
- 4 September. President at the lecture on Some Aspects of Architecture by Bernard Matthews at the Ramakrishna Mission Institute of Culture.
- 9 September. Preface to Bhupen Das's poetical work entitled *Kaler Kabale Bangla* (Bengal in the Grip of Famine), Bengali versical rendering of Bachchan's Hindi poem : "Banglay Bachchan-Sambardhana" (Homage to Bachchan in Bengali)."
- 17 September. Radio talk on the occasion of the birthday celebration of Dharmapala, founder of the Mahabodhi Society : "Dharmapala through Bengali Eyes."
- 20 September. President at a meeting held at Great Eastern Hotel for the creation of Purbachal Province on the Assam-Burma frontier.
- 24 September. President at a lecture on Socialism at Marwari Chhatra-nivas by Ram Monahar Lohia, the socialist leader : "Three Socialisms : Theoretical, Popular and Political."
- 25 September. Lecture at the opening of the South East Asian Exhibition at Commercial Museum by H.E. the Governor Dr. K. N. Katju : "South East Asia as a Problem for Dominion India."
- 2 October. President at the lectures on economic resources organized by the South East Asian Exhibition Committee : "Foreign Capital in South East Asia."
- October. Elected President of the Iran Society, Calcutta.
- 19 October. Lecture at Rotary Club, Calcutta : "The Security Council of the U. N."

- 20 October. Lecture at the Suren Bose Memorial Meeting organized by Bengal Waterproof Works Ltd.: "Suren Bose an Embodiment of Bengali Energism."
- 29 November. Lecture on the occasion of the Girish Bose Birth Centenary: "Bangabasi College and Girish Bose as Embodiments of Revolutionary Bengal."
- 3 December. Lecture at Dr. Radha Binode Pal's lecture on International Law under the auspices of the Indian Law Review Society: "International Law as Positive Law like the Laws of a State."
- 8 December. President at the Conference of Political Sufferers held at Indian Association: "Benoy, Badal and Dinesh as Martyrs."
- 11 December. President at Professor Suniti Chatterji's lecture on Recent Trip to Europe and Egypt at Ramakrishna Mission Institute of Culture.
- 23-25 December. Lectures on "Nationalization as Rationalization of Capitalism" "Non-Currency Factors in Price-Formation" and "Insurance Finance as Index to India's Backwardness" at the Indian Commerce Conference, Second Session (Calcutta University).

The functions indicated above exhibit a part of the cultural, economic and political atmosphere in which scholars like Professor Sarkar have to take interest and carry on investigation.

In the same context it may be observed that he is an Hony. Member of the Bengal National Chamber of Commerce and at Calcutta University he is the Secretary to the World-Economic Institute and the Key-Person to the Voluntary Correspondent Speakers' Unit of the United Nations. He is, besides, the Head of the Departments of Economics and Commerce at Calcutta University and is the Hony. Professor of Economics at College of Engineering and Technology, Jadavpur, and has to participate in its academic and administrative activities.

The Bengali writings of Professor Sarkar cover some fourteen thousand pages of which nearly 5000 are devoted to *Varttaman*.

Jagat (Modern World, in 13 Volumes) given over to the institutions and movements of the countries in Asia, Europe, Africa and America visited by him. Since 1926 he has been editing the monthly *Arthik Unnati* (Economic Progress) with the support of Dr. Naren Law. This journal is the nucleus of seven *Parishats*, Institutes or Academies, conducted by Professor Sarkar. Sixty-five young scholars have been associated with these Institutes of Economics, Sociology, International Relations, Asian Problems, American Institutions, German culture, and Italian affairs. The papers produced by fifty of his scholars in Bengali and English have appeared as valuable articles, brochures or books.

His *Introduction to Hindu Positivism* (Allahabad 1937) is described by *L'Action et Pensée* (Paris) as follows: "If the Westerners wish to understand best the thought of modern India in sociology it is absolutely impossible to pass this work by." The *Amrita Bazar Patrika* says that this is a "monumental work" and "a star never to set." In this book, among other things, as the *Hindusthan Standard* says, "he examines also the influence of Hindu Positivism in South Eastern Asia, Indonesia, Tibet, China and Moslem Asia."

The *Indian Social Reformer* (Bombay) writes in an editorial as follows: "Raja Rammohan Roy, Keshab Chandra Sen, Pandit Iswar Chandra Vidyasagar, Surendranath Banerjee, Swami Vivekananda, Chitta Ranjan Das and Subhas Chandra Bose are all typical of the free and independent spirit of Bengal which refuses to bend its knee to any individual or cult. An even more impressive example is Benoy Kumar Sarkar who, as his lectures recently in Bombay showed (November 1940), challenges practically every school of thought which holds the field in India today."

BIRENDRA NATH DAS-GUPTA

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20 January, 1949

Dominion India in World-Perspectives

Trends of Indian Trade, Industry, Agriculture and Social Economy

The mind of India as of other countries has been captured by the category, planning. It is naively believed by Indian economists and publicists that the fiat of planning can raise economic India up to any level of efficiency and prosperity within three, five or seven years.

There is another idea prevalent about Indian economy. People believe that it is more or less a statical phenomenon. Development, movement or progress is a category alleged to be unknown in the Indian *milieu*.

Both these notions are wrong. Figures are being culled from the *Statistical Abstract of British India* which will enable people to follow the trends in Indian trade, industry, agriculture and social economy. In order to visualize what may be called the somewhat "normal" movements, the 5—10-or 20-year period down to 1938-39¹ (the pre-war year) are being indicated.

The World-Trade of India

In 1938-39 India's exports to all the countries of the world were worth Rs. 1,692 millions. The share of the U. S. A. can be seen in the following table:²

Countries	Million Rupees	Countries	Million Rupees
1. U. K.	583	3. U. S. A.	143
2. Japan	148	4. Germany	87

U. S. A. occupied the third place with 143 million Rupees as receiver of Indian goods. Her position was almost equal to or somewhat lower than that of Japan with 148 millions.

The imports of India during the same year from all the countries of the world totalled Rs. 1,523 millions.

1 For current figures, the *Monthly Survey of Business Conditions in India* (Delhi) is to be referred to.

2 *Review of the Trade of India 1940-41* (Delhi 1942), pp. 180-182, 1943-44 (Delhi 1946), p. 133.

The position of the U. S. A. as a source for Indian imports can be seen below :

Countries	Million Rupees	Countries	Million Rupees
1. U. K.	465	3. Germany	130
2. Japan	154	4. U. S. A.	98

As the supplier of goods for India the U. S. A. was the fourth in the queue.

The percentage share of these four countries in the total international trade of India is indicated below :

Countries	Percentage of Exports from India	Percentage of Imports into India	Percentage of Exports and Imports combined
1. U. K.	34.3	30.5	32.5
2. Japan	8.8	10.1	9.4
3. U.S.A.	8.4	6.4	7.5
4. Germany	5.0	8.5	6.6

U.S.A. commanded 7.5 per cent of the total foreign trade (exports and imports combined) of India during 1938-39. This is to be envisaged against 6.6 per cent of Germany, 9.4 per cent of Japan, and 32.5 per cent of U. K.

Indo-American Trade

The trend of Indo-American trade in comparison with that of Indo-Japanese from 1909 to 1939 in the total percentage exhibits the following evolution :³

Period	U.S.A.'s Percentage of India's Total Foreign Trade	Japan's Percentage of India's Total Foreign Trade
I. Pre-World-War I Average of 1909-14	5.8	5.5
II. World-War I Average of 1914-19	9.9	10.9
III. Post-World War I Average of 1919-24	10.4	10.4
IV. 1938-39	7.5	9.4
V. World War II		
1939-40	11.1	8.8
1940-41	16.6	8.6
1941-42	20.8	4.3
1942-43	20.5	Japan at War

The chief imports of India from the U.S.A. during the pre-World-War II year (1938-39) are indicated below :⁴

Articles Imported by India from the U.S.A.	1938-39 in million Rs.
Machinery	21·2
Instruments	8·8
Tobacco	4·8
Cotton, raw	3·7
Drugs and medicines	2·7
Toilet requisites	2·3
Hardware	2·2
Copper	1·6
Spirit	1·6
etc. etc. etc.	
Total	98·0

The articles supplied by India to the U.S.A. during the same year were as follows :

Articles	1938-39 in million Rs.
Jute Cloth	67,0
Hides and Skins, raw	15,1
Fruits and vegetables	11,0
Jute, raw	6,7
Lac	5,0
Wool, raw	5,0
Tea	4,7
Cotton, raw	4,1
etc. etc. etc.	
Total	139,0

In 1938-39, then, the U.S.A.'s physiognomy as known to the Indian people by the objective test of their imports was that of machinery and instruments, drugs and hardware. In the U.S.A. likewise the Indian physiognomy was told by jute cloth, hides and skins, fruits and vegetables, as well as lac, wool, tea, etc. imported from India.

Industrial India in Snapshots⁵

The progress of industrialization during 1932-39 was quite obvious. Ten items are exhibited in the following table, namely, pig iron, steel ingots, finished steel, sulphuric acid, cement, sugar,

⁴ *E.T.I.* 1940-41, pp. 199-200.

⁵ *Statistical Abstract of British India*, 1940-41.

paper, jute manufactures, cotton piecegoods and cotton yarn. The table covers the period from 1932 to 1941, as follows:

Items	1932-33 (in '000's)	1938-39 (in '000's)	1940-41 (in '000's)
Pig Iron (tons)	880	1,575	1,959
Steel Ingots (tons)	591	977	1,258
Finished Steel (tons)	359	736	925
Sulphuric Acid (cwts)	484	512	778
Cement (tons)	593	1,512	2,183
Sugar (cwts)	6,778	13,360	23,149
Paper (cwts)	804	1,184	1,821
Jute Manufactures (tons)	903	1,221	1,247
Cotton Piecegoods (lbs)	695,000	920,000	1,185,000
Cotton Yarn (lbs)	1,016,000	1,303,000	1,660,000

1940-41 was the second year of World-war II. The increased output was a mark of the war-effort. The pre-war year 1938-39 may be taken to be a year of the "normal" period. The trend with 1932-33 as 100 would give the following indices for 1938-39:

Items	Indices	Items	Indices
Pig Iron	180	Sugar	197
Steel Ingots	165	Paper	147
Finished Steel	205	Jute Manufactures	135
Sulphuric Acid	106	Cotton Piecegoods	132
Cement	255	Cotton yarn	128

The lowest rate of expansion was to be seen in the manufacture of sulphuric acid, namely, 106 (with 1932-33 as 100). The highest was shown by cement with 255, by finished steel with 205, and by sugar with 197. The indices for pig iron (180) and steel ingots (165) were quite high.

In order to get an idea of the somewhat normal trends of industrial activity we are overlooking for the time being the results of the war-boom as manifest in 1940-41. The figures for this year may be regarded as the results of war-time "overproduction" or "inflated" output. These figures as well as the post-war situation have been analyzed in a subsequent chapter.

Industrial Employment

For twenty years (1923-43) the number of industrial workers is shown in the following table:

Year	Number	Year	Number
1923	1,323,000	1939	1,751,000
1935	1,521,000	1943	2,437,000

In 1939 (the pre-war year) the index of industrial employment was 132 with 1923 as 100. 1943 was the fourth year of the war effort. The figure 2,437,000 was exceptionally high. With 1939 as 100 the index was 139. The rate of increment during the first four years of the war was more than that during sixteen years from 1923 to 1939. This was the "inflated" employment or over-employment of the war period. It is the custom nowadays to describe it as "full" employment.

We may overlook this extraordinarily high employment of the war-boom as a temporary phenomenon. The fact remains that the employment trend was on the rise from 1923 to 1939. And this is an aspect of the Indian economy which must not be ignored. Industrial progress was a statistical fact. The rate of progress was very insignificant.

Industrial Poverty by the World-Standard

The meaning of India's industrialization will be evident if we place some of the output figures in the background of certain industrial great powers. In 1939 on the eve of World-war II the output of coal, pig iron, steel and cement was as follows in India and some of the large countries⁶:

Countries	Coal in mill. tons	Pig Iron in mill. tons	Steel in mill. tons	Cement in mill. tons
U.S.A.	352	20	28	20
Germany	186	18	23	13
U. K.	232	7	11	8
France	47	6	6	4
Soviet Russia	133	15	19	6
India	28	1.6	1	1.5

In absolute figures U.S.A.'s output of steel was 28 times, Germany's 23 times, Soviet Russia's 19 times, U.K.'s 11 times and France's 6 times that of India. This was techno-economic backwardness and material poverty for India without question. The depth of poverty and extent or grade of backwardness would be palpable in "relative statistics," i.e., if we calculate the output of steel per head of population in each one of these countries.

In round numbers the populations were approximately as follows: U.S.A., 130 mill; Germany, 70 mill; U. K., 46 mill; France, 42 mill., Soviet Russia, 170 mill.. and India, 350 mill. The output

of steel per head of population on the eve of World-War II was, then, roughly as follows:

Germany	0.038t	Soviet Russia	0.016
U. K.	0.024	France	0.015
U.S.A.	0.020	India	0.003

Per head of population Germany's output was thus 13 times, U.K.'s 8 times, U.S.A.'s 7 times, Soviet Russia's and France's 5 times that of India. All these calculations and equations are to be taken as somewhat hit-and-miss approaches for socio-economic appraisals.

India's poverty in coal output *per capita* would be evident from the following table which places her in the background of industrial great powers:

Countries	Output per head in tons	Countries	Output per head in tons
U.K.	5.1	France	1.2
Germany	3.1	Soviet Russia	1.1
U.S.A.	2.5	India	0.07

Per head of population U.K.'s output of coal was 73 times, Germany's 44 times, U.S.A.'s 36 times, France's 17 times, Soviet Russia's 17 times that of India.

The Peaks of the War-Boom (1939-45)

Up till now we have been talking of the "normal", i.e. pre-war trends. Let us take the war-boom. In the case of cotton piecegoods the war-boom (1939-45) accounted for the average of 4,414 million yards against the pre-war average (1936-39) of 3,975 million yards. The index was 111 (with 1936-39 as 100). The war effort in sugar meant an average of 20,114,000 cwts. Against the pre-war average of 18,481,000cwts this accounted for an index of 109 only.

The war-effort was responsible for the average of 1,259,000 tons of steel. The pre-war average being 833,000 tons the index rose to 151. So far as paper production is concerned, the war-average was 1,800,000 cwts as against the pre-war average of 1,077,000 cwts. The index was 170.

In all these instances the peaks attained as a result of the rather lengthy war-period ranged between the indices 109 and 170. The results were rather modest.

It is pleasant for economists and publicists to think of India as a sub-continent of immense "possibilities". But planners should try

often to pin themselves down to statistical realities and proceed on the basis of modest and short-period forecasts adapted to their pre-war and war-boom achievements.

Improved Varieties of Crops

The improvement of crops by agricultural research was an economic reality. The acreage under improved varieties of crops increased from 3,296,000 acres in 1920-21 to 23,819,000 acres in 1938-39.

The expansion of acreage under improved varieties from 1920 to 1939 is exhibited below:

(a) Food Crops (in acres)

Crops	1920-21	1938-39	Total acreage sown in
			1938-39
Rice	130,000	4,362,000	69,000,080
Wheat	1,805,000	7,803,000	27,000,000
Sugarcane	10,000	2,093,000	2,988,000

With 1920-21 as 100 the index in 1938-39 rose to 3355 for rice, 432.3 for wheat and 20,930 for sugar-cane. The indices imply that at the base year the acreage under improved varieties was very inconsiderable as much for sugarcane as for rice. Hence the extraordinarily high indices in 1938-39.

(b) Industrial Crops (in acres)

Crops	1920-21	1938-39	Total sown in
			1938-39
Cotton	1,116,000	6,156,000	14,000,000
Jute	57,000	1,588,000	3,115,000

In cotton the index rose to 551.6 and in jute to 278.6.

In 1938-39 the total seeded area was 209,000,000 acres. As the area under improved varieties was 23,819,000 acres not more than 11.4 per cent could be accounted for. Primitive traditional varieties commanded 88.6 per cent of the total cultivation.

*Yields Per Acre**

During the two decades (1920-40) the trend of yields per acre was on the increase both in the field of food-stuffs as well as in that of industrial crops. The following table indicates the changes as well as the rate of improvement:

(a) Food Crops in lbs per Acre

Crops	1920-21	1939-40	Variation with 1920-21 as 100
Rice	773	786	101·7
Wheat	619	764	123·4
Tea	494	555	112·3
Sugarcane	1.195	2,767	231·5

(b) Industrial Crops in lbs per Acre

Crops	1920-21	1939-40	Variation with 1920-21 as 100
Cotton	70	103	147·0
Jute	1,056	1.157	109·5
Linseed	216	226	137·0

In sugarcane the rate of improvement was the highest. In twenty years the index rose to 231·5 from 100 in 1920-21. But in wheat the index was not higher than 123·4 and in rice it was negligible (101·7). In tea also the index 112·3 was not worthwhile. In industrial crops cotton showed the highest index 147. It was followed by linseed with 137. In jute, however, it was very modest (109·5).

Acreage Irrigated

The progress of irrigation during two decades 1920-40 can be seen in the following table:

Items	1920-21	1939-40	Variation with 1920-21 as 100
Area irrigated (in acres)	48,000,000	55,000,000	115
In Percentage of total Area sown	24	26	108
Total capital outlay Rs.	7,235,000	15,389,000	213

Of the total seeded area the percentage of irrigated was 24 at the base year. It was 26 in 1939-40. The index rose to 108. Altogether, Indian agriculture has been showing marks of progress. Between the two wars (1919-39) agricultural improvements were taking place on diverse fronts. But in each instance the rate of progress was low. It is possible, however, to speak of an "agricultural renaissance".

Consumption Per Capita

The standard of living in India during the period between World-War I (1914-18) and World-War II (1939-45) did not remain

static. The items of consumption *per capita* per year in regard to certain articles may be seen below :

Items	1920-21	1938-39	Variation with 1920-21 as 100
Cotton Piece-goods (yards)	12.6	17.6*	140
Kerosene (gallons)	0.51	0.58	113
Sugar (lbs.)	4.6	6.4	140
Tea (lbs.)	0.14	0.25	180

The rise of the index to 140 in regard to cotton piecegoods as well as sugar was an event of considerable value between 1920 and 1940. Life's trend was definitely upward. And yet the national satisfaction with 17.6 yards per head per year was a mark not of prosperity but of positive adversity. Economic India furnishes numerous instances of *absolute* poverty in the general background of *relative* prosperity and progress in every sector.

The Socio-Economic Pattern of India

A somewhat objective picture and correct estimate of India's socio-economic pattern can be furnished by the occupational structure of the people. Agriculture constituted the occupation of 33 per cent of the gainfully employed population of India in 1930. The world-economic position in this regard is exhibited in the following table :

Agriculturally Gainful in % of Total Pop. (1930)

A. Above 25% of Total Pop.

1. Lithuania	48	7. Finland	33
2. Bulgaria	44	8. India	33
3. Russia	42	9. Hungary	27
4. Rumania	41	10. Italy	27
5. Poland	40	11. Portugal	26
6. Esthonia	37		

B. Between 10 and 25%

1. France	23	8. Germany	16
2. Mexico	23	9. Norway	15
3. Australia	22	10. Denmark	15
4. Spain	21	11. Chile	14
5. Sweden	18	12. Canada	13
6. Czechoslovakia	18	13. Switzerland	12
7. Greece	17	14. U.S.A.	10

9 For the decline in the net available for consumption during war years see *R.T.I.* 1943-44 (Delhi 1946), p. 74

C. Under 10% of Total Pop.

1. Austria	9	4. Belgium	8
2. Holland	9	5. Argentine	7
3. New Zealand	9	6. England-Wales	3

We can realistically understand on the strength of these statistical data that India's social economy was more or less similar to such "agrar-states" as Lithuania, Bulgaria, Soviet, Russia, Rumania, Poland, Esthonia, Finland, Hungary, Italy and Portugal.

We shall now examine the proportion of Indian population that was gainfully employed in industry. The following table gives the world-view in this regard:

*Industrially Gainful in % of Total Pop.**A. Above 15% of Total Pop.*

1. England-Wales	24	4. Belgium	19
2. Germany	21	5. Austria	18
3. Switzerland	20	6. France	18

B. Between 6 and 15% of Total Pop.

1. Holland	15	9. Portugal	10
2. Australia	15	10. Argentine	10
3. Czechoslovakia	14	11. New Zealand	10
4. Sweden	13	12. Chile	9
5. U.S.A.	13	13. Canada	9
6. Italy	13	14. Hungary	8
7. Finland	12	15. Denmark	8
8. Norway	12	16. Esthonia	8

C. Up to 5% of Total Pop.

1. India	5	6. Bulgaria	4
2. Spain	5	7. Mexico	4
3. Greece	5	8. Russia	4
4. Poland	5	9. Lithuania	4
5. Rumania	4		

India with 5 per cent of total population as gainfully employed in industry was moving on a low-grade industrial level. And in this respect her approximate peers were Spain, Greece, Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, Mexico, Soviet Russia and Lithuania.

Altogether, both in agriculture and industry, India exhibits socio-economic conditions similar to those of the Balkan Complex and Eastern Europe, comprising Soviet Russia.

Quantitatively considered the proportions of population gainfully employed in the diverse industries have not changed considerably,

as has been apparent in the previous sections, on account of World-War II. The socio-economic pattern of Dominion India in 1948 may be taken to be almost identical with the relative position exhibited by the international statistical survey of some two decades ago.¹⁰

Demobilization Economy and Dominion India

Demobilization as Economic Adversity¹

Post-war economic planning is not a planning for the establishment of an economic paradise, as millions have been taught to believe in India and the rest of the world. It is essentially the planning of demobilization. Mobilization or war-effort has implied the inflation of employment, inflation of production, inflation of transportation, inflation of wages, inflation of prices, inflation of currencies. War-economy is the economy of boom in industry. It registers nothing but the industrialization-curve at its peak. Demobilization or declaration of the war-end on the other hand can but spell the exact opposite, namely, disinflation, may be, deflation. It is to involve disemployment, unemployment, under-employment or retrenchment. It is, besides, to be tantamount to deflation of production or closing down of workshops and factories, lowering of wages and prices, and last but not least, eventually monetary deflation.

In all these instances, disinflation, deflation, retrenchment, closing down or lowering has to be taken in a relative sense. In other words, employment, production and transportation are not to cease altogether but to be cut down in very large dimensions especially in certain fields. Employment is likewise not to be called totally out of existence but reduced to comparatively short proportions. Wages will tend to be lower in rates as well as earnings. Prices also will go down considerably,—not an undesirable thing for the householders. And finally, the money market, capital market or finance market will look tight and pessimistic rather than entirely impoverished and famine-stricken. The flow of currency will lose in rapidity and smoothness as well as volume.

10 Based on the *Statistisches Jahrbuch fuer das Deutsche Reich* 1937 (Berlin) p. 37,* the *Statistical Abstract of British India* 1934 (Delhi), p. 41 and the *Statistical Year Book of the League of Nations* 1934 (Geneva), pp. 37-43.

1 Presidential Address at the World-Economy and Economic India Section of the All -Bengal Economic Conference, Calcutta, 15 April 1945. See *Calcutta Review*, June 1945.

The picture is not by any means reassuring. But this is the A.B.C. of demobilization. Post-war economic policy is, strictly speaking, the bunch of measures calculated to combat the evils and hardships naturally associated with demobilization. The evils are business failures, bankruptcies, unemployment, famine, disease and what not. If war-economy involves boom and prosperity in business of all (especially non-civilian) types, post-war, i.e. demobilization economy can but automatically entail depression along the entire front of business activities. From this stand-point war-economy or inflation economy is not normal business-economy. It creates industries, employments, markets and other economic situations for which the peace-world normally has no demand. The abnormal situations created by the war-economy are the legacies against which the post-war planners are required to carry on an economic war.

One of the strategies in the post-war planning of economic wars against depression caused by demobilization, disinflation and deflation is the diversion of some of the war industries to peaceful fields. The change of business directions involved in the partial conversion of war-economy into peace-time economy, furnishes a silver lining in this gloomy cloud. The mechanical and chemical inventions as well as scientific discoveries of the war period bid fair to be translated into the permanent realities of the post-war economic pattern. The role of these inventions and discoveries is bound to loom large in the economics of demobilization.

New Technocratic and Industrial Revolution

So far as economic India is concerned, the most pertinent questions are: Where are Indian inventions and Indian discoveries? How many mechanical, electrical, chemical and other patents of substantial importance have been taken out by Indian engineers, businessmen and industrial concerns since September 1939? Allied questions, therefore, are as follows: How many and which of the war-industries functioning within Indian boundaries are in Indian hands? Where are they located? What percentage of these war-industries is utilizing the latest inventions and discoveries? And how many of them are going to be kept up in order to cater to the consumption as well as production needs of the Indian people in post-war years? Perhaps the statistical data as well as regional and organizational details about the contemporary war-industrialization are war secrets.

In regard to such questions there is no vagueness about the answers so far as England and the U.S.A. are concerned. A new technocratic and industrial revolution has been going on in British and American economies. Anglo-American inventions and discoveries are plentiful as blackberries. And the workshops and factories which utilize them in the U.K. and the U.S.A. are in the hands of natives of those countries. Nor is this all. Both British and American industrial concerns are already armed *cap-à-pie* to conquer the markets of the backward and laggard regions with their products as soon as demobilization starts. India like China is one of these backwards and laggards waiting to be dumped upon by these forwards and go-aheads.

India's Two Economic Wars

Economic India during the period of demobilization will therefore have two serious wars to fight. First, there is the war which every country has to fight against unemployment, retrenchment, failures, bankruptcies, famine, diseases, malnutrition, premature death etc. in the years of post-war depression. The second war is the war of self-preservation against the goods,—both consumption goods and capital goods,—with which the new technocracy and the new industrial revolution of Anglo-American business concerns are up to flood the Indian towns and villages.

Indian industries capable of manufacturing capital or production goods (machineries, tools and implements, heavy chemicals etc.) are hardly to be listed in the inventory of organized business under Indian management. Anglo-American capital goods are expecting therefore a plain sailing on the Indian sub-continent. As for the elementary and primitive consumption goods manufactured by our *Swadeshi* houses during the war time, they have but to be fore-armed or at any rate fore-warned against a veritable catastrophe.

This is no time for glib talks about post-war paradise in India such as have become commonplace among war-profiteers and war-politicians. Nor do the present prospects furnish an occasion for unthinking optimism among Indian bankers and industrialists. Neither the sterling balance stored somewhere in the warehouses of England nor the accumulating capital-reserve-deposits within the coffers of banks in India can be depended upon as solid enough. Shrewd businessmen cannot afford to cultivate blindness to the fundamental realities of demobilization.

The husbanding of resources in every form and every line should

appear to be the first item in the new war-preparedness of India for her agriculture, manufacture and commerce. The second item,—and this as important as the first,—is the investment of resources in the training of personnel of all grades and all denominations. The establishment of institutions for experiments, investigations and researches, as well as the trying out of new machines, tools, implements, methods and processes should naturally be a third item of supreme value in the remaking of India's education and business activity.

A Realistic Plan vis-à-vis Post-war Economy²

A Plan for Economic Reconstruction in Post-War India has been issued by some industrialists of Bombay (January, 1944). It is always useful to discuss the far-off divine events. But as in every other country, belligerent or neutral, in India also post-war reconstruction will have to attend to the problems of famine, epidemics, business failures, and unemployment. The immediate economic requirements of India tomorrow will have to be met, no matter what be the ultimate goal. Post-War economy is essentially the economy of a demobilization. The fundamental problem is to decide as to how much of the war time state controls in industry, trade, currency and agriculture, as well as employment, prices and wages ought to be maintained in order that demobilization may be prevented from producing its worst effects. Reconstruction problems before India are bound to be in the main of the same order as those before other countries.

In the present conditions of underdevelopment the temptation to indulge in comprehensive schemes and fundamental principles of planned industrialization is bound to be great. For the time being let us combat that temptation in a deliberate manner. Since 1907 the present author has been issuing schemes, plans or creeds for theorists and public workers. Some of the most pressing needs of India in the immediate future which have been discussed in one or other of those creeds are being enumerated below. The object is to suggest a few channels along which the demobilized resources in finance and personnel may be utilized.

The plan, designed as it is for all the provinces of India, comprises the following items:

² B.K. Sarkar: "Economic India Tomorrow" (*Prabuddha Bharata*, Calcutta, June 1945)

A. Techno-Industrial

1. Electrification of every municipal area,—in order that, among other things, cheap power may be conveniently rendered available to small and medium industries. (The municipalities of India are approximately 1,000 in number).

2. Construction of roads, inter-district and intra-district, with a view, among other things, to facilitate the marketing of agricultural goods. The poverty of Bengal, especially of East-Bengal and Assam, in roads is notorious. Motor roads between Dibrugarh and Chandpur on the one hand and Sadiya and Chittagong on the other have long been overdue. Perhaps some of them are already under construction as military necessities.

3. Erection of shipyards and equipments of harbours at diverse maritime centres and river-mouths. Narayanganj (Dacca) and Chandpur (Comilla), for instance, may be singled out as first-class sites or seaports in East Bengal no less worthwhile than Calcutta.

B. The Standard of Living of Peasants, Workmen and Clerks

1. Allocation of special funds (of large size) such as may be rendered available to individual cultivators through co-operative societies at convenient rates of interest.

2. Introduction of compulsory social insurance among workingmen and other employees with adequate state grants. (A Bill is in preparation).

The standard of living and efficiency of the masses in villages and towns is likely to be raised in a special manner by the above two measures.

C. Socio-Economic

1. Training and employment of women in health and other social services at the rate of one per each union board. (The number of union boards is about 5,000 in Bengal).

2. Intensified campaign (large scale pumping, land-reclamation, training of rivers, irrigation etc.) for the eradication of malaria, district by district.

3. Enactment of consolidated Public Health Act. (A Public Health Act has already been passed in Madras in 1939).

This may be regarded as the irreducible minimum of techno-industrial and socio-economic planning during the period of "reconstruction" in the narrow sense, say, five years from the end of the war. A large part of the personnel, technocratically educated and disciplined during World-War II, is likely to be absorbed through road-making, electrification, port construction, river-engineering, anti-erosion and allied industrial projects. An avenue may then be found for taking charge of large numbers that are bound to be thrown on the unemployed list as soon as demobilization commences.

For an outsider who is not in the know as to the exact kinds of industries that the war-economy has brought into life or expansion it is not possible to say how many of them ought to be maintained and under what patterns. The re-distribution of workingmen and clerks also among new workshops and business concerns can likewise be suggested only by persons acquainted with the activities of the war supply and other offices.

Of course this prescription, modest as it is, cannot be expected to bring the Indian infant mortality down to the Anglo-American level or raise the expectation of life up to the German level in seven or ten years, as reconstruction planners would wish. Nor can the national income *per capita* be possibly augmented hundred per cent in a quinquennium or so as a result of the carrying out of the simple scheme of eight items formulated here. It would be but crying for the moon if on the strength of these recommendations India were to emulate within a decade or so the figures exhibited in *Japanese Trade and Industry* by the Mitsubishi Economic Research Bureau (London, 1936) or *National Income in Japan* (Japanese Economic Federation, Tokyo, 1939). No economic millennium is in contemplation. And as for the federated world-state of human brotherhood and inter-racial amity, this humble plan is the furthest removed from that consummation.

It is superfluous to observe that the plan put forward in this modest fashion would appear too elementary and primitive by the side of the programme suggested for England in *The Condition of Britain* (London 1937), by G.D.H. and M.I. Cole. That work, of course, deals with pre-war conditions and formulates fundamental policies. Nor is it possible to encounter here the planifications attempted in Turkey under Kemal Atatürk since 1923 and especially since 1934, the year of her first five year plan. It is from a hated condition of *semi-colonies* prevailing during the previous half-century

that Turkey has been emancipated by comprehensive state intervention in the domain of agriculture as well as by state aids to industry, as one understands from Conker and Witmeur's *Redressement économique et Industrialisation de la nouvelle Turquie* (Paris, 1937, pp. 41-54, 123-153, 174-239).

The Adversity Milieu of Dominion India

The analysis of the demobilization or post-war adversity as furnished above in April 1945 seemed pessimistic to the general run of Indian economists and publicists. People enamoured of economic planning at the Government, National Congress and other high levels had their imaginations and idealisms keyed up to the development of earthly paradises in India with the cessation of the war. The realistic approach of the present author has, however, been verified by the actual facts of economic India since 1945. Dominion India (estd. 15 August 1947) is functioning in the *milieu* of demobilization adversity.

"In the sphere of industries particularly, the Government was faced with a situation in which collapse of production seemed imminent", says the Principal Information Officer, Government of India in *Indian Information* (August 15, 1948, New Delhi, Independence Number). He says further: "This state of affairs had in itself contrasted grimly with the expectations of the early post-war planners and more so with the dreams of the National Government, for the latter had set out to realize the ends of political freedom in terms of economic betterment. In face of industrial production slowing down rapidly, the plans, Panel reports and the various positive ideological affirmations of the period appeared rather unreal."

Some of the verifications of the present writer's position of 1945 in post-1945 years are being detailed in the statement that follows.

The pre-war, war-time and post-war trends in the output of cotton piecegoods (in million yards) may be seen below:³

I. Pre-war: average of 1936-37, 1937-38 and 1938-39	...	3,975
II. War:		
1939-40	...	4,013
1940-41	...	4,269
1941-42	...	4,494
1942-43	...	4,109
1943-44	...	4,871
1944-45	...	4,726

³ *Monthly Survey of Business Conditions in India September 1947* (Delhi March 1948), p. 231; *Indian Information*, August 15, 1948* ("India's Industrial Future"). p. 106.

The war-average was 4,414,000,000 yds.

III. Post-war				
1945-46	4,676
1946-47	3,925
1947-48	3,775

The post-war average was 4,125,000,000 yds.

It is the custom to describe the peak of the war-period as "production capacity" (corresponding to "full employment" as the highest employment during the war-effort). In that case the fall from 4,871 million yards in 1943-44 to 3,775 million yards in 1947-48, which is lower even than the pre-war 3,975 million yards, is a verification of diminished output during demobilization.

In regard to the output of sugar (in '000 cwts) we have the following table:

I. Pre-war : average of 1936-37, 1937-38 and 1938-39	...	18,481
II. War		
1939-40	...	25,841
1940-41	...	23,149
1941-42	...	15,902
1942-43	...	21,714
1943-44	...	22,439
1944-45	...	21,637

The war average was 20,114,000 cwts.

III. Post-war			
1945-46	16,931
1946-47	18,400
1947-48	19,000

The post-war average is 18,110,000 cwts.

The decline from the so-called full capacity of 25,841,000 cwts in 1939-40 to 19,000,000 cwts in 1947-48 is noteworthy. The post-war average of 18,110,000 cwts is much below the war-average of 20,114,000 cwts and indeed lower than the pre-war average of 18,481,000 cwts.

The story of the output of steel (in '000 tons) is as follows:

I. Pre-war : average of 1936-37, 1937-38 and 1938-39	...	0,833
II. War		
1939-40	...	1,063
1940-41	...	1,244
1941-42	...	1,369
1942-43	...	1,253
1943-44	...	1,353
1944-45	...	1,268

The war average was 1,259,000 tons.

III. Post-war

1945-46	1,338
1946-47	1,190
1947-48	1,210

The post-war average is 1,246,000 tons.

The decline from 1,353,000 tons of 1943-44 to 1,210,000 tons in 1947-48 is obvious.

The output of paper (in '000 cwts) exhibits the following trends during the same three periods:

I. Pre-war: average of 1936-37, 1937-38, 1938-39 ... 1,077

II War

1939-40	1,416
1940-41	1,753
1941-42	1,871
1942-43	1,821
1943-44	1,939
1944-45	2,001

The war average was 1,800,000 cwts.

III. Post-war

1945-46	1,682
1946-47	1,740
1947-48	1,560

The post-war average is 1,660,000 cwts.

Obviously the decline from the "full capacity" of 2,001,000 cwts in 1944-45 to 1,560,000 cwts. in 1947-48 is catastrophic.

*Industrial Disputes, High Prices
and Low Wages Since 1945*

In August 1947 when the Dominion Status was established in India there were 158 industrial disputes going on involving 106,000 workers and 635,000 man-days lost. And in September the corresponding figures were 162,293,000 and 1,685,000. This situation has to be envisaged in the background of 39 disputes, 34,000 workers involved and 410,000 man-days lost per month in 1939.

This is an aspect of post-war economic adversity to which attention has to be drawn.

Industrial disputes exhibit the following evolution from 1939 to September 1947⁴:

⁴ *Indian Trade Bulletin for 1947* (Delhi), p. 122

Year	Disputes	Workers involved	Man-days Lost
War-Period			
1939	406	409,000	4,923,000
Monthly Average	34	34,000	410,000
1943	716	525,000	2,342,000
Monthly Average	60	44,000	195,000
1945	820	748,000	4,055,000
Monthly Average	69	62,000	338,000

II. Post-War Period

1946	1629	1,962,000	12,318,003
Monthly Average	136	164,000	1,026,000
1947 January ⁵	186	125,000	1,311,000
„ February	171	131,000	1,055,000
„ March	230	250,000	1,807,000
„ April	216	253,000	2,190,000
„ May	194	138,000	1,723,000
„ June	219	168,000	1,512,000
„ July	167	153,000	962,000
„ August	158	106,000	635,090
„ September	162	293,000	1,685,000

In 1939 the monthly average of industrial disputes was 34. During the war period it was steadily rising. Since the end of the war in 1945 it has never been lower than 69. The actual number was 230 in March 1947. The monthly average of workers involved rose from 34,000 in 1939 to 62,000 in 1945. In post-war years the actual number rose as high as 293,000 in September 1947. In the number of man-days lost the monthly average was 410,000 in 1939. In 1946 it was 1,026,000. In 1947 the actual number was as high as 2,190,000 in April.

Industrial disputes are not always due to wage-considerations. But it is none the less worth while to place the disputes of the post-war period in the *milieu* of prices and wages. To begin with the price-level. The evolution of the index numbers of prices in India (war-time and post-war) is indicated below in two columns,⁶ general index and cost of living (Bombay) index (August 1939=100):

⁵ *Monthly Survey of Business Conditions in India, September, 1947* (Delhi, March 1948), p. 220.

⁶ *Report on Currency and Finance 1947-48* (Bombay 1948), p. 126

Period	General Index	Cost of Living Index
I. War		
1939-40	125.6	105
1940-41	114.8	109
1941-42	137.0	122
1942-43	171.0	166
1943-44	236.5	226
1944-45	244.2	225
II. Post-War		
1945-46	244.9	228
1946-47	275.4	252
1947-48	307.0	268

The general index and the cost of living index (Bombay) exhibit a post-war increment of 245-307 and 228-268 *vis-à-vis* August 1939 as 100. This is a phenomenally high price-level.

We are not interested in the analysis of causes for the time being. But it may not be unreasonable to suspect a causal relation between such high prices and industrial disputes. Be this as it may, the wage-rates⁷ should now be inquired into in order to get a somewhat fuller account of the socio-economic ecology. Regrettably enough, no wage-statistics of local, provincial or All-Indian validity are available. The actual earnings of industrial workers in coin and kind remain to be unearthed virtually by factory to factory as well as region to region investigation. We shall attempt a somewhat rough estimate with regard to workers in the jute industry.

Among the jute mill hands of Calcutta and the neighbouring industrial region (covering some 284,000 employees) the monthly basic rates were said to be more or less as follows during 1939:⁸

Categories	Monthly Wage (Rs.)
1. Sweepers, card-receivers etc. ...	14 0 0
2. Coolies, lappers, feeders etc. ...	15 0 0
3. Jute-cutters, calender-feeders, spinning shifters, etc. ...	17 0 0
4. Twisters, listmen, selectors, etc. ...	18 8 0
5. Warp-spinners, ravers, etc. ...	20 0 0
6. Spinners ...	23 0 0
7. Beamers ...	26 8 0

7 For some of the more or less traditional wage-rates in different industrial centres of India see B. K. Sarkar: *Social Insurance Legislation and Statistics* (Calcutta 1936).

8 Anil Chattopadhyay: "Wages and Standard of Living of Jute Workers in Bengal" (*Calcutta Review*, June 1948). See in this connection the *Report on the Activities of the Labour Department Government of West Bengal*, Vol. I. January to April 1948 (Calcutta 1948).

The rates are obviously much too low. The Pay Commission instituted by the Government of India has recommended in 1947 the minimum monthly basic wage for unskilled workers as Rs. 30. But the recommendation has hardly anywhere been adequately implemented in any industry.

In the case of the jute workers, however, the monthly dearness allowance (comprising cash and certain rationed foodstuffs) has been Rs. 25-0-0 since 1947. The dearness allowance was introduced in 1941. It was only Re. 0-4-0 per month at the start.

The monthly basic rates of Rs. 14 to Rs. 26-8-0 have been steady, it should appear, for nearly a decade or so. In 1939 a 10 per cent increment had been offered, but it was nothing but the restoration of a previous wage-cut.

The monthly wage-scale (basic+d.a.) may then be exhibited as follows:

1939	1948	Index (1939=100)
1. 14	39	279
2. 15	40	267
3. 17	42	249
4. 18-8-0	43-8-0	233
5. 20-0-0	45-0-0	225
6. 23-0-0	48-0-0	209
7. 26-8-0	51-8-0	193

The wage-index may be taken to have risen up to 267 and 279 in the lowest categories. In the higher categories it is 209 and 193. Be it noted that it is only during the last few months (1947) that the improvement has been effected. And yet the increment falls short of the increment in the cost of living. For, the cost of living index during April 1947—March 1948 was 268 (with August 1939 as 100). The discontent among industrial workers and the consequent hitch in employer-employee relations may then be attributed in some measure to the lags in the wage-rates *visà-vis* the cost of living index.

In any case it is objectively demonstrated that post-war economy in India (as elsewhere) is an economy of adversity. It is in the *milieu* of demobilization adversity that Dominion India has made its *début*.⁹

The entire legislation relating to labour in India may be seen conveniently in Sailen Bose: *Indian Labour Code* (Calcutta 1948).

⁹ See *World Economic Conditions*, the April 1948 number of *International Conciliation* (New York) pp. 157-161, 240-245.

The conditions, primitive as they are, may be contrasted with those prevailing in the advanced countries of Eur-America. The paper on "From Social Insurance to Social Security: Evolution in France" by Pierre Laroque in the *International Labour Review* (Geneva) for June 1948 may be referred to.

World-Poverty in Food and Industry

The post-war poverty of the world in food supply is indicated by the low index of 1947 *visàvis* 1935-30 as 100. The picture is as follows:

Items	Index	Items	Index
Wheat and Rye	96	Sugar	92
Rice	93	Meat	93
Coarse Grains	97	Dairy Products	87
Fats and oils	88	Potatoes	93
Total	...	93	

The index has come down to 93. But in the mean time the world-population has increased by over 175 millions. The population index is nearly 110. Naturally, therefore, *International Conciliation* (Carnegie Endowment, New York, for April 1948), summarising the Reports of the U.N. has to observe that "food shortages have become a chronic feature of the post-war period."¹⁰

In the *Revue Politique et Parlementaire* of Paris (July, 1948) Hubert d'Herouville maintains that the world-output in industrial sectors during 1948 is insignificant *visàvis* 1937 when one envisages at the same time the relative growth in population.

The indices of industrial production and of population growth in the first quarter of 1948 (both with 1937 as 100) for sixteen countries are tabulated below:

West Europe		Industrial Index	Population Index
1. Norway	...	126	109
2. Sweden	...	110	107
3. France	...	110	99
4. U.K.	...	109	105
5. Belgium	...	93	100
6. Holland	...	103	112
7. Austria	...	83	103
8. Germany (Bizonia)	...	46	110

¹⁰ *Salient Features of the World-Economic Situation 1946-47* (La Succese, New York, January 1948).

East Europe		Industrial Index	Population Index
1. Poland	...	141	70
2. Bulgaria	...	149	113
3. Finland	...	95	107
Other Parts of the World			
1. U.S.A.	...	167	112
2- Canada	...	167	114
3. Chile	...	156	121
4. Mexico	...	128	124
5. Japan	...	28	110

The industrial index is higher than the population index in Norway, Sweden, France, U.K., Poland, Bulgaria, U.S.A. Canada, Chile, and Mexico. It is lower in Belgium, Holland, Austria, Germany, Finland and Japan. The extraordinarily high figure of Poland is due to the annexation of large industrial territories of Germany, namely, Silesia.

From this standpoint the average loses its importance when so many as sixteen countries are considered. In case the entire world including Asia and Africa is brought into the picture the increment in industrial production becomes hardly palpable. Post-war world recovery or post-war world-prosperity is questionable even in April 1948. In so far as a country like Poland has 70 as population index and Mexico 124 "is it not evident", asks d' Herouville, "that the sole consideration of the index of industrial production loses in comparative economics a great part of its apparent significance? We must not lose the human realities out of sight."

The industrial prosperity of the U.S.A. and Canada must not blind one to the low index *per capita* of many of the remaining parts of the world. It is the uneasiness and restriction of penury to which the world in its entirety has come to submit.

India, December 1948

Apart from the general conditions of depression indicated above, the Indian business situation at December 1948- may be exhibited synoptically as follows.

1948 has been a rather unfortunate year for India from the standpoint of investments. There has been a tendency for capital to be scared

away from the arena of business enterprise. The flight of capital cannot certainly be helpful to employment-seekers in the near future. The Government policy or measures about dividends, nationalization, profit-sharing and so forth have not been as wholesome as the sponsors may have wished.

Food shortage has constituted the permanent background of business activities. Self-sufficiency in food is not yet a question of practical politics. The development of agriculture is bound to claim the top priority in all commercial circles.

The cotton and jute mills of India have been divorced to a large extent from their raw materials, cotton and jute respectively. The separation, consummated as it is by constitutional law, has been working detrimentally to both the partners, India as well as Pakistan, so far as the household economies are concerned. Effective remedies have yet to be sought.

For all practical purposes the share market has been at standstill. The quickening of enterprise has yet to come. Companies floated have had still births on account of the paucity of share-seekers. In Calcutta the situation of banking institutions, especially those under Bengali management, has been prejudicially affected by rumours and rumour-mongers such as might perhaps have been controlled by legitimate means on the part of the powers that be.

India is not going to command more than £40 million of her sterling assets per year during the next three years. This sets the limit to her purchases of tools, implements and other capital goods from Eur-America. The supply is too inadequate for our requirements. Nothing can be more unfavourable to her industrialization projects than the fundamental handicap as embodied in this inadequate supply of machineries from abroad.

The Insurance Companies of India have been experiencing enormous difficulties. Pakistan's measures requiring the assets of non-Pakistan companies to be invested in unduly large proportions in Pakistan values are not helpful to India's insurance enterprises. This is another field in which the partition has been seriously curtailing the economic progress of the people.

The problem of tariff barriers between India and Pakistan remains yet to be settled satisfactorily for both sides.

Workingmen, both manual and intellectual, have been taught in recent years to bestow undue respect on the words and phrases used by the publicists of particular categories in some of the ad-

vanced countries of the world. But so far as India is concerned, they remain yet to be taught the elementary principles of business organization, the methods of costing and accounting, as well as the formation of prices. Absence of adequate familiarity with the technical processes involved in production is a shortcoming of our labour leaders and their clients. The ways and means to achievement of success in industrial and other concerns have not been studied by them carefully. The workmen and their leaders have therefore considered it worthwhile to undertake measures such as can but spell disaster to themselves as to the entire country. India has been passing through a tremendous anti-social movement. Employees and their friends should make it a point to understand the problems of industrial management in a more reasonable and realistic manner.

Altogether, the conditions of finance, employment and industrial relation in India at the end of 1948 reveal some of the economic features associated with the demobilization, relative and partial or absolute and total, as involved in a post-war economy.

Cheap Money, Commercial Policy and Indo-Pakistan Economic Relations*

An encyclopaedia has already been said about the economics of cheap money as well as hard money. I shall ask only one simple question, namely, Can cheap money by itself promote the expansion of industry in India at the present moment, i.e., to-day, to-morrow and day after to-morrow? I am not discussing the theoretical implications of easy money or the low rate of interest as a proposition of universal economics. It is to me a practical question for present-day India. And by "day after to-morrow" I am visualizing a period up to the outbreak of World-War III. By that time new economic and financial situations will have arisen and the question of cheap or hard money will have another significance. For the present my answer to my question is an emphatic No. Cheap money to-day cannot inevitably be a factor in the expansion of Indian industries.

To-day, at the end of World-War II, it is not the absence of cheap money that is militating against the expansion of industries in India. I wish to place the money factor in the perspective of two

* Observations at the 30th Session of the All-India Economic Conference at Calcutta on 22-24 December 1947.

other factors. The first is the restriction of imports by the Government of India. The second is the restriction of sterling, which is virtually the same thing as the control or limitation of dollar-supply. The restriction of money in India for business purposes,—i.e. the establishment of a relatively hard money,—would just be in keeping with the two other restrictions. All these restrictions constitute one economic complex. It is interesting that these three controls or restrictions are but virtues of a necessity. And why? Because there is hardly any market in which these moneys, cheap or hard, can be profitably utilized.

It is chiefly on one condition that industries can be started, repaired or expanded in India. This is the supply of production goods, the instruments of production, machineries, tools and implements, *Produktionsmittel*, capital goods. And where are these goods available? Not here and there and everywhere. As a rule, the suppliers of these goods are the small countries like Belgium, Switzerland and Czechoslovakia, and the great countries like England, Germany and the U.S.A. We in India have not yet been able to visualize the fact that with the exception of Switzerland and the U.S.A. the other supply-markets are considerably devastated and thoroughly handicapped. For all practical purposes Central Europe (Germany) does not exist as a creative industrial agent of the world-economy. Several hundred plants and factories of Germany are going to be dismantled by England, France and the U.S.A. as reparations. These are then to be retailed throughout the demand-markets.

The annihilation of Germany as a self-determined industrial and commercial factor is one of the profoundest causes of the world's poverty to-day in the two Hemispheres. This negative item is the greatest single consideration in the world economy at the present moment.

India is not the only demand-market for capital goods. There is China, there is Iran, there is Siam, there is Burma, there is Pakistan, there is Indonesia, and so on. Entire Asia wants to get industrialized and is ready to pay. In a sense the whole world from China to Peru is depending to-day on the Anglo-American resources for the supply of the machineries, tools and implements for industrialization. It is the problem of the victor nations, first, to repair themselves and then get the whole of Europe repaired, and finally to help forward the industrialization of Asia, Africa and Latin America. All the three items are likely to proceed simultaneously.

It is not possible for the U.K. and/or the U.S.A. to supply capital goods to India alone, or China alone, or Peru alone. Each of these markets has got to be satisfied to a certain extent and at the same time. And yet the supply of machineries in the production countries as well as in Anglo-American Germany is as small as conceivable.

Indian businessmen who have travelled in England or the U.S.A. with Rupees, Pounds or Dollars jingling in their pockets have found that British and American industrialists or commercial agents are willing to accept and are actually booking orders from India. But the delivery of goods may take 3-5-7 years, when it is a question of heavy and really expensive outfit. It is impossible, then, to start or expand industries in India on a substantial scale within a few years. The pious wish of Indian statesmen, economic planners or industrial magnates to industrialize the country overnight and at break-neck speed is automatically demolished by the sheer absence or limitation of supply in the matter of *Produktionsmittel*. The question of cheap or hard money should then appear to be considerably irrelevant in the present conjuncture.¹

Commercial Policy

The theory of international trade is similar to and almost identical with the theory of marriage as an interhuman relation. Marriage is a contract, a commerce, a relation of positive law between man and woman. And theoretically every man can think of every woman in the world as his prospective wife, and every woman of every man as her prospective husband. In the American poet Walt Whitman's *Leaves of Grass* the man can say, therefore, "A woman waits for me", as also the woman can say: "A man waits for me". The choice is world-wide. The love-contracts of every human being can be as extensive as humanity itself. In pure theory every man as well as every woman is pluralistic in choice of sex *camaraderie*, i.e., multilateral. Multilateralism may be taken to be the most normal or natural system in the traffic between men and women.

And yet in the interhuman relations of the world since the most archaic and anthropologically primitive times until to-day we

¹ See the papers on cheap money by M. H. Vaswani (Karachi), B. S. Rao (Bezwada), V. G. Sahasrabudhe (Dharwar), V. M. Paranjpe (Poona), H. K. Misra (Sambalpur), B. Dhar (Calcutta), M. Sitaramayya (Bezwada), and S. S. N. Simha (Bombay) in the *Indian Journal of Economics* (Allahabad) for July 1947.

find controls, limitations, restrictions. The sex-contacts have proceeded along certain definite, well-regulated channels. Factually the marriages take place not at one's sweet will but within groups, castes, sects, denominations, nay, families. The field for choice is extremely limited. Our distinguished visitor, Dr. Victor Purcell of UNO (Lake Success) is a Briton. He will be able to tell us as to whether men and women in England are really multilateral in matrimonial contracts or in the last analysis just unilateral (or bilateral), i.e., more or less monistic and circumscribed within well-defined boundaries. We have among us this morning Monsieur Claude Journot, Cultural Attaché to the French Embassy. He will also have to admit that in the marriage relations of France men and women are ultimately more or less monistic, i. e. unilateral (or bilateral). The world of matrimonial realities is not governed by romantic pluralism but by what may be called restrictionism of the monistic type, of which the extreme is to be seen in the theory of marriage in the orthodox Hindu system.

Perhaps we should say that everybody is free, multilateral and pluralistic in theory but more or less restricted, unilateral and monistic in practice. It is modified unilateralism that rules the matrimonial world. This is very nearly the situation in the trade between nations. Factually the system is one of multilateralism modified and multiplied by doses of unilateralism or rather bilateralism.

This pattern is exhibited in the reality of international trade in every democratic country of the liberal type, e.g. the U.K., U.S.A., France. Nay, Soviet Russia with its closed Sovietic state-domination and autarchic Germany of the Hitlerite patent are likewise not exclusively unilateral or bilateral. The pattern of bilateralism, modified or multiplied by multilateralism, is to be seen even in those authoritarian states that have sought to be self-sufficient. *Der geschlossene Handelsstaat* (the Closed Commercial State) of Fichte's theory (1800) has never been known in economic history.

Commercial India like every other region wants to be multilateral in its dealings. The exports and imports between India and the rest of the world have indeed in the past been always multilateral. But let us examine the pattern somewhat intensively. Take Belgium, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Czechoslovakia, Switzerland and some other countries of Europe. Let us exclude Germany as a commercial non-entity of to-day. Is it possible for India to have dealings with

these industrial regions, great as they are although of small size, without the mediation of the U.K? No. British shipping, British banking and British marine insurance have by all means to be utilized in order that export-import transactions of these suppliers of machineries and other industrial goods with India can be consummated. India has perforce to be preferential or specially favourable to the U.K. as a sheer business proposition.

What about the U.S.A.? At the end of World War II we in India, as people elsewhere in Asia, have been enamoured of the U.S. as an eventual substitute for the U.K., in regard to the supply of the needs for our industrialization. In our demand for freedom in the choice of our commercial partners we are perpetually harping on the supply of dollars out of our sterling fund. It is almost a fetish with us to look to the U.S.A. as the liberator of commerce from the thralldom of British channels. But as a pure business proposition this demand or wish of India can hardly be realized in a substantial manner in the present state of world-economy. Without intervention of British commercial institutions it is well-nigh impossible for America to consummate our much longed-for multilateralism.

Until the end of World-War I (1914-18) the U.S. mercantile marine was hardly in evidence as carriers of Indian export-import commodities. Even for the U.S. goods India had to depend on British shipping to a considerable extent. What is the position of overseas or so-called exchange banks? Banking for foreign trade was very primitive in the U.S. down to the establishment of the Federal Reserve System in 1913. Even in 1919 not many banks in New York City outside the specialized institutions in Downtown quarters could find it convenient to make transactions with Asia. It is only during the period between the two wars, i. e., 1919-39 that American banking houses were functioning in Indian port-towns like Calcutta and Bombay. The business of Indian merchants with the U.S. has to depend very often on the British banking interest remaining friendly to the traders at the Indian as well as at the American ends.

The co-operation of shipping with banking interests is a pre-condition of foreign trade. Exporters of India are thoroughly well acquainted with the fact that in this regard the U.K. can hardly be dispensed with for quite a long time in regard to large business deals.

Let us now look to marine insurance. The role of marine insurance in overseas trade is a dominant consideration in business

success. American insurance companies are as yet of too little significance for the vast volume of India's foreign trade. It is chiefly with the help of British insurance companies that large scale business deals can be consummated.

Last but not least, there is the consideration of Indian business habits. Not any and every foreign merchant can easily and in a short time get used to the methods, practices and institutions of the Marwaris, Bhatias, Parsis, Momins, Saiyads, Bengalis, Chettis and others. British merchants have known by long experience that certain Indian merchants are dependable and trustworthy although they may happen to fail to observe the due date in regard to making a payment. French, Belgian, Swiss, Czechoslovak, American or other foreign merchants are not likely to take such a humane and practical view, because they have not had enough time to get acculturated to Indian conditions, Indian character and Indian personalities. Naturally, therefore, British business houses can offer Indian merchants better facilities, more convenient terms and much more satisfactory accommodation than other foreigners.

It is not for love that Indians have been factually offering a more "favoured nation treatment" to British commerce,—even when there is no legalized agreement to that effect. For Indian merchants it is often a more paying proposition to deal with the U.K. than with the rest of the world. And yet there is no hostility or indifference to the latter. For India the bilateralism (of factual preferential treatment of the U.K.) has been and will continue for a long time to be the bed-rock of commercial policy within the framework of a general multilateralism.²

Indo-Pakistan Economic Relations

It has been suggested to me by a Sindhi delegate of Karachi who comes from New Delhi that in connection with the commercial and economic relations between India and Pakistan I should develop my yesterday's (23 Dec.) thesis of marriage as a contractual business proposition. And I do it with pleasure.

To-day it is a question of divorce, which is a criminal breach of trust in sex relations. While dealing with "family disintegration"

² An aspect of the issues between bilateralism and multilateralism may be seen in the controversy between T. Balogh and G. I. A. Macdougall in "Britain's Foreign Trade Problem" (*Economic Journal*, London, March 1948).

and "broken homes," we come across American social experience which should be very interesting in the present context. Of the divorcés, male and female, nearly 40-45 per cent get remarried to each other. Some 45 per cent pine for each other the rest of their lives without getting a second partner, and very few marry the correspondents. It is indeed extremely difficult to get new partners.

We are all prophets, *Rishis* or seers into the future this morning. But I dare not foresee the political reunion of India and Pakistan. I should, however, like to suspect that it will be difficult for Pakistan as well as India to get new partners of intimate business relationship, such as may replace the political enemies of to-day.

Be this as it may, it is obvious that the ugly and sometimes beastly feelings awakened in the divorce courts by both parties disappear as a rule very soon after the divorce is consummated. The atmosphere of these courts is not eternal in the lives of the divorcés.

At the present moment pessimism prevails in the political atmosphere in regard to the relations between India and Pakistan. Certain economists are obsessed by this political pessimism and are inclined to inject this political pessimism in the economic domain. This, however, is an exclusively political interpretation of economic relations and is entirely monistic. It ought to be regarded as fallacious in the same sense and to the same extent as the Marxist economic determinism, i. e. interpretation of politics, history and culture by exclusively economic forces.

Facts of objective economic history as well as the theory of material prosperity and economic development should counsel us to be less pessimistic in our forecasts. Enmity between Pakistan and India is not the first enmity of world history. Nor is the partition of India into two states the first partition in history of a territory into several independent regions. The United States of America got separation from England. Did England become poorer by that secession? Did the U.S.A. lose economically and commercially because of this fact? Other instances are the separation of the Belgian regions from the French and the partition of the Netherlands into Holland and Belgium. Did such partitions spell the economic disaster of one or the other partner in each instance? Then there were the separations of Norway, Sweden and Denmark. In recent years the separation of Northern Ireland from Eire has been a conspicuous case. Last but not least was the pulverization of Austria-Hungary into six independent states, namely, the *Petite Entente*

(Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Roumania) as well as Poland, Hungary and Austria. Is there any economic statistics available to indicate that the national wealth of each one of these states was less than what it had been under the joint Austro-Hungarian Empire? Factually, the economic situation is not so pessimistic.

Take the international trade statistics of Central Europe before and after World-War I (1914-18). The export and import figures of the allies, France, Belgium, Italy and England in their trade with the ex-enemy, Germany, during the period, say 1925-35, were more or less similar to those during the ante-bellum period, say, 1903-13. The pattern of commercial relations between ex-enemies remained virtually the same in spite of the war. The war neurosis failed to affect appreciably the economic structure of post-war Europe, in spite of the presence of political prejudices and racial antagonisms. Comparative figures have been analyzed in my *Equations of World-Economy* (1943). Business conditions were not all determined by political rivalries and military memories. Pakistan and India are likely to exhibit more or less the same commercial relations within 3-5 years of the final settlement as, say, the corresponding areas during 1935-38, perhaps somewhat better.

Let us now consider the theory of material prosperity and economic progress. It has been suspected that Pakistan would try to crush India economically and *vice versa*. We are often asked to believe that the prosperity and *arthik unnati* (economic progress) of Pakistan can be raised on the graves of Indian finance and industry or that India can prosper at the cost of Pakistan. To cite one instance, let me ask a simple question: Can Karachi the port kill Bombay the port? Is it possible to develop a new port at Chittagong such as can annihilate the port of Calcutta? To suggest an eventuality like this is to betray an ignorance of the elements of port-economy. The port of Bombay does not owe its prosperity exclusively to the Maratha or Gujarati districts on the sea-coast. It is on the trade of entire south-west India, Central India, nay, a large part of Northern India that Bombay has depended for its activities. Calcutta is not a Gangetic delta port or a port of South Bengal or West Bengal in any significant sense. Nearly 50 per cent of the exports and imports of all Northern India pass through Calcutta. It is these extensive and vast hinterlands that account for the growth and development of Calcutta as well as of Bombay.

The prosperity of Marseilles does not depend exclusively on

Southern and Eastern France. It is conditioned by the prosperity of Switzerland and Germany as well. The Belgian ports are fed by Germany and France in a considerable measure. Without access to German business the ports of Holland would dwindle into insignificance. The Baltic and North Sea ports of Germany have likewise Poland and Czechoslovakia as feeders.

We should therefore suspect that it may not be possible for the port of Karachi to maintain the prosperity that she enjoys to-day in case it has to rest content with the little hinterland of Western Pakistan alone. In the interest of self-preservation Karachi will have to cultivate friendly business relations with large areas outside Pakistan, i.e., with all those regions which fed its traffic until August 1947. This is as much as saying that Western Pakistan is bound to remain a good business neighbour to Delhi and beyond, i.e., the Indian Dominion.

Similar considerations should lead us to believe that Chittagong cannot flourish as a port and cannot possibly grow into something of substantial importance in the Asian economy, if its hinterland happens to be just the jute and rice districts of East Bengal. If Chittagong is to build up its future as a port of considerable dimensions, it will have to grow into the outlet for Assam as well as Bihar and Upper India. And of course the rivalry of Chittagong cannot alone strangle the port of Calcutta, unless, unluckily enough, the geography of rivers renders the latter incapable of access to large ocean-liners in the near future. Altogether, Pakistan cannot function in economic isolation from India. The prosperity of Pakistan is integrally bound up with the prosperity of a friendly India.

Some Economic Fundamentals of the Indian Dominion in World-Economy

The Absurdities of Autarchy within India

It is curious that even in 1949 the Economic Programme Committee of the Indian National Congress has considered it worthwhile to place regional self-sufficiency as the economic goal before all and sundry in the Dominion of India. And this economic regionalism is to be not only provincial and districtwise but rural as well. It is further to be noted that food and clothing have been singled out as two special items for the exercise of the people's right to local self-sufficiency.

Evidently no demand could be more unreasonable and absurd. One of the most fundamental brass tags of the Indian Dominion economy is the extensive market rendered available to everybody on account of political unification and territorial consolidation.

For an extensive country like the Indian Union the principle of regional self-sufficiency would be the most objectionable item of its internal economic policy. The economic advantages of a large market and numerous markets are automatically assured to us on account of the political unification or federalization. These can but be counteracted and nullified by the wrong ideology of regional autarchy. The communications and transportation systems are getting more and more efficient and widespread. The prospects of cheap and quick mobilization of products, labour as well as finance, in response to the demands of diverse localities are already in evidence and bid fair to be more so. Under these circumstances rural autarchy, or district autarchy, nay, provincial autarchy would but spell economic *harakiri* for Indian producers and consumers. And of course it can be tantamount to wilfully cultivating a mediævally parochial economy in the *milieu* of modern economic paraphernalia.

Politics as well as the technique of communication have brought regions like Gujarat and West Bengal into one social organism. Regional self-sufficiency would prevent Bengalis from buying the cloth produced in Gujarat. It would even forbid the people of one district of West Bengal to import rice from another district!

In order to assure minimum prices and maximum supply at all market places the internal economic policy of a large territory like the Indian Dominion should be to help forward the free and unhampered mobilization of industrial goods and raw materials as well as finance and personnel by every possible means. In regard to certain products Bengal may conveniently afford to depend on Bombay just as Bombay can equally afford to depend on Bengal in regard to certain other goods. Generally speaking, the principle of free enterprise consistent with the techniques of the economically most paying production and distribution ought to be the guiding factor in industrial location throughout the Union of India. Every region should be placed in a position of being free enough to buy from and sell to other regions. The market for each kind of goods as well as finance and labour should be considered, theoretically, to be the whole of the Indian Union.

Dominion India is a single economic unit. And this is a

brass tag of the world economy. This unification of an extensive market in South Asia can be treated as a spur of immense magnitude to the exporters and importers of the two Hemispheres.

*Commercial Internationalism As A
World-Economic Reality*

The problem of regionalism in economics with special reference to autarchy *versus* international intercourse is nothing new or special to India.

From the Mohenjodarian, nay, pre-historic times for thousands of years down to the discovery of America and finally to the end of the eighteenth century, exports and imports between different countries of the world and even of the same continent were very little in quantity and variety and confined mostly to what might be called the luxuries of life. Both in East and West every country, sometimes every town with its rural suburbs and villages, was economically more or less self-sufficient. Autarchy was virtually an actual fact of the economic and material conditions prevailing among the diverse tribes, races or nations. This old-world millennium-long autarchy may be described as unconscious self-sufficiency.

International trade, as we understand it to-day, is barely a fact of not more than a century or a century and a half. Exports and imports between continents and between the Hemispheres have grown immensely since the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 and the Panama Canal in 1915. The commercial tendency of mankind has been moving towards the establishment of an "interdependence" of regions, states or peoples in the requirements of daily life. This hanging on one another—this mutual dependence—between the remotest nooks and corners of the globe is the "world-economy". It is a reality, a brass tag of contemporary men and women's material existence.

But during this same period the theory and policy of isolation, self-sufficiency and autarchy have been no less prominent than the fact of unconscious isolation and autarchy during the primitive, ancient and medieval epochs. Autarchic ideology was embodied, first, in the mercantilist concept of promoting exports with the object of importing gold. Secondly, it found shape in the protectionist tariff measures, e. g., of the British Corn-laws (since 1689) as well as in the anti-British fiscal policies of Napoleon, Hamilton, List and others in Eur-America. One of its latest forms is to be seen in the

Swadeshi (national) industrialisation movement of Bengal and other parts of India since 1905.

The autarchistic ideas associated with the *swadeshi* or national industry complex were the most prominent features in the tariff policy of every country, old and new, after World-war 1 (1914-18). Autarchy has been the ideology as much of the Gosplans in Soviet Russia since 1928 as of the non-Sovietic plans in other countries comprising the protective and preferential customs duties of the British Empire-economy and the French Colonial Empire. Some of the facts and ideologies may be seen in the present author's *Imperial Preference vis-à-vis World Economy* (Calcutta 1934).

The third phase of autarchy, which may really be described as continuation of the second, is to be seen in the Italian economy during and after the Abyssinian War (1936). Under the pressure of the "sanctions" or boycott exercised by the League of Nations Italy was compelled to develop her economic possibilities to the farthest limit. Another form of this new autarchistic ideology and policy was furnished by Hitler's Germany down to September 1939. Because of the high protective tariffs of the industrial nations, large, medium and small, which restricted the importation of German manufactured goods, Germany was forced, on account especially of currency and exchange considerations, to restrict the purchase or importation of foreign goods to the extent of her exports abroad. For instance, Germany could afford to buy more cotton from India in case India cared to buy more manufactured goods and machinery from Germany.

The new autarchy, as observed in Nazi Germany (1933-39), did not base itself specifically on protectionism and high tariffs. Nor of course did it seek the splendid isolation such as had been preached by the German philosopher, Fichte, in his *Der Geschlossene Handelsstaat* (Closed Commercial State) in 1800. It attempted, on the other hand, to foster foreign trade by all means, bilateral agreements, barter system, different kinds of currency, and what not.

Autarchy as an ideal or as a fact is then almost eternal, no matter in what form. But in spite of mercantilism, protective tariffs, boycott movements, preferential treatment, and restrictions on imports, virtually every country has imported more and more from foreign countries. The volume and value of exports and imports have been growing tremendously from decade to decade during the last four or five generations. "Interdependence", hanging on one another, mutual

dependence is an outstanding brass tag of the material pattern of mankind. Commercial internationalism and world-economy have not been killed by the *swadeshi* (national industry) movements of regions. In other words, autarchy as a socio-economic or economicopolitical fact has been becoming more and more of an impossibility under modern conditions.

The economic reason for this situation is not far to seek and indeed too simple and elementary to be missed. The values created by the trade between nations are quite substantial and are enjoyed by both the partners to the commercial transaction, although not always to the same extent. The mutuality of the benefits rendered and the furtherance of development of undeveloped areas are two of the greatest consequences of international trade. They are well calculated in future also to keep it going and to lead mankind further and further into the solidarities of world-economy.

The Bloc Autarchies of To-day

Since the end of World-War II (1939-45) hardly any country or theorist has ventured to harp on economic autarchy of the nationalist type. Economists and economic statesmen of today, orientated as they happen to be to the prospects of World-War III, try to envisage self-sufficiency not for their own fatherlands but for extensive regions known as "blocs" comprising a large number of territories. We are in the *milieu* of bloc autarchies, so to say. In a sense these bloc economies are but continuations to a certain extent of the *europäische Neuordnung* (European New Order) consummated by Hitler and the "co-prosperity sphere of East Asia" under Japanese command during World-War II. These blocs are real military alliances or politico-economic consolidations planned out as strategic groupings in preparation for the next war.

Instances are the Japanese economy functioning under the American command and integrated into the system of the U.S.A., and the German economies integrated either into the Russian organism or into the Anglo-American-French economies. Then there are the West-European politico-military and economico-financial concentration (Marshall Plan), and last but not least, the techno-economic and military-political Empire of Soviet Russia in Eastern Europe. Whatever these blocs of 1949 be, they are not autarchies of our traditional economic science or economic policy, although each has

economic implications and consequences on every constituent limb of the unifications or consolidations.

In the background of these bloc autarchies or economic expansions being consummated in Eur-Asia and Eur-America, the autarchistic ideologies or expressions indulged in by India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Indo-China, Siam, China, Iran, Afghanistan, Iraq, Egypt, or other countries of Asia and Africa should appear to be formal lip-service to sentimental nationalism without serious meaning attached to them. Under the pressure of political hatreds certain territories like India and Pakistan may once in a while shout from house-tops about boycotting each other and developing each its own self-sufficiency to the detriment and ruin of the other. Sometimes the newly established "free" regions of Asia may think aloud about their being capable of developing their resources without contact with their late Eur-American rulers.

But the economic brass tags are palpable in every region of Asia, western, southern, and eastern. They are poor in technical inventions and inventors. Their financial resources are limited. And so they are all dependent to a considerable extent on capital, technical experts, even *mistris* (skilled workmen), as well as *Produktionsmittel* (means to production, i. e. machineries, tools, implements, capital goods etc), nay, consumers' goods of superior qualities, imported from Eur-America. India's perpetual demand for sterling balances and dollar priorities can but mean one thing. In the Indian Dominion economy, factually speaking, there is no place for autarchy. It must buy capital goods from the U.K. and the U.S.¹

The economies of India, as well as Pakistan, Burma, Ceylon, Iran, Iraq, Egypt, Siam, Indo-China, Indonesia, and Japan are all integral parts of the Anglo-American economy today. In case the Soviet Russian regions of Eur-Asia become to-morrow free enough for intercourse with the rest of the world India, Pakistan, Burma and so forth will get integrated into the system of world-economy and not remain merely the limbs of the Anglo-American economy.

1 Some of the commercial data of India today may be seen in the chapters on the "planning of India's Foreign Trade" in *India's Leading Commercial Problems* (Published by A. N. Agarwala, Secretary All-India Commerce Association, Allahabad, 1948). See also B. N. Ganguli: *Reconstruction of India's Foreign Trade*, New Delhi, 1946)

India Integrated into the Anglo-American Economy

In 1946 the U. K. accounted for 38.4 per cent of India's total imports and the U. S. 17.7 per cent. India was thus dependent on Anglo-American goods to the extent of 56.1 per cent of her total imports. This is to be envisaged against 38.8 per cent (U. K. 31.4, U.S. 7.4.) of the pre-war year 1938.

Under American command the Japanese Trade Mission visited India for the first time after World-War II in May 1948. In 1938 Japan's share of India's imports had been 10.1 per cent, much above the U.S.A.'s 7.4 per cent. Indeed, the present American share of 17.7 per cent may be taken to be equivalent to the combined Japanese and American share of 1938. From the present position of zero, Japan is in for rising somewhat up to her pre-war percentage. But for quite a long time the Japanese exports and imports as well as industry, commerce, agriculture and finance will have to be operated as but subordinate limbs of America's world-economy. It is virtually through the U.S.A. that India as well as Pakistan will have to negotiate with Japan for transactions of substantial value.

Let us look to the German element in the world-economy. Since 1945 it is under British and American commands that the capital goods of Western Germany have been filtering through into India, Pakistan and the rest of the world. The utilization of sterling assets for German goods depends on the deals of India and Pakistan with the U.K. (and indirectly also with the U.S.). Very soon we may expect a German Trade Mission visiting India and Pakistan under Anglo-American command. It is only as an integral limb of the Anglo-American economy that non-Russian Germany can function in the world-economy for a number of years.

Altogether, then, both from the Japanese as well as the German sides the economic fundamentals of India as of Pakistan are integrated into the Anglo-American system.

The Keys to Material Prosperity

Dominion freedom is now being enjoyed by the men and women of India. Everybody feels therefore that economic prosperity and especially industrialization or technological progress may be expected overnight. This is another wrong and absurd idea which ought to be knocked out of the brains of Indian intellectuals and businessmen. Political freedom cannot automatically lead to material pros-

perity, or for that matter, industrial advance. In Eur-America Bulgaria, Greece, Portugal, Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia and dozens of other politically-free states are neither rich nor techno-industrially well-developed. In Asia also China, Iran, and Afghanistan tell the same tale. On the other hand, India was long a politically dependent country. And yet in spite of political slavery and during the epoch of subjection to a foreign power India was becoming richer, as objectively demonstrated by the index of consumption per head of population as well as by the slowly improving expectation of life. Advances in industrialization and technical progress,—although in slight doses,—could also be felt from decade to decade. Nay, the progress of India in the power of labour, in trade unions and in the workingmen's struggle for better living and efficiency was also a fact of India's economic and social expansion during the period of foreign domination. This, however, is no argument for the restoration of foreign subjection and political enslavement. It is simply necessary to admit that material prosperity and industrial progress, capitalistic growth and socialistic advance are not the functions exclusively of political liberty. Our countrymen will have to energize like giants and be up and doing in the economic sphere and in techno-industrial fields even in this era of political freedom of the Dominion pattern. A re-thinking along such lines is a desideratum among Indians of all groups.

While talking of industrial progress we should have to draw attention to an item which is generally overlooked by rich people, capitalists and employers. They are very often tempted to believe that capital alone creates wealth as well as technical achievements. Nothing is more absurd than this conception. People can carry on business for a certain period and also amass huge fortunes by importing machineries, tools and implements from foreign countries like England, Germany, U.S.A., Belgium, Switzerland, Czechoslovakia and so forth. But this sort of consumption of foreign machineries or capital goods will not carry India very far high on the industrial ladder. What is needed in India at the present moment is not mere consumption of machineries and chemicals imported from abroad but the production of *Produktionsmittel* (the means of production), i.e. of machineries and chemicals within Indian boundaries. And for this the *Rupaiyawallas* (Rupee magnates) will have to depend entirely on the brains of intellectual and manual workingmen. India must have to train researchers, discoverers and in-

ventors in order that she can compete with the great industrial powers and achieve genuine and solid techno-economic progress.

Institutes for industrial research, academies for scientific investigation, associations for the promotion of discoveries and inventions, and not merely schools and colleges of engineering and technology,—these are the requirements of the hour. Rupaityacracy—the capitalists, employers and wealthy people—will have to come down to the realities of economic prosperity and co-operate with the brain workers, the scientists, the engineers, nay, the *mistris*, some of whom are inventors, if India's industrialization is to be a substantial *fait accompli*.²

It is interesting in this context to read the controversy in the *Neue Zeitung* (Munich) of 8 February, 4 March and 8 April 1948 about the question of capital goods vs. consumption goods. Ludwig Erhard pleads for the transfer of business from "investments" to consumption under official command. "Does he believe", asks Rudolf Zorn, "that the production of foodstuffs, clothing, shoes, etc. can be increased by stopping or reducing the efficiency of such investment industries as coal, iron and steel, locomotives, railway repairs, fertilizers, etc?"

The Mistrification of Man-Power

Men who ten, fifteen or twenty years ago were mere speculants and came into possession of money by sheer luck, so to say, cannot be said to have developed within a short time the qualities of industrialists, administrators of industrial enterprises, and industrial statesmen. Industrial leadership is like every other leadership an essentially intellectual and moral, nay, spiritual phenomenon. Although it operates on materialistic, economic and worldly planes it is by nature anything but materialistic and worldly. The aptitudes, propensities and qualifications of real industrial leaders, like Krupp, Ford, Bata and so forth require experience and training such as do not come automatically to accidentally successful speculators and financial upstarts. The millionaires of the Indian business world are endowed more with the Stock Exchange or the speculative sense than with the techno-industrial mind. They are used

² See the section on the "Role of Inventions and Discoveries" in B. K. Sarkar: *The Equations of World-Economy* (Calcutta (1943), See also his *Education for Industrialization* (Calcutta 1946).

to looking upon every industrial concern as the target for just another speculation or financial risk-taking.

But it is the mentality, technical-mindedness, machine-sense and work-view of the *mistri* (hand worker or artisan), the foreman, the engineer, and the technical expert that constitute the fundamental basis of eventual leadership in genuine industrial enterprises. The foundation of Eur-America's great industrial magnates in England, Germany, U.S.A., France, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Switzerland etc. is the workshop and hand-work of the *mistri*. What we need urgently and systematically for the industrialization of India is the *mistrification* (training as *mistris*) of a large proportion of our *personnel* or man-power, both rich and poor.

This key to economic progress and material prosperity remains yet to be seriously understood by and assimilated to the bourgeois, capitalistic and financial world of India. The solid bases of industrial progress have hardly been laid in our country as yet. Indian publicists and patriots should have sense enough to realize this tremendous shortcoming of our people even in the epoch of Dominion freedom. This freedom cannot be invoked or utilized as a magical hocus-pocus in order to achieve any and every consummation. This is another line of re-thinking desirable among our countrymen at the present stage.

The Creation of Technocratic Tradition

The sons and relatives of the present generation of Indian industrial employers and financiers have not as a rule cared to master the technical and scientific aspects of factories, mines, and workshops. They behave but as the mere descendants of rich people, as automatic inheritors and successors of their ancestors' industrial properties. It is not because of technical talent or managerial capacity in industrial enterprises that these descendants become general managers and directors of industrial concerns. They have not cared to pick up the industrial virtues either from workingmen or from engineers and supervisors. Nor have they considered it worthwhile to master the techno-industrial sciences in schools, colleges or research institutes. If anything, they have learnt but to cultivate contempt for intellectuals, engineers, inventors, technical experts, and industrial workers. They believe that these intellectual and technical services can but be bought like potatoes and shoes with the help

of money. The scientists, inventors and other intellectuals are mere wage-earners in the mentality of the financial bourgeoisie.

In an atmosphere like this it is not possible to build up a technocratic tradition or industrial atmosphere. Indian industrialists of today possess the character, habit, mentality, and world-view generally speaking, of the feudal landed bourgeoisie. The transformation of such a medieval-minded financial oligarchy into a scientifically orientated technocratic brains trust or general staff is one of the greatest problems before Dominion India.

Financial Data of Dominion India

The Sterling Agreement and International Exchange

While explaining the Sterling Assets Agreement of July 1948 between India and the U.K., Finance Minister Chetty wants the world to believe that the "ghost of scaling down the sterling balances has been finally laid". This statement is more than can be accepted. No shrewd businessman is prepared to believe that cash realizable after 10, 15, 20 or 30 years is equal to cash in hand. In so far as the balances are not likely to be entirely recovered before half a generation or even one full generation, the world will understand that tremendous discounts or depreciations to be estimated at one's own discretion are foreseen. Liquidity preference is of course an individual and a subjective phenomenon. In any case the sterling balances appear, therefore, factually to have been already scaled down,—although not nominally so.

In the second place, the face value of sterling deposit is not secure and is really subject to the quicksands of international exchange. The devaluation of virtually every European currency is but a question not of months but of weeks. The European Recovery Plan of the U.S.A.'s Marshall Pattern has foreseen this consummation as almost an inevitable precondition or concomitant. For some time it may be expedient for the U.K. to maintain that the devaluation of sterling would not be a necessity. But the U.S.A. is likely to put pressure upon some of the E.R.P. countries, *e.g.*, Scandinavia, Benelux, France, Italy, Greece and Turkey, to devalue their currencies in order that the U.S. currency can function properly with a view to facilitating the export of American foodstuffs, cotton, coal and steel to themselves. It is in sympathy with and as a repercussion of these devaluations on the continent that the U.K.

will consider it in the long run expedient to keep company with them and maintain the tenor of her own exports.

We shall then come back virtually to the international financial situation of September 1931 which necessitated U.K.'s going off the gold standard as a measure for the protection of her trade balance. Competitive devaluation became a world necessity at that time in order that each country might maintain its exports in different markets of the two Hemispheres. There was a competition between the diverse exporting regions with the goal of delivering the goods to the importing countries at as cheap a price as possible. A world-competitive conjuncture similar to that is likely to be confronted by the U.K. in the near future as soon as the ball of devaluation is set rolling anywhere in Europe on account of the Marshall Plan pressure.

Incidentally it may be observed that with reference to the eventual American pressure for devaluation in Europe the German weekly, *Wirtschaftsrevue* (Economic Review) of Constance-Bodensee, remarks (29 May 1948): "It is only exporting countries that can be affected by this pressure. For Germany (*i.e.*, non-Russian Western Germany) the circumstances are different. The exchange rate fixed at RM=1.30 U.S. cents is actually prejudicial to exports from Germany. But this helps Germany to import cheaply from foreign countries. For some long time Germany is bound to have a passive balance of trade, *i.e.*, excess of imports over exports. Germany is, therefore, more interested in an exchange rate that is favourable to imports rather than to exports".

Evidently the U.K. is more interested in the opposite condition, *i.e.*, the excess of exports over imports. Just at present her exchange rate happens to be favourable to exports. In case the U.K.'s export-curve tends to decline, the International Monetary Fund will have to advise her to devalue her currency. And she will hardly consider it worth while to sit tight on her prestige. The impacts of the British export-situation from day to day are sure to affect the value of India's sterling deposit.

The rumours or whispers that were afloat in May about the devaluations of British and French currencies are not without significance according to the *Wirtschafts-revue*.

The devaluation of European currencies is indeed almost a first postulate in the thinking of the business world in Germany. In the section entitled *Aus dem Wirtschaftsleben* the commercial editors

of *Die Neue Zeitung* (Munich, 20 and 27 May) maintain that in the official circles of the U.S.A. the devaluation of the pound which at present is worth 4.03 dollars would *zu späterem Zeitpunkt zu Frage kommen* (come into question in future). It is also announced that the Directors of the E.R.P. and a group of American bankers while envisaging the 5,300,000,000 dollar expenditure on goods for the E.R.P. countries during 1948 "have been working out relevant and adequate methods for a devaluation of European currencies".

In the natural course of things Indian currency will have to jockey itself up to the *faits accomplis* in the international exchange rates and adopt adequate security measures.

The £40 M. Level of Industrial Finance

The implications of the Sterling Agreement on India's industrial prospects may now be analyzed. This agreement has placed only £80 million (Rs. 1,070,000,000) at the disposal of India down to June 1951. But it so happens that a sum of £80 million has been brought forward from the last year's account and is available as liquid capital for India's purchases of foreign goods during 1948-49. The total sum, then, available for the purchase of foreign (comprising chiefly British) goods during the next three years is indicated by £160 million (Rs. 2,140,000,000).

More realistically speaking, it has been pointed out from the U.K. side that not more than the sum of £40 million (Rs. 535,000,000) *p.a.* can virtually be released by her for India's purchases. The £40 million maximum ought, therefore, to be envisaged by India's industrialists, businessmen, economists and statesmen as the limit beyond which their effective demand for foreign goods (both producer as well as consumer) cannot function.

The composition of this sum may be analyzed as follows from the standpoint of the countries in which the purchases may be made by India:

(1) U.K.: £25 million.

(2) Other countries (Switzerland, France, Czechoslovakia, Belgium, Portugal, Anglo-American Germany, American Japan, the U.S.A., etc.): £15 million.

These are the brass tags of India's world-finance. During 1948-49 not more than £15 million (Rs. 200,000,000) worth of goods can be bought by India in all the non-British countries put

together. The so-called multilateral trade transactions of India are limited by this reality.

Under these conditions it is nothing but sheer folly or chasing the will-o'-the-wisp when Indian publicists and national planners cry hoarse over the alleged monumental sterling balances of the Reserve Bank of India deposited with the U.K. Treasury. Theoretically they amount to £1,160,000,000 (Rs. 15,470,000,000). After legitimate payments and other deductions of all sorts this astronomical figure should be brought down to the realistic level of £600 million (Rs. 8,000,000,000), as says Finance Minister Chetty quite correctly.

In connection with the industrialization of India during the next few years, the situation deserves further analysis with reference to the availability of liquid capital. The industrialization-complex of India as of Pakistan is dependent, in the last analysis, on the availability of *Produktionsmittel* (means of production i.e., machineries, tools, and implements, precision-instruments, scientific apparatuses, etc.) in foreign countries. India is not the sole foreign purchaser of such capital goods in these supply centres. Even supposing that they were willing to treat India as the sole customer her effective demand for 1948-49 is restricted to the sum of £40 million. It is upto the level of foreign *Produktionsmittel* worth £40 million that her industrialization can be consummated. In so far as industrialization is to be bought by the utilization of the sterling deposit, India should, therefore, envisage neither £1,160 million nor £600 million as her industrial capital. Economic *Realpolitik* counsels her to visualize the modest sum of £40 million. It is here that we encounter the fundamental financial bottle-neck of India's national economic planning.

Rupees Nine per Head as Annual Revenue

The solvency or otherwise of the public finance of India is not the chief consideration in regard to Indian economy. The most substantial fact about it is the tremendously small amount of revenue and expenditure per head of population. The extremely low indices of agricultural, industrial and commercial wealth produced by the people constitute the fundamental economic data of the two Dominions now known as India and Pakistan.

Between 1939 and 1946, the years of World War II, India's total revenue amounted to Rs. 15,000 million (in round figures) and

expenditure to Rs. 21,000 million (in round figures).¹ During the same period the total revenue of the United Kingdom amounted to £17,000 million and total expenditure to £33,000 million. The corresponding U.S. figures for the same period were \$182,000 million and \$397,000 million. The percentage of revenue to expenditure in India was 71, in the U.K. 52, and in the U.S.A. 46.

In 1946-47 the debt position of the Government of India (undivided) was embodied in the figure Rs. 24,000 million (being the total interest-bearing obligations including unfunded debt and deposits). This is to be seen in the perspective of the revenue for that year, namely, Rs. 3,600 million. For the U.K. the corresponding figures for the period were £26,000 million and £3,300 million. The U.S. figures were 260,000 million and \$40,000 million respectively.

In the U.K. the public debt was nearly 8 times while in the U.S.A. and India near about 7 times.

It should appear that in the formal logic of public finance India (undivided) presented proportions that were quite reasonable and decent by the Anglo-American standard.

But material logic enables us to visualize other conditions. It is the *per capita* values that are really meaningful. In 1946-47 the revenue per head of population was approximately Rs. 9 for India, £66 for the U.K., and \$286 for the U.S.A. In round figures the population is taken to be 400 millions for India, 50 millions for the U.K., and 140 millions for the U.S.A. Taking the pound to be Rs. 13-5-0 and the dollar to be Rs. 3-2-0 the revenues per head are roughly speaking as follows:

India	Rs. 9
U.K.	Rs. 890
U.S.A.	Rs. 970

Crudely considered, we get the following equations of comparative public finance:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Every American} &= 108 \text{ Indians} \\ &(\text{approximately}) \\ \text{Every Briton} &= 100 \text{ Indians} \\ &(\text{approximately}) \end{aligned}$$

¹ *Report on Currency and Finance 1946-47* (Bombay 1947, pp. 28,65). An analysis of provincial finances from 1937 to 1942 may be seen in B. Das-Gupta: *Provincial Taxation under Autonomy* (Calcutta 1948).

It is not to be understood that in every sector of economic efficiency as well as of human values these approximate equations are valid.

Indo-Pakistan Agreement re. Cash Balance

Be this as it may, let us look to another brass tag of economic India.

On August 15, 1947, the Indo-Pakistan Agreement distributed the available cash balances between the two parties as follows:

India	...	Rs. 3,250 million
Pakistan	...	Rs. 750 million
Total		Rs. 4,000 million.

Taking the entire population of undivided India as, roughly speaking, 400 millions, the cash balances on the day of partition amounted to nearly Rs. 10 (15 shillings or say \$3.00) per head.

The terms of the Financial Agreement between India and Pakistan are likely to be contested, as has been done by Deshbandhu Gupta in *A Glance at the Indo-Pakistan Financial Agreement* (New Delhi 1948). But in the world-economy the relative position of both is to be assessed as more or less identical, because each is a territory used to operating on very small doses of finance.

The categories of economic development or economic policy, to which people in the U.K. and the U.S.A. and other regions of more or less the same standard of living are used, are hardly applicable in India and Pakistan unless, of course, they are employed simply as formal or heuristic terms. The world-economic realities of India as of Pakistan are to be understood in the perspective of Rs. 9 per head as the annual revenue and Rs. 10 per head as the cash balance of the undivided Government of India.

State Aid in Agricultural Finance

The category, industrialization, is often wrongly taken to be indifference to and neglect of agriculture and the allied economies. But no economic statesmanship has ever sought to permit industries to kill or eclipse farming, animal-husbandry, fisheries, forestry and the like. These agricultural and allied occupations or professions are never meant to be ignored or overlooked in any scheme for industrialization. Rather, it comprises the modernization of the farming and allied occupations as well as their advancement by the

application of latest scientific discoveries and technical inventions, Agricultural improvement belongs, as a matter of course, to the content of industrialization.

In India as well as Pakistan relatively large doses of mechanization and fertilizer therapy will be necessary for quite a long time in order to uptodate the agricultural economy. In the domain of agricultural finance, likewise, some of the uptodate methods will have to be imported from Eur-America.

The Central Co-operative Bank ought to be furnished with substantial funds from the Government Treasury or from the Reserve Bank in order to enable it to offer loans liberally to individual cultivators through their co-operative societies at reasonable rates. In India the Governments have as a rule followed the opposite, the wrong, principle by compelling cultivators to depend on self-help.

The combined self-help of resourceless and perpetually indebted people such as cultivators everywhere generally are, cannot possibly enable them to possess enough capital for agricultural transactions. The magic of self-help alone cannot turn a zero into a million. It ought to be a fundamental objective of Co-operative Acts to mobilize state finance adequately in the interest of cultivators through the chain of co-operative credit societies.

The constructive role of state help in agricultural finance and farming economy is recognized in every modern legislation, including that of the U.S.A. (e.g., the Farm Credit Administration of the Federal Government). The activities of the *Banque de France vis-à-vis* the *Credit Agricole* deserve also to be followed in India with due modifications. The example of France in the field of co-operative finance may be seen in the present writer's *Economic Development* Vol. I (Madras) and Vol. II (Calcutta). The Dominion of India cannot afford to overlook the achievements of state finance in the agricultural developments of Eur-America.²

American Money Supply Fifty Times Indian

In 1936 the total money supply of India was Rs. 4,700 millions. With a population of some 350 millions this gave a circulation of Rs 14 per head. The money supply of the U.S. for the same year

² G. Costanzo: "Agricultural Credit: Its Organization and New Tendencies" (*Monthly Bulletin of Agricultural Economics and Sociology*, Rome, December 1939, p. 537).

was \$31,000 million. The circulation per head (total population 126 millions) was approximately \$246 (roughly equivalent to Rs. 738@ \$=Rs. 3). Total circulation in the U.K. was £1620 million. The circulation per head (total pop. 46 millions) was £35 (roughly Rs. 420).

In 1947 the total money supply for India (pop. 400 millions) was Rs. 21,500 millions, for the U.S.A. (pop. 140 millions) \$113,500 million and for the U.K. (pop. 50 millions) £5,230 million². The circulation per head was then Rs. 54, Rs. 2575 and Rs. 1260 respectively.

The figures in every instance have been taken in round numbers as well as rough approximations. In regard to the rates of exchange also very crude estimates have been given.

It is seen that in 1947 every American per head of population had at his command on the average the supply of Rs. 2575. This was more than double that of the Briton and nearly 50 times that of the Indian. We can easily understand, therefore, that while the American in his daily parlance talks of 50 dollars the Indian cannot afford to think in terms of more than one dollar. In 1936 also the relative proportion between the American and the Indian had been more or less the same (738: 14).

Inflation as High Price*

High Price and Prosperity

Inflation is an abstraction. The concrete reality is high price. To-day our Convention is formally addressed to inflation. But factually each one of us is orientated to high price.¹

Men and women of the teaching profession,—even though they may be economists,—are the least competent to discuss the economics of inflation. As gainfully employed persons they belong to a

² *International Financial Statistics*, February, 1948 (Washington) pp. 74, 124 and 126.

* Presidential Address at the Economic Convention on Inflation organized by the *Khoj Parishat* (Institute of Social and Economic Research) of the Socialist Party of India at Calcutta University Senate Hall (27-29 August 1948).

¹ Benoy Sarkar: "Inflation in Theory and Practice" (lecture at the Bengali Institute of Economics on 18th March 1943) reported in the *Hindustan Standard*, 19 March, 1943. "Inflation in the Paradox of War-Economy" (*Calcutta Review*, August 1943); "What is Demobilization?" (*C. R.*, June 1945).

group whose income is despicably low and extremely inelastic. And they are just the persons who are the greatest sufferers during an inflation-economy. But in the occupational structure of the entire country this group is one of the smallest of all groups of gainfully employed men and women. It is, therefore, on the sufferings of a very small number of men, women and children, that as a rule the professors and schoolmasters (and perhaps journalists also) try to build up their theories of inflation as an economic dis-equilibrium or malady.

Economists are likely to ignore or minimise a great statistical reality of the world to-day. However high the price, no bazar is suffering from the dearth of buyers. There are buyers with small, fixed and limited supplies of money, and there are buyers with large, elastic and expanding supplies of money. The latter are not confined to any particular sector of the community. Such buyers with elastic and plentiful earnings are considerable even among unskilled workers, porters, illiterate *chaprasis*, literate *durwans* of business offices, industrial workingmen, clerks of commercial establishments, ration shop-hands, persons employed by Government in war or quasi-war effort. As consumers of goods and services they are functioning as effectively as the market wants. Prosperity in the regime of high prices is quite in evidence among large groups of buyers, whose propensity to consume is quite keen and extensive.

What about sellers? High price is a God-send to them. It is a or the key to high margins of profit and furnishes the greatest spur to producers, wholesalers, retailers and shop-keepers. They may be dealers in production (capital) goods or in consumer goods. Their output may be primary commodities as well as the necessities of life. Or it may be the comforts and luxuries. They are invariably out of stock during the regime of inflation. Perhaps the markets for certain kinds of goods are found to be somewhat dull in certain localities or in certain seasons. But on the whole the demands appear to be never-failing and the salesmen to be ever active. And in the background "full employment" is being enjoyed by workingmen.

There are then millions of human beings in India as elsewhere who are exhibiting prosperity during the inflation. The earnings of many groups of gainfully employed persons are not fixed and are quite elastic. In order to increase their command over the medium of exchange they do not often have to depend upon the paltry dearness allowances doled out by their employers in a niggardly fashion.

The economic world to which many of such persons belong is used to *bakshish*, bribery, corruption, blackmailing, profiteering, black-marketing, swindling and so forth. These anti-social customs and practices,—perhaps known to be illegal and immoral,—constitute the brass tags of a country's normal economy in East and West, especially during an inflation boom.

It is this boom aspect of inflation that enables legion of customers to buy fish at Rs. 4 per seer, sweets at Rs. 10 per seer and *sarees* at Rs. 100 per piece, build houses, factories, workshops, and cinemas and to travel long distances by air or in air-conditioned first class compartments. Members of the teaching profession may not have the chance of hobnobbing with such specimens of inflation bourgeoisie or the *nouveaux riches*. But the statistics of bazar-goers, the sales of sweetmeat stores, hotels and restaurants as well as the dinners at social clubs can be seen by those that run. They can hardly be overlooked by intellectuals and scientists, whose function is not to enjoy wealth but study how wealth is enjoyed by others and to inquire into the causes of the wealth of nations.

Group-Economics vis-à-vis Inflation

There are two groups of gainfully employed persons. There are those who as traders, speculators, middlemen, agents, dealers, clerks, assistants, and so on are always likely to earn several times their legally known fees, honorariums or salaries by hook or by crook in the daily conduct of their transactions. And there are those others to whom the chances of such extra-wage, extra-salary, extra-contract, extra-honorarium gratifications are like angels' visits few and far between. High price affects these latter groups in a way entirely different from how it affects the others.

Inflation like every other item of economic phenomena is a matter of group values. There can hardly be any universal or uniform and national or regionally united reactions to inflation. In this connection I am reminded of an old story current in Sanskrit literature. In the winter month of *Paush* (December-January) the householder enjoys a meal of meat and keeps himself warm. But how does he get the meat? By killing the goat, of course. To the goat, therefore, the value of the transaction consists in its own annihilation. Hence the slogan:—*Ekasya Sarvanashah Anyasya tu Paushamasah*. (It is destruction to one but the month of *Paush*, that is, enjoyment to the other). The conflict between groups is the

eternal reality in economic activity. It is this group-conflict that is the fundamental theme of economic science, comprising as it does the science of inflation.

The income-groups or gainfully employed groups of which I am speaking are numerous. They are not identical with and have no logical or functional *liaison* with the two stereo-typed classes of Marx, the surplus-value-walla bourgeois and the surplus-valueless proletariat, who are supposed to be carrying on a ceaseless class-struggle between themselves. My groups are none other than the myriads of occupational or professional divisions of a community. These are the cultivators, artisans, shop-keepers, domestic servants, intellectuals, technical men, administrators, investors and so on. They comprise, of course, the industrial workers whose number in India, however, is almost immaterial, less than 2 per cent of the total Indian population.

Encyclopaedia of Inflation Therapeutics

For inflation doctors the first offender is obviously the Reserve Bank with its increased note-circulation. The second offender is the large money-supply in the hands of consumers. The next is the high price charged by producers or dealers. The fourth is the market with a reduced output. Last but not least is the businessman with large profits and extensive tax-evasions.

These five targets constitute the irreducible minimum of strategy in the war against inflation. An encyclopaedia of inflation therapeutics would have to deal with each one of these and other offenders in an elaborate and intensive manner.²

The encyclopaedia of antidotes to inflation comprises such standardised specifics as steeply graded taxes on businessmen and exemplary punishment of tax-evaders. Restrictions on demand and purchase, compulsory savings and rationing of goods occupy a few chapters in this huge tome. Price-control and discriminative prices as well as subsidies to producers in order to render price reduction possible are likewise important remedies. Regulation of exports and imports is not to be overlooked. Then there is the intensification of output occupying a great deal of space. The withdrawal of large

² For antidotes to inflation see Benoy Sarkar: *Equations of World-Economy* (1943), pp. 139-141; *Report on Currency and Finance 1947-48* (Bombay 1948), p.7.

denomination notes from circulation is not an unimportant item. Retrenchment and balancing of budgets belong by all means to this encyclopaedia.

Just one or two of these and similar remedies are being touched upon in the present address.

Ideal Price Pattern

Let us start with the price mechanism and the pricing of goods. What is a good, socially desirable or economically worth-while price-pattern?

The price may, in the first place, be (i) high, (ii) higher, (iii) rising. These three categories of prices are different from one another in their impacts on producers as well as consumers. Secondly, the prices may be (i) low, (ii) lower, and (iii) falling. And finally, the prices may be static, fixed, stationary or stabilised.

Obviously, in regard to these seven different patterns of price the income-groups, the producer-groups, the dealer-groups and other groups are each likely to have their own and therefore divergent and conflicting reactions. Nay, in each one of these groups there are likely to be different sections which would react to the pricing in diverse ways.

One illustration would suffice. We know when Southern Calcutta, especially the newer portion of Ballygunge, was raising its head. It was during 1929-35 that buildings were being erected on a somewhat appreciable scale. Many of the proprietors were persons with fixed incomes, pensions and so forth. They found it convenient to buy house properties or build them because the building materials as well as the services were cheap. It was known as the epoch of world-economic depression or slump. Cultivators were getting hardly any price for rice, jute and wheat. The village people were being impoverished. The prices were unspeakably low. And naturally persons with fixed incomes, say, Government servants, pensioners, etc., in towns were flourishing. Prosperity in urban areas was proceeding side by side with adversity, depression and poverty in the rural. That was the economics of low prices,—without indulging in statistical magnitudes.

Today the situation is just the reverse. On account of high prices of rice, wheat, fish, and other commodities coming from the hinterland, it is the rural areas that are commanding money and exhibiting prosperity. The opposite is to be found among Govern-

ment servants, clerks, schoolmasters, etc, and such other categories as can hardly help themselves with extra-salary earnings. High price is not more anti-social than low price. The pattern of low price is not more ideal and worthwhile than that of high. The dynamics of price mechanism does not know an ideal pattern.

For one thing, an abrupt fall of prices at the present moment is likely to generate bankruptcies, failures and commercial disasters on a countrywide scale. This would initiate an epoch of unemployment.

Direct Price Control

Suppose we proceed on the hypothesis that the lowering of prices is a worthwhile consummation. Some of the precedents in this field may be easily singled out.³ Direct attacks on price-increase were well-known in the therapeutics of inflation during World War II. As a preparation to war Germany had declared a general prohibition of price increase in 1936 in connection with the 4-year plan. It was practised in France, Switzerland and Italy during 1939-40. In the U.S.A. "ceilings", i.e. maxima for prices began to be set up in 1941. Most non-ferrous metals, steel scrap, certain iron and steel mill products and so forth were not permitted to be placed on the market at higher than the legally maximum prices. Price-stop was practised in Japan also. In 1937, highest prices were fixed for many commodities. Their number rose to 100,000 by 1940.

Reduction of prices by Government paying subsidy to producers belongs likewise to the experiences of state control during World War II. In 1943, subsidies to the tune of \$1,143,000,000 were paid by the U.S. Government in order to check the rise in wholesale prices and the cost of living. Of these amounts 73 per cent was paid to the producers of foodstuff and farm products, 12 per cent to those of metal ores, 9 per cent to the transporters of petroleum products.

From 1939 to 1944, the Government of the U.K. spent £815,000,000 on subsidies paid to the producers of a very large number of goods. Without such subsidies "the cost of living index

³ *World-Economic Survey 1939-41* (Geneva 1941), pp. 118-126, 1942-44 (Geneva 1945), pp. 235-240. For 1948-49 the British budget for subsidies to farmers is £41,300,000 (*National Provincial Bank Review*, August, 1948, pp. 6-7). See A. C. Pigour: "The Food Subsidies" (*Economic Journal*, London, June, 1948).

might have been 45 to 50 p.c. over the pre-war level compared with the actual increase of 28 p.c." during 1943-44.

Quasi-War-Economy

World-economy since 1945, i.e., the end of World War II is not an ordinary post-war economy, say, like the pattern of world-economy between 1919 and 1922 after World War I. It would be a profound mistake to describe it just as an aftermath of the war. It is, to all intents and purposes, a continuation of the war-economy, nay, war-economy itself. And this war-economy is to be found today (1945-48) as much in India as in the rest of the world,—although actual shootings and bombings, Blitzes and evacuations and so forth are not much in evidence.

Three kinds and patterns of war-economy are to be envisaged. The first, of course, is the full war-economy. The second is the economy of war-preparedness, *e.g.*, of Germany and Soviet Russia and to a certain extent of the U.K. and France from 1919 to 1939, specially from 1933 to 1939. Then there is what may be called quasi-war-economy.

It is as instances of the quasi-war-economy that every industrial technocratic, scientific, sanitary and populational measure in the world since 1945 has need to be appraised. For one thing, World War II has not yet been formally rung out and legally closed by a declaration of peace on an internationally recognised and valid basis. The Anglo-American world-empire or the so-called Western Bloc is virtually at war with the Russian Empire in Europe as well as in Asia. The Marshall Plan for the recovery of Europe and the world is antipodal to the Molotov Plan for the Sovietisation of Europe and mankind. In regard to India since August, 1947, the official head of Pakistan has in season and out of season employed just one category, namely, "enemy". It is as enemy that Pakistan is publicly orientated to India. Then there are the Kashmir and the Hyderabad theatres. In Southern Asia as well as South Eastern Asia from Burma to Indo-China and Indonesia, nay, in Asia Minor, it is not mere war-preparedness that we witness but actual warfare.

For all practical purposes no Government anywhere in Eur-Asia or Eur-America has considered it prudent to practise substantial relaxations of or deviations from the war-economy of 1939-45. Production, monetary circulation, transportation and other economic items are being kept up as far as possible on the war basis.

This is how and why the "full employment" of war-boom has been somewhat sought to be maintained since 1945.

Handicaps to Production

War-economy is essentially control economy because at bottom it is nothing but state-economy. It is war-communism or war-socialism. Price-control is a most fundamental item in the economics of control during war. Analytically speaking, it involves, among other things, first, state-control of production, and secondly, state-control of marketing. Ultimately it resolves itself into a problem of business administration, agricultural organisation, industrial management, bank rationalisation as well as financial and currency manipulation.

In the Anglo-American sphere the State-control of production has been realised to a considerable extent. But in India it has been tremendously handicapped. The paucity of trained industrial workers as well as of machineries, tools, and implements is one supreme factor. The relative absence of scientific and technical resources for agricultural improvements is a second factor. The inadequacy of agricultural experts, industrial engineers, geologists, chemists and so forth and their inability to cope with the vast problems on a sub-continental level is a third factor. No less serious are the handicaps due to presence of anti-social agencies and forces. The loyalties of workingmen, foremen, superintendents, technical experts, managers, directors, accountants and clerks to one another are very often questionable. Mutual suspicions and sabotage are the inter-human realities in every business enterprise, bank, insurance company, factory, agricultural establishment as well as administrative office. Bribery, corruption, nepotism and immorality of diverse sorts militate against the smooth functioning of control economy in production under state auspices.

It is worthwhile to invite attention here to special handicaps to production in the Indian conjuncture. India together with Pakistan does not claim more than, roughly speaking, five million industrial workers strictly so called, in a population of, say, 400 millions. Besides, unionised labour constitutes a very low percentage of this labour force. Labour strength of the modern industrial and capitalistic pattern is, therefore, extremely small in India.

And yet so far as the ideas and ideals of labour are concerned these few members of trade unions have been taught to accept the

most radical and uptodate slogans prevalent in the hyper-developed countries of the world. Indeed, India has become Doctor of Philosophy in socialism and communism *as ideologies* before she could effectively master the A.B.C. of industrial economy and capitalism on a somewhat appreciable scale. The factories, workshops, laboratories and other industrial establishments are with very few exceptions miserably poor in expert man-power, primitive and antiquated in technical appliances, as well as inefficient in the organisation of men and materials. Very few of them can really be described as genuine industrial concerns of the successful Eur-American pattern. Social insurance is as yet virtually unknown in the atmosphere of these concerns.⁴ The lag and disequilibrium between a low kindergarten stage of industrialisation and the very high level of socialistic-communistic slogans is one of the strongest handicaps to material and social progress.

Marketing As A Moral Phenomenon

In regard to marketing, likewise, the Anglo-American sphere can be credited with certain doses of success in controlled economy. But in India the links between the producer and the consumer through the dealer are ever disjointed, rickety and anything but smooth. The administrative hierarchy in the techno-economically more advanced countries has for years been used to a large number of trained and dependable officials at different rungs of the ladder. India has hardly had any experience of state-socialism on an extensive scale and is therefore not used to the regime of effective controllers, effective inspectors, and effective enforcers. Effectiveness in state-control of marketing as of production presupposes a relatively bribe-proof, honest and incorruptible *corps* of officers. India will have to look for such an administrative staff from the highest to the lowest level if the economics of control, as inevitable in war-economy, is to be successfully managed with a view to combating inflation.

In controlled economy with special reference to inflation as high price, we encounter, then, on the one hand, a problem of effective administration of agriculture, manufacture and commerce. On the other hand, the problem of honest, dependable and morally solid

⁴ Benoy Sarkar: *Social Insurance Legislation and Statistics* (Calcutta 1935), pp. 10-19. 46-63.

agents in Government service as well as in the business world, municipal and local government offices, middlemen's activities, and domestic relations becomes a tremendous issue. In economics, a non-moral science as it is, we are finally confronted with the questions of ethics. An intriguing situation, undoubtedly.

The Inflation-Complex

In regard to the inflation-high-price complex the most conventional topic is the note-issue and the role of the Reserve Bank. It is generally ignored or overlooked that this complex is more comprehensive and really totalitarian. Inflated money arises and becomes necessary during a war-regime or a quasi-war regime on account of inflated employment, extra-ordinary employment, or over-employment. Inflation in employment is attended at the same time with highly strung-up salaries and wages, that is, inflated earnings or incomes.

In the third place, there is inflation in production and transportation. This inflated output is to be seen chiefly in certain directions or sectors. These are the so-called war goods and services as contrasted with the civilian or "non-essential" goods and services which as a rule are cut down quite considerably. And in this field also the payments for raw materials, machineries and services are keyed up as high as possible in order to attract even the most mediocre and worthless producers.

Inflation, then, is not a complex simply of two items, large monetary circulation or over-monetisation and high price. It comprises inflation in employment, inflation in earnings, as well as inflation in production (comprising transportation).

Supply of Money

We shall now attend to the monetary inflation or over-monetisation.⁵

With 1945 as 100 the money-supply index in Feb-March, 1948 for Canada is 111, Switzerland 109, India 108, Sweden 99, U.S.A. 97, Australia 92, and U.K. 91. Sweden, U.S.A., Australia and U.K. have been witnessing a fall. Rise has been a fact in Canada, Switzerland and India.

5 *Monthly Bulletin of Statistics* (United Nations, Lake Success, New York), April, 1948, Vol. II, pp. 128-137, 153-161, 164-170; *Report on Currency and Finance 1947-48* (Bombay 1948). p. 53.

During the same period the wholesale price index has gone higher in every one of these countries. The indices are as follows: U.S.A. 152, Canada 143, U.K. 141, India 140, Australia 117, Sweden 107, Switzerland 107.

Price increase is 52 per cent in U.S.A. although money supply has come down to 97. It is 41 per cent in U.K. with money supply diminishing to 91. Similarly it is 7 per cent in Sweden, although money supply has slightly fallen, e.g. to 99. Evidently price increase is not invariably a function of increased money supply. The quantitative formula cannot, as is well understood, be accepted at its face-value.

From 1945 to March 1948 the cost of living index has risen from 118 to 149 in Canada, from 153 to 163 in Switzerland, from 125 to 163 in U.S.A. (1937=100). But in the U.K. it has gone down from 132 to 106 (1937=100). U.K.'s experience is unique. It is noteworthy also that there the cost of living index has not gone along with the wholesale index as in other countries. The wholesale index is higher but the cost of living index is lower.

Evidently the currency curve and the price-curve do not run parallel. It is possible to enable the two curves to run at different levels. There is such a thing as management and control. Currency can be managed and controlled. So also can price. We have already noticed how price control has been achieved by Governments in various countries. That experiment should be quite worthwhile in India too on the German, British, American and other models.

Reduction of Sterling Balances

What about currency, and the note-issue, and the Reserve Bank? They are also to be brought under state control if reduction of prices be accepted as an economically and socially desirable goal.

Increase in the monetary circulation has been effected in diverse countries of the world in different ways. So far as India is concerned, the most obvious and the palpable method is that of the sterling balances deposited by the U.K. with the Bank of England in the account of the Reserve Bank of India. It is by this technique that the note-issue in rupees has multiplied during and since World War II. One of the most effective antidotes to inflation, or what is the same thing in the present context, increased monetary circulation, should appear to be a direct and front attack on the sterling balances. These balances in favour of India rose to astronomical figures

during the war period, because the U.K. was prepared to pay extraordinarily high prices for the goods and services sold by India. The purchase was a military necessity for the U.K. and therefore she considered it expedient and worthwhile to be charged anything and everything. Today there is hardly any reasonable chance of India's being able to realize and utilize these assets in a palpable manner at her own will and within a short period of time.⁶

Indian inflation-doctors of the day should be well-advised therefore, if they were, first, to reconsider the excessively heavy war-prices charged of the U.K. by India, (inspite of the war-time acceptance of those prices as "fair" by the U.K.), and secondly, to commence revaluing the mythical assets of India with the U.K. and writing off considerable slices in an unsentimental manner. Other circumstances remaining the same, Rupee circulation in India can be driven automatically somewhat downwards as soon as the sterling deposits of India in London are scaled down to reasonable proportions. A deliberate, judicious, and discriminative devaluation of the sterling balances⁷ in a goalful and planned manner ought to be discussed by Indian economists and businessman as one of the most specific and effective remedies to inflation-cum-high price in the present conjuncture.

APPENDIX

Anti-inflationary Measures

(Based on the Above)

It is not the homoeopathic principle of a single remedy that is embodied in the present prescription. There is no economic Nux Vomica, as it were, such as may alone be efficacious enough to deal with the inflation-complex.

My economic reasoning does not follow a single-track, monistic pattern. It is pluralistic and recommends rather, on the allopathic

6 Benoy Sarkar: "The Sterling Balances as a Semi-mythical Asset" (lecture at the Indigenous Manufacturers' Conference, Indian Association, on 28 November, 1944), reported in the *Amrita Bazar Patrika* of the next day; "The Relative Futility of Sterling Balances as Aid to Industrialization" in *Benoy Sarkar's Baithake*, vol. II, (1945);

7 An antithesis to this proposal about the writing off of sterling balances is to be seen in C. N. Vakil: *Our Sterling Balances* (Bombay 1947), which suggests the transfer of all British capital assets operating in India (commercial, industrial, shipping etc). to the Reserve Bank of India.

principle, so to say, a large number of recipes for internal as well as external applications. Each is of diverse doses according to the circumstances of the case. But all are to be applied simultaneously without priority or preference.

The fundamental problem consists in slowly and judiciously consummating the transfer from war-economy to peace-time economy, in case a real peace-time economy is ever to come. And yet the boom and so-called "full employment" of the war or quasi-war period must not be mismanoeuvred or misdirected into depression, bankruptcies, slump and unemployment by an abrupt and reckless lowering of prices and profits. The antidotes to inflation-high price are therefore to be prescribed in a cautious, open-eyed and realistic as well as pragmatic although firm manner.

No anti-capitalistic animus ought to be indulged in. It should be the aim of the Government to harmonize the interests and viewpoints, as far as practicable, of cultivators, industrial workers, businessmen as well as intellectuals. No one-sided interpretation from the academic angle can by any means be entertained or fostered.

The measures are being indicated below. They are partly for long and intermediate periods. But most of them can be applied at once and others can likewise be initiated without delay. On the whole, however, the recipes would look like a programme of planning for economic development, under state initiative and direction.

I. *Price-control*

1. Price-stops. Prohibitions of price-increase. Maxima of prices. Ceilings: To be declared by the Government in regard to cereals, oil, sugar, clothing, cement, kerosene, domestic hardware, and building materials.

2. Price-discrimination. Relatively lower prices for food-stuffs and clothing to be sanctioned by Government for certified families on relief, refugees and other destitutes.

3. Subsidy to producers and transporters of food-stuffs in order to reduce the prices.

II. *Intensification of Production*

(A) *Agriculture*

1. Cultivable waste lands to be brought under cultivation with adequate financial aid of the Government. New Settlements established. Internal Colonization promoted.

2. Liberal grants from the Reserve Bank to the Co-operative Credit System for distribution among primary societies at nominal rates of interest.

3. Development of fisheries (riverine and maritime).

(B) Industry

1. Stricter factory management with an eye to unbroken and systematic work.

2. Medium industries to be started under Government auspices in order to construct improved ploughs and other agricultural as well as irrigational implements.

3. Employment of artisans and *mistris* in cottage industries under municipal and union board auspices.

4. Machine-building and engineering factories to be started or whipped up in order to supply capital goods.

5. "*Mistrification*" of youngmen at 15 (for three years) by Government in schools or workshops in order to furnish technically trained personnel to industries.

6. Inventions and discoveries to be promoted by the employment of scientific personnel in Government laboratories and research institutes functioning independently of but in co-operation with Universities and Colleges of Engineering and Technology.

(C) Stimulation of Transportation and Internal Trade

1. Expansion of Railway workshops with a view to the construction of engines, rolling stock, and aids and accessories.

2. Building of vessels to be used on rivers and seas.

3. Improvement of roads for bullock carts.

4. Removal of hindrances to the movements of coal, raw materials and finished products.

(D) Marketing

1. Middlemen's emoluments to be controlled.

2. Quality of goods to be guaranteed.

3. Weight-cutting in bazars to be severely dealt with.

4. Cornerings to be sedulously unearthed and punished.

III. *Expansion of Foreign Trade*

1. Imports of machineries and quality goods to be encouraged.

2. Exports to Asia and Africa to be promoted through Consular and Commercial Agents.

IV. *Restriction of Consumption*

1. Rationing (according to sex, age, occupation, etc.) of food-stuffs for the non-agricultural population, and of cloth for the entire population.

2. Black markets to be minimized through inspection and penalty.

3. Honest, impartial and effective administration to be guaranteed.

V. *Restriction of Money Supply*

1. Withdrawal of 100-Rupee notes and their replacement (above a certain amount) by Government securities at par.

2. Freezing or blocking of long-standing time-deposits above a certain amount in commercial banks, part of which may be released subsequently.

3. Compulsory savings to be enforced on salaried individuals and wage-earners.

4. Sterling balance to be written off or scaled down deliberately and discriminatively in a goalful manner.

VI. *Public Finance*

1. Steeply graded taxes on war-profits and quasi-war profits together with the assurance of fair profits.

2. Retrenchments and curtailments of salaries especially at the higher levels.

3. Balanced budget.

Government's Anti-inflationary Policy*

1. Wanted A Direct Attack on Prices by Producers' Subsidies

The fundamental objective of the anti-inflationary policy should have been the lowering of prices in regard to food and other essen-

* Circularized by the United Press of India through the dailies, 9 October 1948. With the author's ideas about India may be compared the British Anti-Inflation Policy as stated in the White Paper entitled *Economic Survey for 1948* (London, March 1948). The measures for the U.K. comprise (1) budgetary surplus, (2) high taxation, (3) cuts in Government expenditure, (4) postponement of capital development plans, (5) cost-of-living subsidies, (6) comprehensive price controls, etc. (*International Labour Review* for August 1948, p. 210).

tials. But the measures announced by the Government of India, although not unreasonable in certain respects, are virtually silent on this item and hence most disappointing. High prices cannot be lowered by ethical moralisings or nationalistic shibboleths—administered to producers, middlemen, wholesalers or retailers. They have to be attacked frontwise and at the source. The Government must be prepared to grant adequate subsidies to the producers and the transporters of the goods included in the cost of living.

In India as in Eur-America the reduction of prices to a reasonable level such as may be desired by the public and the Government is not likely to be effected on a considerable scale by any other means. No hocus-pocus of journalistic or party-political public finance can possibly bring the prices down. A substantial increase of production for "civilian" purposes is not a question of practical politics for some long time to come.

In addition to the declaration of ceilings or maxima for prices the Government will have to sanction relatively lower prices for certified families on relief, refugees and destitutes.

2. *Wanted A Stricter Administration*

In case the Governments at the Centre and the Provinces as well as the local and municipal authorities be strong enough they can,—even other circumstances remaining the same,—crush the black-markets and profiteers, thereby undoing the evils of the inflation. The uneconomic hoardings and the tyrannous prices can be considerably controlled by a stricter administration of the bazars. It remains to be seen how far the administrative system is likely to be improved in order that it may remove the anti-social, illegal and immoral practices that have been ruling the markets and trade centres.

3. *Retrenchment Impossible*

The Government may indulge in the pious wish of curtailing expenditure, putting off long-deferred projects, and undertaking retrenchments. A declaration to this effect may have a psychological value and give a sop to persons and institutions such as can be easily bamboozled. But *Realpolitik* is much too exacting.

Hard-headed realists and men with eyes can see that the relative prosperity that exists in post-war India as elsewhere in spite of diminution of output is in the main due to the factual continuation on a somewhat palpable scale of the war-time financial, industrial,

commercial and employment policy of Governments. Curtailments and retrenchments except in the cases of the superfluous, overstaffed and duplicated establishment can but lead to inefficiency, friction and under-production. It cannot be the policy of a Government to invite disaster by resorting to senseless economies or unjustified reductions.

Governments to-day, to-morrow and day after to-morrow in India as in the rest of the world are factually functioning in the regime of a war or a quasi-war economy. The production of war goods and semi-war essentials is a reality of the present and the immediate future. The "inflated employment" (miscalled "full employment") and the inflated production of 1939-45 (World War II) are tending to repeat themselves here and there and everywhere under our very nose. Without these quasi-war industries, occupations and employments the world-economic situation since 1945 would have been punctuated with relatively much larger doses of misery in the shape of bankruptcies, business failures, unemployment, and industrial unrest.

Curtailment and retrenchment programmes can at most appease the theorists who, obsessed as they are by text-book "isms", cannot see an inch beyond the printed word. Or perhaps these phrases are appreciated by the shrewd politicians or gamblers in *haute finance* who know how to manage the matters of the moment in a skilful manner suited to their own long-range interest.

The Government of India will have to function quite actively in the industrial and business world. There will have to be created more Government jobs, more Government job-holders, and therefore more note-issues (of course not un-covered) and enlarged monetary supplies. Inflation has come to stay. And without inflation the business of the war or the quasi-war period cannot possibly go on.

Besides, development projects will have to be carried out in the industrial, technocratic, militaristic, sanitary and educational fields, and scientific and technical personnel of diverse types will have to be trained and built up in order to enrich the man-power. These items (*e.g.*, the Damodar Valley Scheme) cannot wait, no matter whether the parties in power be nationalist, socialist or communist. The man-power methodologies of Soviet Russia, France, England and U.S.A. are identical in form and content.

The expenditures of the Government at the centre and the provinces,—in spite of a few pettifogging retrenchments here and

there,—are bound to be on the increase. Their impacts on note-circulation cannot but be inflationary. It should be sheer folly to practise obstinate blindness to these realities of Dominion India.

6. *Taxes, More Taxes, Still More Taxes*

None but school-book economists, nervous politicians, and party-political finance-directors fear inflation even when it is legitimate and justified. One of the most judicious doctorings of justifiable inflation consists in direct attack on prices in and through the grant of subsidies to producers. Realistic public finances as those of England, U.S.A., France, Germany and elsewhere know how to deal with legitimate inflation by extracting revenues from businessmen in order to cover the subsidies. In India as elsewhere the slogan should be "taxes, more taxes, still more taxes". Is the Government of India bold enough to declare this slogan in so many words and strong enough to implement it in a goalful manner?

The Bourgeois as a World-Economic Reality

Methods of Bourgeois Finance

Economic life in India is not yet as highly developed in technocratic and other modernistic institutions as Eur-America at the beginning of the present century. We are indeed in some of the Kindergarten stages of industrial capitalism. And yet the Italian economist Pareto's description of the financial methods of modern bourgeoisie may apply with some force to certain individuals, institutions and movements of India as well.

"In certain countries the modern bourgeoisie knows", says he in his French book, *Les Systèmes Socialistes*, Vol. II. (Paris, 1926) "how to usurp the rights of others by fraud, if not by force. It gets itself paid by the citizens through varied premia on certain products. It obtains the protective duties on manufactures. Vast parliamentary swindlings are organized by it as in the case of the *Banca di Roma* in Italy or the *Banque de Panama* in France. Finally, the bourgeoisie has recourse to stock-jobbings of all forms in order to appropriate the goods of others."

The role of bourgeois bribery and corruption in international diplomacy is not negligible. Many of the wars fought in the name of national honour, racial prestige, cultural freedom, etc., are very often undertaken against the will, interests and sentiments of the

peoples concerned. The chief incentive in such instances is the gold offered to the dozens of the leading statesmen and business magnates by some interested powers, whose strategic plans require that the particular peoples must somehow organize a battle-front, no matter whether there is any the least reasonable chance for success or not. These statesmen and business magnates become thereby responsible for the destruction of property worth millions and the bloodshed of thousands of men, women and children. The middle classes, the poorer classes, the peasants, the workingmen and the soldiers are sacrificed not at the altar of liberty but at that of the greed of the leaders, many of whom are seasoned municipal and parliamentary bosses.

Some of the trends of bourgeois finance indicated here may perhaps be verified by an intensive and realistic analysis of the events that constituted the Battle of Calcutta in August 1946. The partition of Bharatvarsha into India and Pakistan (August 1947) was perhaps neither a necessity of Hindu masses as such nor of Muslim masses as such. It may have been brought about to a considerable extent by the play of bourgeois economy among Anglo-American groups as well as Hindus and Muslims. Circumstances connected with the Kashmir and the Hyderabad wars (1948) are neither purely Hindu-Muslim, nor Indo-Pakistani phenomena. In the creation of these two battle-fronts it is the spirit of the bourgeois, both Asian and Eur-American, that is conspicuously operative. The regrettably halting and hypocritical attitudes of the UNO in regard to these two wars lead one to suspect that the world-wide bourgeois financial methodology as visualized by Pareto may have here also something substantial to account for.

Although relatively primitive, the Hindus and Muslims of Bharatvarsha are not immune to bourgeois attitudes and tendencies or methodologies of bourgeois finance. Wallas's "great society" of the hyper-capitalistic complex has not fully or extensively made its appearance in the *milieu* of Bharatvarsha's men and women. And yet the psycho-social *Gestalt* of their publicists and economic statesmen is today almost a replica of that of the Western.

Bourgeois Economy: Rural and Municipal

The preponderant masses of human beings in Bharatvarsha live in the rural *milieu*. Urbanization has hardly affected as yet more than 25 per cent of the total population. As an effect of town life

and the municipal administration groups of men and women get their personalities transformed. Very often this transformation due to the municipal complex is anything but decent. Municipalism engenders certain forms of social pathology. Municipal personalities become therefore substantially different from non-municipal and pre-municipal personalities. All the same, the distinction between the rural order and the urban order cannot be made too much of. So far as interhuman relations are concerned, men and women do not fail to exhibit the same kinds of social pathology under the non-municipal or pre-municipal patterns as under the municipal. The forms of pathological phenomena, perhaps, are different, as for instance, one encounters to a certain extent in our Lal Bihari Day's *Bengal Peasant Life*. (Calcutta 1874-78) which is in all respects a photographically realistic novel of folk society and culture.

The bourgeois economic methodology and *mores* are not exclusively modern phenomena. They are neither entirely industrial nor entirely urban in their origins and patterns. In semi-industrial or pre-industrial conditions as well as in semi-urban or rural *milieus* also the bourgeois economy and mentality can often be in evidence.

Under conditions of pre-municipal ruralism the people can factually experience some sort of human, "familistic" or communitarian equality in social relations between the higher and the lower classes. For instance, something like the "direct" democracy of all, and the unconscious equality of status between the rich and the poor may be seen in the territorial assemblies of entire villages known as the *panchajats* (councils of five) or the *baroiyaris* (councils of twelve), etc. in pre-municipal conditions.

But municipal democracy introduces a legal equality. And this legal equality serves but to accentuate the differences between the richer and the poorer, the leaders and the followers, the councillors or commissioners and the constituencies. The inequalities of money manifest themselves in the most inhuman manner. Obnoxious snobishness prevails in the atmosphere. Sycophancy, on the one hand, and nepotism, on the other, constitute the most fundamental basis of municipal morality. Bribery, sex-exploitation, extension of patronage to the unfit and other undesirables, promotions based on backbitings and secret informations, distribution of orders for goods among relatives and party-members, — these are some of the normal features of municipalized urbanism. The *milieu* is vitiated from top to bottom by deliberate injustice and palpable inequality. Whatever the socialists condemn in the economico-political and socio-

ethical morphology of bourgeois culture are visible in India today, although the grade of modern capitalism is not yet very high.

On the question of equality, be it observed *en passant*, it is hardly warrantable to agree with Bouglé, the French sociologist, who in his *Idées Egalitaires* (Equalitarian Ideas) has tried to correlate equality with urbanism. Sorokin is more acceptable when he maintains in *Social and Cultural Dynamics* Vol. III (New York 1937) that there is no definite correlation. "If we ask", says he, "where,—in the city or the country,—are the greater inequalities of fortune, of privilege, of rank, are present, the answer is:—in the city".

The Bourgeois as the "Economic Man"

In *Aspetti Morali della Vita Politica* (Moral Aspects of Political Life, Bari 1928) the Italian philosopher, Croce, finds fault with the manner in which the term, bourgeois, has been used by socialists. The bourgeois has been presented by them, says he, as a conspicuously economic reality, and this again in all his exaggerations and deficiencies, in his vulgar and coarse aspects, in toughness and hypocrisy of the profiteer. The socialists have, further, enlarged the idea of the bourgeois epoch and rendered it synonymous with the modern age by including in it the geographical discoveries, the industries, the machines, protestantism, rationalism, encyclopaedism, and the Kantian philosophy.

Croce's criticism of the socialist use of the category, bourgeois, is not wrong, and yet perhaps the socialists are not wrong either. For, the type which is known scientifically as the Ricardian *homo oeconomicus*, is not a mere abstraction improvised for the purposes of scientific speculation. The *homo oeconomicus* of Ricardo, or the bourgeois of socialists is a factual reality, and can be encountered here and there and everywhere as a human being of flesh and blood.

In Bharatvarsha also this character or personality is quite in evidence. And this type of hard-headed as well as heartless "economic man" has been growing in numbers since the World-War II (1939-45) ushered into being legion of profiteers, inflation-millionaires, ration-administrators, black market-inspectors, control-agents, preachers of business morality, and exponents of moral re-armament. It so happens that both in Bharatvarsha and the rest of the world the bourgeois functions in the midst of all the achievements in arts and sciences referred to above by Croce. Even without committing oneself to parties,—political, economic or religious,—the student of social science would be justified in employing the term bourgeois in the

traditional socialist sense. The employment of this term in the manner of Marx who uses it to define just that class of persons who obtain surplus value (i.e., wages, interest, rent) in contrast with the surplus valueless proletariat is exceptional and not to be identified with the more or less general use among socialists. The ordinary and conventional socialist way of describing the bourgeois is quite expressive and leaves no vagueness about certain mental and moral features of the modern personality.

Plutocracy the Regime of the Bourgeois

In *Europe's Dance of Death* by Garratt (London 1940) the British democracy under Baldwin and Chamberlain has been discovered to be something essentially plutocratic. He analyzes French democracy and discovers in it nothing but the despotocracy of two hundred families, some of whom are the steel magnates of the *Comité des Forges*. Such interpretations and observations about England and France would apply also to the infantile democratic-looking organizations and institutions of social life in contemporary India and Pakistan. The psycho-social identities of East and West which were in evidence in ancient and medieval times through all the ages have been but continuing their existence under the conditions of capitalism and technocracy, although East is today younger in these items than West by a few decades. Plutocracy,—the regime *par excellence* of the bourgeois,—is eternal and ubiquitous.

"Restaurants, tea-shops and hotels in Bombay have been notorious for their exploitation of child-labour," says the *Social Service Quarterly* (January 1941). We are told that ninety per cent of the young delinquents brought to the Remand Home in Bombay as victims of unnatural offences were hotel boys. But the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act which came into force in November 1940 in order to stop the exploitation of child labour and to give opportunities for leisure and recreation to the menials and clerical staff is "not being appreciated by those whose interests have been adversely affected" by it.

The democratized bourgeois of Bharatvarsha knows well how to manage the difficulties of situations created by the enactment of labour protecting social legislation. For the hands that are to be raised and the noses that are to be counted in all democratic institutions,—legislative, municipal or otherwise,—during the voting incidents,—belong to the sycophants and *petwas* (camp-followers) of the industrial and commercial magnates. They owe their salaries, allowances, privileges and position often to hardly any qualifications.

except the understanding between themselves and their bosses to the effect that inconvenient questioners, reformers and publicists must ever have to be silenced by them by hook or by crook. Councillors, parliamentarians, labour leaders, party-bosses, group-chiefs are as a rule in the pay of some interest or other. This is an objective reality of the bourgeois epoch in world-economy. It is in the atmosphere of such democracies and socialisms,—managed and manoeuvred by financial magnates as they inevitably happen to be,—that the standard of service, efficiency and morality is lowered to the satisfaction of the standing bourgeois complex. Under such conditions the few creative pioneers and self-sacrificing leaders, if there be any, are compelled to enjoy the spiritual dignity of being in the minority of one.

*New Bourgeois through Nationalization
and Profit-Sharing*

Nationalization of industries and financial institutions like banks, insurance companies, etc. is like profit-sharing one of the planks in the public economics of hyperdeveloped and ultra-rationalized states. To what extent this is to the advantage of the wage-earning workers and clerks in point of Rs-as-ps. and in improved interhuman relations remains to be investigated for the industry-states such as have been used to vigilant democracy, constructive socialism and efficient civil service for nearly two generations.¹ For primitive countries like China, India, Pakistan, Iran and so forth which have been practising the A.B.C. of modern economy in industrialism, technocracy, democratic administration, and labour welfare the fundamental question is somewhat different. Their chief problem is that of a sufficiently large number of expert officials and technically trained personnel as engineers, metallurgists, chemists, labour officers and so forth. In such regions the tendencies to idleness, inadequate supervision, absence of prompt attention to complaints, bureaucratic procrastination, redtapism, inexpert management, nepotism, indifference to change and progress, as well as maladministration of all sorts are likely to be the special features of the new pattern of socialism and democracy as embodied in nationalization.

In any case nationalization like profit-sharing is one of the latest business patterns of the bourgeois-socialistic epoch. And it has come to stay as a world-economic reality in backward as in advanced

¹ H. Finer: "Planning and Nationalization in Great Britain" (*International Labour Review*, Geneva, April 1948).

regions. Neither nationalization nor profit-sharing is likely, however, in the long run to affect the bourgeois adversely. The nation, i.e., the state, will continue in future as in the past to be run by the bourgeois or the bourgeois-minded persons who, as in Soviet Russia, professionally pose as the champions of the proletariat.

Nationalization cannot automatically and eventually imply proletarianization. It is tantamount pragmatically to the ownership or control of mines, industries, banks, transportation agencies etc. by the bourgeois. In regard to profits, those persons (rich, middling or poor) who furnish capital (and no labour) will know tomorrow and day after tomorrow as they know today how to manipulate the costing, accounting, returns, yields and so forth in the manner best calculated to serve their interests.

It is not the end of the bourgeois or the replacement of the bourgeois by the proletariat or even the establishment of equality between the proletariat and the bourgeois that is in sight. If any thing, a fresh lease of life is being granted to the bourgeois. The creation of new bourgeois and the expansion of the bourgeoisie are to be expected from the large-scale administration of profit-sharing, nationalization and such other patents of up-to-date socialism.

Nationalization, Currency and Insurance Problems in India*

Nationalization as Capitalism Rationalized

Nationalization is as universal and eternal as private enterprise. In every economy, archaic, primitive, ancient, medieval and modern, certain doses of nationalization are to be found mixed up with certain doses of private enterprise.

In no significant sense can nationalization be described as socialism or communism. Leftists (socialists or communists) should not gloat over it. Nor should rightists (employers, capitalists, bourgeoisie) be scared away by it. Nationalization is substantially a rationalization of capitalism. It is in any case capitalism pure and undefiled.

The correct approach to nationalization is that from the technical and administrative viewpoint of business organization. Joint stock administration, limited liability, trust, cartellization, holding company and so forth are the categories in the background of which nationalization ought to be placed. State enterprise or na-

* Observations at the Second Session of the Indian Commerce Conference at Calcutta, 23-25 December, 1948.

nationalization is virtually nothing but the administration of business interests by the state as a holding company.

In India, taken as a sub-continent of some three hundred million human beings the principles of joint stock, limited liability, trusts, cartels, holding companies and so forth are very little understood and practised. Relatively primitive as the economy of India happens to be, large doses of nationalization can hardly be assimilated to her business pattern.

The doses of nationalization to which the United Kingdom, France and other countries have been getting used since the end of World-War II would have been entirely unassimilable in the economies of these countries about 1850 or even 1900. The business economy of Dominion India is somewhat comparable in features to that of the advanced countries of Eur-America as obtaining some two generations ago. Even if nationalization is being practised in the U.S.A. or elsewhere today India can hardly think of making experiments with it except in very slight doses.

Nationalization involves a very large quantum of administrative personnel under state auspices. The public services of India do not yet possess a considerable number of officials, technically trained and adequately equipped with the sense of duty. Efficiency as well as honesty in the discharge of responsibilities are not to be postulated of Government servants. Nor can regularity of attendance and punctuality as well as the full-day's work, whether it be for five or eight hours, be assured in the state services as a matter of course. Government officials are used to automatic increments in salary and promotions in position or status. They can by no means be depended upon as hardworking and strenuous to the same extent as those employees who in private concerns are compelled on account of their wage-incentives to cultivate punctuality, regularity, full-time work and other responsibility.

Non-Currency Factors in Price-Formation

If there is any difference between the behaviour of the security market and that of the commodity market, as pointed out by Dr. A. K. Das-Gupta (Benares), an explanation may be sought in a very elementary fact. The security market is relatively more white, i. e. free to competitive forces. But the commodity market is almost hundred per cent black. It is being commandeered and concerned by monopolistic and other sinister forces.

For post-war war years inflation is not necessarily bad. Nor is high price automatically anti-social. Both inflation and high price are the features of war-economy. In case those conditions are removed abruptly the entire business world may experience bankruptcy and collapse. Adjustments to the currency and price conditions of yesterday may not be tampered with in an indecent haste.

Let me draw your attention to the *Tata Quarterly* for October 1948. Here we find the curve of notes in circulation rising from 170 crores of Rupees in August 1939 up to 1330 crores for All-India in June 1948 (and 1212 crores for Dominion India, i.e. excluding Pakistan in September 1948). The increment is nearly 7 to 8 times.

In this background it would be interesting to place the price curves. The wholesales market shows the following picture. During the same period (August 1939-September 48) (1) the food prices have risen up to 397, (2) the industrial raw materials up to 435, (3) the semi-manufactures up to 340, (4) the manufactures up to 348, (5) the miscellaneous up to 531 and (6) all commodities combined up to 382. Evidently every individual commodity has its own price-behaviour. And yet the currency background is one and the same for each of these commodities. Price-formation is thus not exclusively a function of the notes in circulation. Other than currency considerations will have to be entertained in explaining the range of differences in index between 340 and 531. In regard to every commodity some special circumstances have to be unearthed if the price-structure is to be understood.

Cost of living indices for the period 1939-48 are no less instructive. At Bombay the index was 311, at Ahmedabad 366 and at Nagpur 397 in September 1948 (August 1939=100). Under the same conditions of temperature and pressure,—in the present instance, the identical currency context,—three industrial regions exhibited three different cost of living behaviours. The cost of living cannot therefore be all accounted for by the quantum of notes in circulation. Regional differences are to be explained by special considerations.

The experiences of the last eight or nine years (war and post-war inflations) confirm the fundamental theoretical position that prices are not exclusively conditioned by currency. And therefore an exclusive attention to currency should be bad therapeutics for the treatment of high prices.

Among the non-currency factors in the present price-level as obtaining in the world-economy today the most educative experien-

ees are those of the U.K., the U.S.A. and other countries. There the price-stop, or the price-ceiling or the maximum price has been commanded by the fiat of the state. And the grant of subsidies to producers has been the most potent financial technique of the Government.

In spite of large money-supply prices have remained low in these countries. Price-behavior in the U.K. and U.S.A. has been on the whole contrary to the impacts of currency. Prices have been curbed by non-currency or extra-currency forces.

Some of the non-currency factors of the Indian business world are to be seen in the market conditions. It is the black market that prevails over here and it is the profiteer that commands the commodities. And the Government is powerless to remove the black market and punish the profiteer.

The regime of illegal, anti-social and immoral practices is the most dominant item in the Indian situation. The role of currency in price-formation is considerably eclipsed by that of cornering, dishonesty, swindling and immorality in business practice. Until the corruption prevailing in the wholesaling and retailing of goods as well as in the administration of laws be sedulously removed it will be out of the question to assess properly the role of enlarged money supply in the high prices of India.

Insurance Capitalism as an Index to India's Backwardness

The few studies in insurance that have been published in India have come from insurance agents and persons otherwise associated with insurance business. The contributions of University academicians and other intellectuals to insurance science are almost negligible. The present Commerce Conference is furnishing auspices under which intellectuals have been enabled to participate in discussions on insurance.

In the course of the last two decades or so insurance business in Indian hands has made extraordinary progress. And yet insurance is one of those business fields which exhibit India's poverty in the most glaring manner. The number of policies is less than 3 millions in a population of 400 millions for pre-Dominion India. In the number of policy-holders per 1000 inhabitants India is almost at the bottom of the world-economic ladder in insurance. The total value

of premium, further, is unspeakably low (nearly 5,500 million Rupees). Per head of population the premium comes to such a little figure that Americans, Canadians, and Englishmen may believe that India has no place on the insurance map of the world. What, for instance, is the value of, say, Rs. 14 per head in the mentality of those who operate Rs. 1,000 and above ?

In the *milieu* of insurance business we Indians are made to realize, again, how miserably poor we are in longevity. The expectation of life of the Indian people as determined by international actuary-science, is the lowest conceivable. The distance from the 65 years of New Zealand and Australia to the 27 years of India is tremendous, India's poverty is thus rendered thoroughly palpable when we contact the insurance companies' agents and doctors.

India's backwardness comes home to us in the insurance fields when we realize that virtually the only line of insurance known to our businessmen is life insurance. In this particular field India has indeed made substantial progress. During the last decade or two the *swadeshi* (indigenous) insurance companies have been able to beat the foreign in the command over life-premium. But so far as industrial insurance is concerned Indian companies are practically nowhere. Fire insurance is just being attempted. In marine (or overseas insurance) India is still in the kindergarten stage.

The names of other non-life insurance business are hardly yet talked of among us.

An important insurance field is that of agriculture. Crop insurance is an item to which the attention of hardly any Indian economist or businessman has been drawn up till now.

Altogether insurance economies and commerce are topics in which the poverty and backwardness of India find their most revealing indices. The interest of our countrymen should be attracted to this particular form of finance.

The Man-Power of West Bengal

A Large Demographic Region

In absolute figures the population of West Bengal is large. Demographically speaking, West Bengal is to be regarded as a great power both by the Indian and the world standard. The man-

power of West Bengal *visàvis* that of large provinces or states of the Indian Dominion is indicated below (in round figures):¹

Province	Population in Millions	Province	Population in Millions
1 United Provinces	... 55,0	5 Bombay	... 20,8
2 Madras	... 49,3	6 C. P. 16,8
3 Bihar 36,3	7 Assam 10,2
4 West Bengal	... 21,2	8 Orissa 8,7

In the demographic pattern of Dominion India the figure 21 millions for West Bengal represents a substantial human grouping. This renders West Bengal somewhat larger in population than Bombay, and considerably larger than C. P. while outdistancing Assam and Orissa by enormous intervals. Demographically West Bengal is indeed more than twice as large as Assam and is also over 10 per cent larger than Assam and Orissa combined. Of the eight larger provinces of the present Indian set-up (since August 1947) West Bengal is the fourth in the list according to numerical importance, being outdistanced by Bihar, Madras and the U. P.

By the world-standard also the man-power of West Bengal is not negligible. There are very few countries in the two Hemispheres which command the 21 million level. We may exclude the almost subcontinental, federated areas like China (400 millions), Soviet Russia (170 millions) and the U. S. A. (144 millions) from the present consideration. In that case the only countries of the world that exceed the 21 million unit are the following six:²

Country	Population in millions	Country	Population in millions
1 Japan (1947) 78,0	4 Brazil (1946)	... 46,7
2 Germany in four zones (1946)	.. 65,9	5 Italy (1946)	... 45,4
3 United Kingdom (1947)	.. 49,7	6 France (1947)	... 41,0

The countries whose man-power is more or less on a par with that of West Bengal may then be singled out as follows:

Country	Population in millions	Country	Population in millions
1 Spain (1947)	... 27,5	5 Egypt (1947)	... 19,0
2 Mexico (1947)	... 23,2	6 Siam (1947)	... 17,2
3 West Bengal (1941)	... 21,2	7 Rumania (1946)	... 16,4
4 Korea (1946)	... 19,3	8 Argentine (1947)	16,1

1 The figures are derived from the Census of 1941. For West Bengal districts see *Statistical Abstract West Bengal 1947* (Calcutta 1948), p. 3.

2 *Monthly Bulletin of Statistics*, April 1948 (United Nations, Lake Success, New York), pp. 4-7.

The approximate demographic peers of West Bengal are Spain and Rumania in Europe, Mexico and Argentine in Latin America, Korea and Siam in Asia, and Egypt in Africa. For economic and social studies it is these eight regions, demographically large as they are, reasonably speaking, to be considered together in the interest of comparative values regarding achievements, the rate of progress, and future prospects.

Second only to Mexico in Birth Rate

We shall take the birth rates first. It so happens that not all the countries of the above schedule are statistically equipped enough to exhibit these figures of vital statistics. The following table places West Bengal's average of 1939-43 in the perspective of those of its demographic peers whose birth rates are available for the same period:³

Country	Birth Rate	Country	Birth Rate
1 Mexico ...	44·7	4 West Bengal ...	28·9
2 India ...	30·0	5 Rumania ...	25·8
3 Japan ...	29·0	6 Spain ...	21·0

West Bengal's birth rate is virtually identical with that of Japan, which we have introduced in the above table as a demographic peer from this standpoint. In the same manner India has been placed in this group as an example of the general level to which the international neighbours of West Bengal are used. Be it observed that these birth rates are the highest in the world. The birth rates of West Bengal, Japan and India are much higher than those of Rumania and Spain which exhibit the maximum in Europe, but are lower than those of Latin American Mexico, which with 44·7 per 1000 inhabitants tops the world-list. Be it noted, however, that West Bengal is way behind Mexico.

Death Rate Highest

The demographic peers of West Bengal may now be grouped together from the standpoint of mortality or death rate per 1000 inhabitants. The table is as follows (in averages for 1939-43):

Country	Death Rate	Country	Death Rate
1 West Bengal ...	23·7	5 Ecuador ...	20·0
2 Mexico ...	22·7	6 Rumania ...	19·0
3 India ...	21·8	7 Spain ...	16·4
4 Chile ...	21·2		

³ *West Bengal 1947*, pp. 17-18; *Monthly Bulletin*, April 1948 (Lake Success), pp. 15-17.

These seven countries are practically the regions of highest death rates in the world. And West Bengal happens to top the list.

In this context it is worthwhile to observe that 1943 was the worst year for the two Bengals or rather Undivided Bengal on account of the *Panchaser Manvantar* (Cataclysm of 1350, the Bengali equivalent of 1943 A.C.).

The *manvantar*, cataclysm (tremendous famine as well as deaths due to famine) did away with 3-5,000,000 human beings. This famine, be it observed, was perhaps hardly economic, i.e., due to absence or scarcity of food products. It may rather have been deliberately and planfully brought about as a war measure against the prospective *Azad Hind Fauj* (Indian National Army) of Netaji (Field Marshal) Subhas Bose who was in alliance with the Japanese Empire and Nationalist-Revolutionary Burma. It was probably considered expedient to destroy every possible source of food and transport in pursuance of the "scorched earth" policy. This was known in India as the "denial of facilities to the enemy." Subhas Bose and the Indian National Army, as eventual liberators of Bengal from the retreating British Army, were to be presented with a grainless, boatless, and drugless Bengal. It belonged naturally to the war strategy to leave a famished, hungry, sick, and dying people of sixty millions in the hands of Subhas Bose. The people of Bengal were expected automatically to revolt against the liberators or at any rate to keep their hands tied to the problem of feeding, clothing, medicating and transporting the men, women and children from day to day.

The result of "the denial of facilities" to the advancing nationalists was an unprecedented havoc on human lives in West as in East Bengal. The death rate of West Bengal for 1943 was consequently a very weighted one.

All the same, the "scorched earth policy," *manvantar*, the famine and the deaths were not exclusively responsible for the mortality 23.7 per thousand inhabitants in West Bengal during the quinquennium 1939-43. India's rate of 21.8 indicates a generally more or less uniform height for the entire subcontinent. With the due that should be accorded to the calamitous famine we may take 21 as the somewhat common norm for Latin American Chile and India (comprising West Bengal). Thus considered, there is but one country in the world that can beat West Bengal, and this is Mexico in Latin America. The two European regions, Rumania with 19 and Spain with 16.4, are substantially below this rate, although quite high for the general Eur-American standard in mortality.

For instance, some of these death rates are as follows (for 1943):

1 Holland	... 8.6	9 U. K.	... 12.2
2 New Zealand	... 9.2	10 Czechoslovakia	... 13.3
3 Canada	... 9.7	11 Bulgaria	... 13.4
4 Australia	... 9.9	12 Italy	... 13.4
5 Denmark	... 10.1	13 Belgium	... 13.9
6 Norway	... 10.2	14 Ireland	... 14.2
7 U. S. A.	... 10.6	15 Austria	... 15.3
8 Sweden	... 11.5	16 France	... 15.6

The West Bengal or All-Indian average for the quinquennium 1939-43 is not to be compared with these rates for the single year 1943. But it shows us to what heights in the matter of control of deaths the European countries have risen. In the matter of control of deaths West Bengal, nay, India as well as Pakistan, have an enormous problem. In case Holland's 8.6, nay, France's 15.6 be set as the ideal, West Bengal with 23.7 (or say, 21) will have before her a target of vital statistics which should appear to be virtually inaccessible. This furnishes one of the most fundamental socio-economic data for West Bengal so far as man-power is considered.

The Death-Conquerors of the World

West Bengal is now a part of a Dominion. It is therefore time for us Bengalis and other Indians to attempt catching up with the Dominions like Australia and Canada in modern spirituality, civilization and efficiency. In population strength West Bengal is, as we have seen, in a sense one of the largest countries of the world. But in quality and achievements this man-power is one of the lowest by the world-standard,—although it is not inferior to any throughout Bharatvarsha comprising India as well as Pakistan.

The greatest achievement of modern mankind is to be found in the decline of the death rate. In ancient Hindu medical and social literature the expectation of life was declared to be one hundred years. That was certainly a pious wish. The conquest of death was the motto set before Hindu children. *Mrityunjayi* (death-conqueror) was the ideal of men and women. The ideal has been realized to a considerable extent in virtually every country of Europe and in all the Dominions.

The death rates of New Zealand, Canada and Australia are between 9 and 10 per 1000 inhabitants. There is hardly any country of Europe where the death rate is above 16. Rumania with 19 happens virtually to be an exception. But in West Bengal as indeed in All-India (1939-43) the death rate is 22-24. The Domi-

nions as well as Europe have grown into earthly paradises, so to say. Examined by the objective and positive indices of international vital statistics they have thereby become the pioneers of a new spirituality. It is for West Bengal as for the rest of India to attempt establishing these paradises of low mortality in our midst and spiritualizing the people with this new achievement.

*The Zones of High Infant Mortality in the
two Hemispheres*

Quite a flood of light is thrown on the situation from an examination of the infant mortality rates. From the five-year averages (1939-43) of the 14 districts in West Bengal we get 160·9 (161) deaths per 1000 births during the first year of existence.⁴ Let us place this rate in the table of more or less approximate or neighbouring rates as exhibited by diverse countries of the two Hemispheres.

For 1939-43 the table of infant mortality rates for certain demographic peers of West Bengal is indicated below:⁵

Country	Infant Mortality	Country	Infant Mortality
1 Chile 206	7 Portugal 132
2 West Bengal	... 161	8 Spain 124
3 Colombia	... 153	9 Hungary 123
4 Ecuador	... 146	10 Peru 123
5 Ceylon 145	11 Mexico 121
6 Bulgaria	... 132	12 Venezuela	... 120

Chile in Latin America tops the list with 206 deaths per 1000 births during the first year of the living-born.

West Bengal is second to Chile, although considerably behind. Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Mexico and Venezuela are some of the countries of Latin America that belong to the group, which happens to be the zone of highest infant mortality. The only European countries of this pattern are Portugal with 132, Spain with 124 and Hungary with 123. The socio-sanitary conditions of these 12 regions constitute by all means a menace to human civilization.

⁴ Stat Abst. West Bengal, 1947, pp. 27-28.

⁵ Monthly Bulletin, April 1948 (Late Success), pp. 26-27; B. K. Sarkar: *The Sociology of Population* (Calcutta, 1936); chapters on Vital Statistics in *Villages and Towns as Social Patterns* (Calcutta 1941).

The standard of civilization may be said to be set by another group of countries which are exhibited below :

Country	Infant Mortality	Country	Infant Mortality
1 New Zealand	... 31	9 Denmark	... 58
2 Holland 34	10 Canada 61
3 Norway 37	11 France 64
4 Australia 38	12 Ireland 66
5 Sweden 39	13 Austria 73
6 Switzerland	... 43	14 Belgium 82
7 U. S. 48	15 Italy 97
8 U. K. 53	16 Czechoslovakia	... 98

In these sixteen countries there is a great difference between New Zealand's 31 and Czechoslovakia's 98. But so far as West Bengal is concerned even Czechoslovakia's 98 is much too high a target for the region exhibiting as it does 161.

"Aunties' Homes" in Latin America

In infant mortality as in general death rate West Bengal's man-power, like that of All-India, is on a par with that of some Latin American countries. That is why, generally speaking, Latin American countries may be regarded as some of the *Mashibaris* (maternal aunties' homes) of Indian peoples.

New Zealand with 31, Australia with 38, Canada with 61, France with 64, Austria with 73, Czechoslovakia with 98 are all much too above West Bengal and India generally in this respect. It will be long before the man-power of the Indian Union or of entire Bharatvarsha can think of enjoying spiritual parity with the Dominions or the European regions and the U. S. A.

Hospitals and Beds per Thousand Inhabitants

High mortality is evidently a concomitant of high morbidity or proneness to disease. It is significant that public facilities in West Bengal for the treatment of disease are few and far between. In 1942 there were altogether 628 hospitals and dispensaries⁶ in the districts now known as West Bengal (comprising Calcutta). As the area is something over 28,000 square miles this means one hospital or dispensary per 45 square miles.

These hospitals had provision for 5650 beds. For a population of over 21 millions this implies 0.27 beds per 1000 inhabitants. One bed only was available for 3704 persons.

6 *Stat. Abst. West Bengal (1946)*, p. 32.

The position of West Bengal in world-perspectives in this regard may be seen in the following table which gives the number of beds in the hospitals per 1000 inhabitants' (mostly for 1925).

Country	Beds	Country	Beds
1. Germany ...	7.9	8. Denmark ...	4.3
2. Switzerland ...	7.3	9. Hungary ...	3.4
3. U.S.A. ...	6.9	10. Holland ...	3.0
4. Norway ...	5.7	11. Poland ...	7.8
5. Sweden ...	5.7	12. Soviet Russia ...	1.3
6. New Zealand ...	5.3	13. Bulgaria ...	1.1
7. Austria ...	4.8	14. Japan ...	1.1
15. West Bengal ...		0.27	

From the above international survey we get the following table indicating the number of persons in each country for whom a bed is available.

Country	Persons	Country	Persons
1. Germany ...	127	8. Denmark ...	233
2. Switzerland ...	137	9. Hungary ...	294
3. U.S.A. ...	145	10. Holland ...	333
4. Norway ...	175	11. Poland ...	355
5. Sweden ...	175	12. Soviet Russia ...	769
6. New Zealand ...	189	13. Bulgaria ...	909
7. Austria ...	208	14. Japan ...	909
15. West Bengal ...		3704	

It is obvious that in regard to the treatment of diseases while not more than 127 persons in Germany have eventually to compete for one bed, in West Bengal the number of competitors is 3704. The German people has 29 times as great facilities for medical care as the West Bengal. This is the highest medical facility available in the world. For West Bengal such a high target would be but a crying for the moon. Even the nearest, namely, Japan or Bulgaria offers 4 times as much facility as West Bengal. These figures are very significant in a comparative study of the man-power of West Bengal *visavis* that of other countries. And it must not be overlooked that the 1942 figure for West Bengal has been placed in the background of 1925 for which the figures for other countries have been indicated.

Two Medical Men per 10,000

In the Joseph Bhoze Report (1946) the medical men (qualified) are distributed (1942) in Bharatvarsha (comprising India and Pakistan) as follows :

1. Bengal	12,276	7. Assam	1,859
2. Bombay	9,401	8. C.P. & Berar	1,153
3. Madras	8,030	9. Orissa	664
4. Punjab	6,324	10. Sind	478
5. U. P.	4,048	11. N. W. F. P.	282
6. Bihar	3,253	12. Delhi	256

The number of persons for whom one qualified medical man is available is then as follows :

1. Bombay	2,218	7. Sind	9,487
2. Delhi	3,586	8. N. W. F. P.	10,773
3. Punjab	4,494	9. Bihar	11,171
4. Bengal	4,913	10. Orissa	13,145
5. Madras	6,145	11. U. P.	13,586
6. Assam	7,509	12. C. P.	14,582

In 1942 Bengal and Punjab were more or less at par. Bombay was twice as equipped as each of these areas because she had one medical man for 2218 inhabitants while Punjab had the same for 4,494 and Bengal for 4913 inhabitants. The services of medical men available in Bengal and Punjab were half those in Bombay.

From these figures it is obvious that Bombay had, say, nearly 4 medical men per 10,000 inhabitants and Bengal something like 2. India's position can now be envisaged in the international perspectives. During 1921-25 medical men per 10,000 inhabitants were as follows in diverse countries of the world :

Germany	29	France	13
Austria	19	Holland	11
Japan	19	Sweden	10
Norway	15	Bulgaria	8
Denmark	13	Poland	5

Russia 3

The statistics of different countries are not collected in a uniform way and are therefore not comparable. But a rough idea can be obtained from the fact that so late as 1942 Bengal did not have more than 2 medical men (and Bombay not more than 4) while twenty years before that Germany had 29, Japan 19 and Bulgaria 8.

Sanitary-Medical Re-armament

The economics of public health may now be examined. During 1946-47 Undivided Bengal had a total budget of Rs. 426,754,000. Out of this amount the sum spent on health department was Rs. 12,989,000.⁸ As the total population was 60 millions the expenditure was Rs. 7 p. h. and the health expenditure p. h. came up to Re 0-3-6.

On any count the position is despicably miserable. Among the numerous "plans" that have become popular in recent years in order to advance the economic and cultural interest of the people, we have the Bhore Plan of 1916. This is the scheme formulated by the Committee for Health Survey and Development under the Chairmanship of Sir Joseph Bhore. This plan envisages 25,800 beds for 24,000,000 inhabitants. This implies one bed for every 936 persons. A situation like this would be considerably superior to the present condition and more or less equal to the Japanese or Bulgarian pattern in medical provision. This is quite a conceivable target. It may not be brushed aside as much too idealistic or unrealisable. And yet the attempt to rise from the condition of 3704 persons to that of only 936 persons eventually competing for one bed should be treated as Herculean. The Bhore Committee has therefore considered it expedient to treat this target as a long term goal and be content with suggesting a short term goal of half this dimension.

The Bhore Committee again envisaged an annual finance of Re. 1-4-0 per head of population during the first five years, Rs. 2-7-0 during the second five years, or an average of Rs. 1-14-0 during the first ten years. A finance like this in the present background of Re 0-3-6 can but be an expression of ultra-romanticism in the economics of public health.

All the same, in order to assure the minimum requirements of efficiency per head of population the sanitary and medical rearmament of West Bengal, district by district, is an urgent desideratum. No item of economic planning can be regarded as more basic than the reconstruction of public health and medical administration.

The Achievements of Small Nations

In order to realize the ideal of *mrityunjayi* or death-conqueror the Dominions as well as the U. S. A. and Europe have been bestowing brains and bullion in large proportions on the sanitary and public health service; i. e. the prevention (as contrasted with the cure)

⁸ *Stat. Abst. West Bengal (1948)*, p. 199.

of diseases during the last two generations. These services are independent of and different from medical care, hospitalization, dispensary activities and so forth. West Bengal's or India's positive equality with the Dominions, U. K., France, Germany, U. S. A. and so forth cannot be a question of practical politics until and unless "preventive" medicine acquires a prominence in our culture, patriotism and public finance.

With the object of mastering the spiritual science or art of the conquest of death West Bengal, like the rest of India, will have to practise discipleship with the new death-conquering institutes and movements of Australia, Canada and their peers in a goalful manner for quite a number of years. No problem before the man-power of West Bengal as a limb of Dominion India is more serious than this one of manufacturing *mrityunjays* or death-conquerors in large numbers. The patriots of West Bengal have need likewise to cultivate intimacy with the smaller countries of the world.⁹

Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Belgium, Switzerland, Czechoslovakia, Austria and so forth are the regions which although relatively small in population strength are really great powers in sanitation, culture and efficiency. Bengalis and Indians generally should cease to get obsessed by "great powers" like the U. K., Germany, the U. S. A., France etc. and divert their attention to a considerable extent to the achievements of these small nations, which are almost invariably as high as, if not higher than, those of the former. And yet we must be realistic and sensible enough to understand that it will not be a question of practical politics for quite a long time to think of catching up with these small countries in matters of public health, expectation of life and other items of man-power. The problem of productivity or output per acre or per head is being left out of consideration for the time being.

Land-Supply Per Family

Next to health and physical vitality the most crucial consideration in connection with the man-power of West Bengal is its material

⁹ Among other things India has quite a lot to learn "Federal"—"State" financial relations and the principles and methods of grants from the Centre to the states from the experiences of countries like Australia. See *Report on the Applications made by the States of South Australia, Western Australia and Tasmania for financial assistance in 1947-48*. (Melbourne). Be it observed that the experiences of the Industrial Finance Department of the Commonwealth Bank of Australia have been utilized by Saroj Basu in *Financing of Post-War Industry* (Calcutta 1948).

subsistence. The land-supply per head of population or per family is the dominant question in this regard.

The 13 districts of West Bengal possess 12·6 million acres of land divided as follows :¹⁰

1. Cultivated area	9·8 million acres
2. Cultivable waste	2·8 „ „
	12·6 „ „

The following table exhibits the cultivated area of the West Bengal districts (in million acres) :

1. Midnapur	2·0	7. West Dinajpur	0·7
2. Twentyfour Parganas	1·4	8. Nabadwip	0·6
3. Murshidabad	0·9	9. Malda	0·5
4. Burdwan	0·8	10. Jalpaiguri	0·5
5. Bankura	0·8	11. Hooghly	0·5
6. Birbhum	0·8	12. Howrah	0·2
13. Jessore	0·1		

The distribution of cultivable wastes in the same thirteen districts is as follows (in million acres) :

1. Midnapur	0·7	7. Burdwan	0·2
2. Bankura	0·4	8. Murshidabad	0·2
3. Twentyfour Parganas	0·3	9. Malda	0·1
4. Jalpaiguri	0·3	10. West Dinajpur	0·1
5. Nabadwip	0·2	11. Hooghly	0·09
6. Birbhum	0·2	12. Howrah	0·03
13. Jessore	0·03		

From the above two tables it is possible to get the percentage of cultivable but uncultivated waste to the total area. These percentages for the thirteen districts are given below :

1. Jalpaiguri	37	7. Birbhum	20
2. Bankura	33	8. Murshidabad	18
3. Midnapur	25	9. Twentyfour Parganas	17
4. Nabadwip	25	10. Hooghly	17
5. Jessore	23	11. Malda	16
6. Burdwan	20	12. Howrah	13
13. West Dinajpur	12		

¹⁰ *Questionnaire of the Agrarian Reforms Committee and Replies thereto* (Government of West Bengal, Land and Revenue Department, 1948), p. 13.

For entire West Bengal 22·2 per cent is then the uncultivated but cultivable waste. This proportion should indicate the target such as economic planning may reasonably set before itself.

Less than 2 Acres per Family in Two Thirds of West Bengal

We shall now deal with some of the indices of poverty such as lie on the surface.

The cultivated area per family of agriculturists in 12 districts of West Bengal is indicated below (in acres)¹¹

1. Jalpaiguri	8·74	7. Twentyfour Parganas	5·43
2. West Dinajpur	7·48	8. Murshidabad	5·41
3. Malda	6·89	9. Midnapur	4·82
4. Bankura	6·48	10. Nadia	4·46
5. Burdwan	6·14	11. Hooghly	4·45
6. Birbhum	6·02	12. Howrah	3·10

The family average is the highest in Jalpaiguri (8·74 acres) and the lowest in Howrah (3·10 acres). But the number of families possessing less than 2 acres is very large. The percentage of families belonging to this category is indicated below district by district :

1. Twentyfour Parganas	56·5	7. Hooghly	32·7
2. Malda	54·2	8. Burdwan	28·6
3. Bankura	53·7	9. West Dinajpur	24·2
4. Howrah	53·2	10. Nadia	16·8
5. Murshidabad	38·3	11. Birbhum	15·1
6. Midnapur	38·2	12. Jalpaiguri	5·3

In Howrah, Bankura, Malda and Twentyfour Parganas more than 50 per cent of the agricultural families possess each less than 2 acres. Of the remaining districts, Burdwan, Hooghly, Midnapur and Murshidabad are regions where more than 25 per cent of the agricultural families are in the same condition. Even without intensive analysis these eight districts may be regarded as zones of poverty (in acreage per agricultural family).

Families (agricultural) possessing each 5-10 acres of land may be regarded as somewhat substantial. Their percentages are as follows district by district :

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 14. Some of the firsthand studies are to be seen in K. M. Mukherjee's papers published in the *Calcutta Review* and the *Modern Review* (1946-47).

1. Jalpaiguri	32·2	7. Murshidabad	16·9
2. West Dinajpur	28·3	8. Malda	15·9
3. Nadia	20·3	9. Burdwan	12·8
4. Hooghly	18·8	10. Twentyfour- Parganas	10·9
5. Midnapur	17·6	11. Bankura	10·3
6. Howrah	17·5	12. Birbhum	8·2

Prosperity as embodied in an agricultural family's command over 5-10 acres is very little distributed in the districts of West Bengal. Jalpaiguri appears to be the most prosperous district from this standpoint. And even this does not exhibit a higher percentage than 32·2. Less than one-third of all the agricultural families in Jalpaiguri possess each 5-10 acres of land.

Landless Labourers^{1 2} More than 30 per cent in Six Districts

Agricultural labourers constitute a substantial portion of the population in West Bengal. The percentage of those families which live mainly or entirely as agricultural labourers is indicated below :

1. Murshidabad	40·8	7. Midnapur	24·9
2. Burdwan	40·0	8. Bankura	24·6
3. Malda	39·8	9. Hooghly	24·3
4. Birbhum	37·6	10. West Dinajpur	23·5
5. Nadia	36·1	11. Twentyfour- Parganas	17·3
6. Howrah	31·2	12. Jalpaiguri	4·1

Agricultural labourers are virtually all landless. More than 30 per cent of the agricultural families are such landless labourers in six districts, e. g. Howrah, Nadia, Birbhum, Malda, Burdwan and Murshidabad.

Wanted Internal Colonization

Studies in acreage as available to agricultural families in the districts of West Bengal demonstrate three fundamental facts bearing

12 *Ibid.*, p. 15. See the papers on agricultural labour in India by V. Jagannadham (Waltair), S. C. Dashi (Puri), P. C. Malhotra (New Delhi), D. V. Rajalakshman (Madras), K. Dutt and A. Dass (Calcutta), K. M. Mukherjee (Calcutta), M. V. Kibe (Indore), B. Govindarow (Guntur), S. Misra (Lucknow) and S. N. Mukherjee (Delhi) in the *Indian Journal of Economics* (Allahabad) for July 1947.

on poverty. First, the acreage available per agricultural family is small. Secondly, landless families are many. In the third place, a very large percentage (22.2) remains yet to be brought under cultivation. These facts or indices of poverty are independent of the question of fertility or yield per acre. One of the most urgent problems in economic development is then to be found in that of redistribution of lands. It is to be effected in such a manner that landless families be endowed with "economic" holdings and that small holders may be enabled to expand their holdings to an adequate extent.

It is only by the Government that such redistributions and re-allocations or resettlements can be consummated. The operations are to be conducted district by district and with consummate tact as well as reasonable equity and humanitarian considerations.

Large-scale schemes of *innere Kolonisierung* (internal colonization) will have to be embarked upon in order to establish the man power of West Bengal on a somewhat secure footing. Improvement of cultivation by scientific and technological methods (mechanization and motorization)¹³ as well as the material advancement of the country through industrial and other ways and means are of course to be envisaged as pre-conditions or concomitants of the general economico-cultural ecology.

Rice Yield Per Acre

We shall now analyze somewhat intensively the poverty of West Bengal with reference to man-power *vis-à-vis* soil.

The total seeded area in West Bengal as well as the area under foodgrains are indicated below for 1939 and 1943-44 (in '000 acres):

		1939-40	1943-44
Total Seeded Area	...	8,900	10,300
Food-grains Area	...	7,872	9,177

During 1939-40 nearly 89 per cent of the total seeded area was under foodgrains. In 1943-44 the percentage was slightly higher, namely 90. It is obvious that virtually most of the cropped territory is given over to the cultivation of foodgrains. These are rice,

¹³ Pierre Fromont: "The Consequences of Motorization in Farming" (*Monthly Bulletin of Agricultural Economics and Sociology*, Rome, February 1940).

wheat, barley, *jowar*, *bajra*, maize, grams and pulses etc. The lion's share belonged to rice.¹⁴

The acreage and output under three kinds of rice (*aus*, *aman* and *boro*) were as follows from 1942 to 1947:

Year			Acreage in '000	Output Maunds in '000
1942-43	7,254	50,910
1943-44	8,159	101,116
1944-45	8,202	83,476
1945-46	8,006	73,603
1946-47	9,154	108,583
Average	8,155	83,537

On the average, 8,155,000 acres were under rice during the five years. The average output per year for the same period was 83,537,000 maunds, say, 84 million mds. One md. (=40 seers) is roughly equal to 40 kilos or, say, 80 lbs. The average yield per acre p.a. then was approximately 10 mds (400 kilos or 800 lbs). This means 9 quintals per hectare, to use an international category. For a population of 22,000,000, be it noted incidentally, the average per head p.a. came up to something like 4 mds. (320 lbs). The daily average per individual was 14 ounces, which is more or less identical with the ration sanctioned at Calcutta (1948).

The poverty of the soil in West Bengal may be envisaged by a comparison with the output of rice in different countries of the world. For 1928 the *Annuaire Statistique* (pp. 53-64) of the League of Nations, Geneva, offers the following productivities of rice in quintals (220 lbs.) per hectare (2½ acres):¹⁵

Group I

Countries	Output	Countries	Output
1 Spain	... 63·6	4 British Guiana	... 29·3
2 Italy	... 49·0	5 Formosa	... 21·4
3 Egypt	... 32·7	6 U. S. A.	... 20·5

Group II

Countries	Output	Countries	Output
7 Korea	... 19·7	12 Mexico	... 15·5
8 Bulgaria	... 19·0	13 Indonesia	... 15·0
9 Portugal	... 17·8	14 India	... 13·9
10 Brazil	... 17·5	15 West Africa	... 11·4
11 Siam	... 17·2		

¹⁴ *Statistical Abstract West Bengal 1947* (Calcutta 1948), pp. 37-39. For the rice economy of the world see the *Monthly Crop Report and Agricultural Statistics* (Rome, 1939, August, p. 799).

¹⁵ B. K. Sarkar: *The Equations of World Economy* (Calcutta 1943), p. 244.

Group III

	Countries				Output
16	Guatemala	9.8
17	West Bengal (1942-47)	9.0
18	Ceylon	7.8

We have placed the figure for West Bengal (1942-47), namely, 9 quintals (220 lbs) per hectare ($2\frac{1}{2}$ acres) in the above international survey (1928). It is obvious that it is much lower than the general Indian average of 13.9 quintals. In the background of the maximum productivities of rice (e.g. 63.6 quintals in Spain and 49 quintals in Italy) India's figure 13.9 quintals makes a very poor show. West Bengal's 9 is unspeakably low.

Irrigation Facilities

In connection with the poverty of output per acre in West Bengal the question of actual irrigation facilities available assumes a special importance.

From 1939 to 1944 the area irrigated from (1) Government canals, (2) private canals, (3) tanks, (4) wells and (5) other sources was as follows:¹⁶

Year				Acres (in 1000)
1939-40	1,886
1940-41	1,630
1941-42	1,730
1942-43	1,706
1943-44	1,648
Average	1,720

The average area p.a. under irrigation was 1,720,000 acres.

The total seeded area during this period was as follows:¹⁷

Year				Total Seeded Area (in 000 acres)
1939-40	8,898
1940-41	8,436
1941-42	9,495
1942-43	9,512
1943-44	10,301
Average	9,330

The annual average of soil under cultivation for all purposes was thus 9,330,000 acres. The area under irrigation was then nearly 18 per cent. The percentage of irrigated area was thus very small. One of the reasons for the poverty of yield per acre is to be found in this inadequacy of irrigation facilities.

¹⁶ *Statistical Abstract West Bengal 1947*, p. 44.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 37.

West Bengal is notorious as a dry and arid region. One of the problems before the statesmen of this territory as of Dominion India is to transform this relative "desert" into an agriculturally productive land. The Damodar Valley Corporation is addressing itself to this target. It is a long-period project, however.

In the meantime the publicists of Dominion India are called upon to investigate if West Bengal cannot be provided with more alluvial soils and larger river-basins in the east. The eastern frontiers of West Bengal have need to be pushed forward to the River Padma in Murshidabad and Nabadwip districts as well as to the River Garai in Jessore and the River Madhumati in Khulna. The problem of West Bengal's territorial expansion to the east so as to touch the western borders of Pabna, Faridpur and Barisal Districts has been acquiring an acuteness during 1948. Large masses of Hindus have been emigrating regularly and almost every day from the East Bengal Districts of Pakistan. The Government of Pakistan Dominion will have to be prevailed upon by the Government of Dominion India to cede the areas referred to (namely, parts of Murshidabad and Jessore as well as Khulna) to West Bengal in order, among other reasons, to accommodate the evacuees from East Bengal.

It is superfluous to observe that the financial needs of West Bengal deserve a special consideration from the Central authorities. The problems of South Australia, Western Australia and Tasmania in the Australian Federation are being experienced by West Bengal. The Central Government will have to study the methods and principles of the Australian Commonwealth¹⁸ *vis-à-vis* needy states in order to Indianise them for the purposes of West Bengal and other areas of Dominion India.

Gandhi, Non-Gandhi, and Anti-Gandhi in the Pattern of Indian Ideologies*

On 30th January 1948 Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi (born 1869) was assassinated at New Delhi by Non-Gandhi and/or Anti-Gandhi. The triumph of Non-Gandhi and/or Anti-Gandhi over Gandhi was ruthlessly complete and with vengeance. The venom of brutality could no further go.

¹⁸ *Report on Applications*, etc. pp. 52-55, 73-74.

* Written on 12 February 1948 last and published in the Gandhi Number of the *Calcutta Review*. See "The Eternal in Gandhi" in B. K. Sarkar: *Creative India* (Lahore 1947).

This fact of interhuman relations should give the last rude shock to all those thinkers, publicists and statesmen who are used to visualize India in terms of a single man, a single institution, a single ideology or a single movement. Like every other region in the world India has always been the theatre of diverse forces, manifold personalities and pluralistic creativities.

Gandhi himself and his ideologies were permanently orientated to the non-Gandhi and the anti-Gandhi elements of the Indian pattern. And invariably it was the Non-Gandhi and the Anti-Gandhi that triumphed over Gandhi from 1906 to 1948. The tragic event of 30th January was but the last item in this series of Gandhi's perpetual surrenders to Non-Gandhi and Anti-Gandhi.

The Basic Indian Bed-Rock of Gandhi's Categories

It is in a sense extremely difficult to categorize Gandhi into a particular slogan. Gandhi touched the Indian masses and classes on the most varied and heterogeneous fronts. And these contacts were intimate and solid. The *liaisons* of Gandhi's political, social, moral and economic categories with those of the rest of the Indian people were very often the *liaisons* of identity, sympathy and co-operation. In most instances these were the relations of a complementary or supplementary character.

Once in a while some of the Gandhian slogans seemed to be in conflict and at variance with those of certain Indian individuals, groups or parties. But even then,—coming down to the brass tacks,—it was possible to detect a fundamental Indian bed-rock. It is this basic, common and universal Indian incentive or urge that rendered formal Gandhi virtually akin to formal Non-Gandhi and formal Anti-Gandhi in a large number of spheres.

The eighteen *sutras* (aphorisms or maxims) of Gandhi's nonviolent revolution are enumerated in the following titles: (1) communal unity, (2) abolition of untouchability, (3) anti-alcoholism, (4) *khadi* (hand spun), (5) other rural and cottage industries, (6) village sanitation, (7) basic education (8) adult education, (9) women's rights and welfare, (10) health education (11) mother-tongue, (12) national language for All-India, (13) removal of economic inequalities, (14) peasants, (15) industrial workers, (16) aborigines, (17) care for lepers, (18) students and youngmen.

These eighteen items may be analyzed as slogans, i. e., words, words, words. We may consider them also as programmes of action. As slogans very many of these have been current coin in India since the days of Rammohun. From generation to generation they have been acquiring momentum. Both professional Non-Gandhi and professional Anti-Gandhi have accepted many of these categories as parts of a general socio-economic

ideology. These have not however been appraised by them in an *advaitavadi*, monistic or exclusive fashion. In regard to many of these items the situation of Gandhi *vs.* Non-Gandhi and/or Anti-Gandhi could not possibly arise. It has to be admitted, however, that a few of these categories have been emphasized in season and out of season in Gandhi's lectures and essays in an almost monistic manner.

So far as the programme of action is concerned, virtually every patriot of India during the last century and a half has tried to do his bit in quite a number of these sectors. The programme belongs indeed to the basic all-Indian socio-economic planning for today as well as for tomorrow. The amount of success achieved by Gandhi in the practical realization of solid results is, as everybody is aware, statistically not very mentionable.

*The Asian Monroe Doctrine in Gandhi's South
African War (1906-14)*

Gandhi was introduced to Young Bengal during the glorious Bengali revolution (1905-14) by Poet Satyen Datta as follows :

Neta tader tarur mata
stabdha drirha dukkhajit,
Nijer mathay bajra dharen
vijay tanhar sunishchit.

Firm is their leader like the tree upright,
His soul flourishes by conquering griefs,
On his own shoulders he bears the thunder,
Thus is their success guaranteed of course.

This is how Gandhi was described as the General of the Indian War against the whites in South Africa (1912). What was Gandhi's *élan de la vie* in that passive resistance movement of the Hindus and Muslims of "Greater India" against the chauvinism and albinocracy of the South-African Colony of the British Empire? In Datta's words :

"Ah, there, the guileless children of Ind,
Lured by the immigration agents' snares,
Deprived of home and of self-respect robbed,
Beyond the seas abide in foreign lands."

Indian "emigrants" had been submitting to the humiliations perpetrated on them by the "superior races" for over a quarter of a century. They had been waiting for a commander to start the war of races against the domineering and the dominant. Gandhi came forward as the champion of the browns against the whites, of Asians against Westerns. It was a phase of the struggle for Asia's Monroe Doctrine. Gandhi's urge was

nothing short of the establishment of political, legal and social equality between the diverse races living in a British territory. And it was in response to the open demands of Indian settlers in South Africa and the tacit support of Chinese and Japanese settlers in all white lands that the war operations were commenced by Gandhi.

There was no "universal brotherhood" in the campaign. No question of loving your enemies arose in that resistance movement. Gandhi was just one of the thousands of Indians at home and abroad who during the revolutionary period (1905-14), were working each and all for the emancipation of India from foreign rule. In the cult of "passiveness" as found in the resistance India as well as the world saw but the only weapon available to unarmed and disarmed human beings.

Gandhi had been quite conscious of the world-value of his South African war and his victories. In December, 1931 at the plenary session of the Round Table Conference in London he was enthusiastic enough to recall his triumphs of some twenty-five years ago. He wanted the British Premier and other politicians to remember that things which General Smuts had "vowed he would never yield in the year 1908, reinforced as he was by General Botha, he had to do in the year 1914 after having tried these civil resisters through and through."

Gandhi was at one with Non-Gandhi and/or Anti-Gandhi, *i. e.*, with every Indian, nay, every Asian during the South-African campaigns. It is only by surrendering to the cry for justice, freedom and self-respect among Non-Gandhis and/or Anti-Gandhis that Gandhi could function in that historic movement of his life. Gandhi was acclaimed as the hero of India, Asia and of all oppressed, races or nationalities. The reason was very simple. The ruling races saw for the first time with their own eyes that their prestige, power and pretensions had been challenged somehow or other by a little representative of unarmed and disarmed slaves. The world understood quite well that the unarmed character of the revolt was but the virtue of a necessity. But a revolt it was and a war of Asia against foreign masters. The Gandhian way was taken to be the common and universal way to Indian as of other armless and emasculated peoples.

Neither any formal or professional Non-Gandhi nor any formal or professional Anti-Gandhi could differ from the Gandhi of action as operating in the South African theatre from 1906 to 1914 (epoch of eight imprisonments for Gandhi).

British Government=Rule Of Satan (1920)

No slogan of Gandhi is better known in India and abroad than the one which condemns the British Government of India as but identical

with the rule of Satan. This identification of Satan with the British regime was declared by Gandhi in 1920.

It was in connection with the civil resistance movement launched against the British Government as a reaction to the British massacre of Indian men, women and children at Amritsar (Punjab) that he enunciated this equation. Evidently this was an all-Indian equation *vis-à-vis* the British regime. There was hardly any non-Gandhi or any Anti-Gandhi to modify this Gandhian equation. The masses and classes of India had been used to this orientation as regards the government of India by the British people. Gandhi just accepted this traditional slogan.

It was neither universal brotherhood nor religion of love that inspired Gandhi to formulate this cult of hatred. Gandhi was at one with every non-Gandhi or anti-Gandhi, if there were any.

If any thing, what one has to observe here is the clarity of expression. Gandhi gave a "local habitation and a name," so to say, to a universal sentiment. He was bold enough to make the declaration in categorical terms. And this was an achievement that could be witnessed by all mankind in Asia and Africa as well as Europe and America. Indeed, the recognition came almost instantaneously from the U. S. A. Gandhi was pronounced to be "the greatest man of the world" by Rev. John Haynes Holmes of the Community Church (New-York). Be it noted that for the entire world it was the age *par excellence* of Lenin, the architect of Bolshevik revolution in Russia.

Enemy And High Priest Of Foreign Propaganda
(1927-39)

The political creed of Gandhi, as formally and officially known throughout the world, was averse and positively hostile to propaganda conducted by Indians in foreign countries. He wanted Indian patriots to concentrate their energies on activities at home. It is to the rural services that he specially directed the attention of social servants and nationalists. He was convinced that the number of men and women required for village reconstruction and establishment of *khadi* (hand-spinning) among the teeming millions was legion. It was, therefore, extremely necessary for him to have at his command and at close quarters every available man and woman possessing literary, scientific, technical and medico-sanitary qualifications. He could not afford to have his man-power or human resources frittered away in political or cultural propaganda in the two Hemispheres. The cultivation of foreign contacts or friendly diplomatic relations even in the most influential centres like London, New York, Paris, Berlin,

Moscow, Tokyo, Rome and Ankara was considered by him to be a luxury which could wait for more convenient times. Gandhism came thus to be a synonym for stay-at-homism and hostility to world-contacts of international diplomatic intercourse. As the enemy of foreign propaganda Gandhi was highly respected in certain circles.

Gandhi's hostility to foreign propaganda was apparent already in 1920. In the atmosphere of the Indian National Congress it became a by-word. The intensive agitation for "*Swaraj* within seven months" was the constant reply to the Non-Gandhi advocates of the cultivation of foreign contacts.

It was interesting that in this instance as in others Non-Gandhi and Anti-Gandhi actually prevailed upon Gandhi from beginning to end. The American certificate about Gandhi as being the "greatest man of the world" was issued in 1921 at a time when the world was really being governed by the ideologies of the Russian revolution and Lenin was the epochmaker of human history. In this American appraisal of Gandhi was to be seen, as the British Foreign Office knew, the hand of hundreds of Indian students, publicists, preachers, political refugees, and businessmen working in the U. S. A. since Vivekananda's Chicago Lecture in 1893, specially from 1905 down to World-War I (1914-18). The impact of *vishwa-shakti* (world-forces) on the valuation of Gandhi's work in India was a solid fact which could not be ignored by Gandhi himself.

And so inspite of aversion to foreign diplomatic contacts Gandhi knew how to receive foreign visitors in the manner of sweet reasonableness. His immediate entourage was never without the influence of foreign *bhaktas*, adorers, associates, colleagues and comrades. Indian visitors and adorers knew this when they wanted to get the *darshan* (sight) of Gandhi. Besides, he fully realized the importance of having foreign newspapermen, authors, politicians, men and women, as interviewers or guests, observers and students. The utilization of *vishwa-shakti* (world-forces) became thus an integral part of his daily life. By 1927 Gandhi's official surrender to Non-Gandhi was registered in the formal affiliation of the Indian National Congress at the Madras session to the League against Imperialism,—the Communist Association of Frankfurt (Germany). This surrender was perhaps a surrender to his devoted *chela* (disciple), Jawaharlal Nehru, who had negotiated this alliance between Indian nationalism and international communism. It is questionable if Gandhi knew or fully understood the tenets of the League against Imperialism or, for that matter, the creed of communism. Gandhi's political, economic and social ideologies, be it observed, have ever fought shy of the fundamentals of class-struggle as indispensable in

socialistic isms. Be this as it may, Gandhi, formally the stoutest despiser of foreign propaganda, came to be the official high priest of the utilization of *vishwa-shakti* (world-forces), curiously enough, under the auspices of communism, as a means to the achievement of India's freedom.

In the cultivation of foreign contacts Gandhi became monistically wedded to Pro Sovietism. Anything associated with Germany, Italy and Japan even in name was treated as poison by Gandhi and the High Command of the Indian National Congress (1933-39). He succeeded in having the party or followers of the Indian National Congress recognized as hostile by German, Italian and Japanese authorities during World-War II (1939-45). In the long run the Indian National Congress leaders,—but not the majority of the Indian population,—found themselves in the position of "formally" declaring Subhas Bose, the ally of Japan, Germany and Italy, as the enemy of India.

It is not necessary to examine the correctness or logicity of this foreign policy of Gandhi and the Indian National Congress in the present context. We understand at any rate that Gandhi's formal and most loudly proclaimed hostility to foreign propaganda hardly ever functioned on the practical level from 1920 to 1942, the year of the *Quit India* complex and consequent imprisonment of himself and Indian National Congress stalwarts.

The establishment of the Dominion of India in August, 1947 placed the Indian National Congress as a matter of course in the midst of *vishwa-shakti* (world-forces). It is Gandhi's lieutenants as well as admirers, colleagues and comrades who are nowadays holding forth as India's ambassadors, ministers, envoys, consuls, experts, observers and what not—here and there and everywhere in Asia, Europe, Africa and America. Gandhism today is with vengeance the cultivation and utilization of *vishwa-shakti* (world-forces).

*"Quit India" = Virtual Alliance with Japan and
Subhas Bose (August, 1942)*

Another slogan of Gandhi's that has become international currency is "Quit India". This was his pronouncement during World-War II in 1942. That was the moment when the British military power as well as the British Empire were at the nadir of depression. The American Army, Navy and Air-force had hardly yet been able to make their presence felt on the Indian theatre of operations (June-August, 1942). The British Empire was considered to be almost a thing of the past in India both by Gandhi as well as by Non-Gandhi and Anti-Gandhi.

The slogan and action of Gandhi on this occasion are worth the attention of all students of world-progress.

On June, 7, 1942, Gandhi wrote in his *Harijan* as follows :

"But my attitude has now undergone a change. I feel that I cannot afford to wait. The people have not my *ahimsa* (non-violence), but mine should help them. I am sure there is ordered anarchy around and about us. I am sure that the anarchy that may result because of the British withdrawal or their refusal to listen to us and our decision to defy their authority will in no way be worse than the present anarchy".

Gandhi was confident as a Hegelian absolutist or moral autocrat that the virtues of his own *ahimsa* would make up for all the sins committed by the *himsa* (violent) activities of his countrymen. This kind of Gandhian 'compensation' belongs to a type of vicarianism rare in the annals of spiritual transformation. It is almost like Jesus's virtues atoning for the vices of all mankind.

In any case it is obvious that Non-Gandhi and Anti-Gandhi triumphed over Gandhi during World-War II. *Ahimsa* was liquidated by Gandhi himself. He bade adieu to it, if not for his own conduct, at any rate, for all his countrymen. In his "Quit India" there was neither universal brotherhood nor peaceful revolution. It was the cult of association with *himsa* or anything and everything calculated to force the British to withdraw from India.

"The programme of mass movement," wrote Gandhi later in *Harijan* (July 26, 1942), "covers every activity included in a mass movement. I would not hesitate to go to the extreme limit, if I find that no impression is produced over the British Government. With the arrests of leaders it should gain strength if it has any vitality."

It is in keeping with the spirit of these pronouncements of Gandhi that on August 4, 1942, the Working Committee of the Indian National Congress passed the following resolution : "The Committee resolves therefore to sanction for the vindication of India's inalienable right to freedom and independence the starting of a mass-struggle on the widest possible scale so that the country might utilize all the strength it has gathered during the last twenty-two years."

While watching this Gandhian preparation for the "mass-struggle on the widest possible scale" it is worth while to visualize the Japanese armies in alliance with Nationalist Burma and ready to thunder at the Burma-India borders. The only function of the British armies everywhere, especially in Asia, at that time was to withdraw. Defiance of England by Gandhi implied automatically a tacit agreement of alliance

with her mortal enemy, Japan. The "August rebellion" organised by the Gandhi men and the Indian masses was an open invitation to Nationalist Burma and Japan for co-operation with the Indian National Congress in order to expel the British Empire from the Indian territories. The "Quit India" ideology was engendered by the consciousness and confidence about the good chances of India's victories over England at the moment of her virtual annihilation. The greatest and most hated Non-Gandhi and/or Anti-Gandhi of the hour was Subhas Bose, the political exile.¹ And yet Gandhi's slogan as well as action were complementary, supplementary or spiritually and materially allied to those of his most uncompromising anti-thesis. In the "Quit India" programme Gandhi was the ally of Subhas and his followers. He submitted to Non-Gandhi and Anti-Gandhi.

Non-Violence And Violence

The first political fact about the Indian pattern from 1857 to 1947 is that the people are thoroughly disarmed and unarmed. Any armed rising of the masses against the British power was automatically unthinkable. The only movement of a large scale and national dimension was therefore bound to be non-violent. This was understood by myriads of Indians, and by none more than by Gandhi. This is the ætiology of his harping on *ahimsa* (non-violence). But Gandhi's *ahimsa* could, as we have seen, be utilized as a means for compensating the sins committed by his colleagues of violence. It was possible for him to hold his non-violence in abeyance when the need arose, as for example, during the summer of 1942, in connection with the "Quit India" complex.

Gandhi hardly ever functioned in isolation from the prevailing world-forces. His *liaisons* with Non-Gandhi and or Anti-Gandhi were constant. If anybody can be described as Non-Gandhi and/or Anti-Gandhi it is the terrorist. And so about Indian terrorists Gandhi had quite a lot to say to the British Premier and others at the Round Table Conference of London in 1931.

He said, of course that he held "no brief for terrorists." But he was careful enough to point out that "the historian has not condemned them." And the existence of terrorists as a political party in India was utilized by him in a thoroughly diplomatic manner. "If you will work the Congress (i. e. the non-terrorist organization) for all it is worth then you will say good bye to terrorism, then you will not need terrorism." In his

¹ See "Gandhi vs Bose" in B. K. Sarkar's *Villages and Towns as Social Patterns*, (Calcutta, 1941) and his Preface to Jiten Ghosh's *Netaji Subhaschandra* (Calcutta, 1946).

appraisal the British Government was nothing but an organized terrorism. It is implied that the terrorist party,—although relatively organized, was no less respectable than the Government itself. "Today you have to fight the school of terrorists," he went on, "with your disciplined and organized terrorism, because you will be blind to the facts of the writing on the wall."

What, then, was Gandhi's suggestion? It was very simple, and went something like this: "If you don't follow me, the terrorists will take care of the country and accomplish in their own way whatever I wish to get done." His own words were as follows: "Will you not see the writing that these terrorists are writing with their blood? Will you not see that we do not want bread made of wheat, but we want bread of liberty; and without that liberty there are thousands today who are sworn not to give themselves peace or to give the country peace?"

This was Gandhi's ultimatum to England in December, 1931. And no propaganda in favour of *himsa*, violence, terrorism and so forth was more broadcast and effective than this one skilfully engineered by the apostle of *ahimsa* (non-violence). India and the world understood it.

There were limitations in Gandhi's fetish of *ahimsa*. For the Dominion of India (estd. August 15, 1947) he accepted *himsa* (violence) as the first postulate among the incentives of its citizens. He did not, therefore, recommend the abolition of the police in the administration of this state. He took it for granted also that the Indian Dominion might become the target of attacks from aggressive states. The army, the navy, and air force were therefore accepted by him without question as the indispensable limbs of this new state. He did not preach or practise pacifism in such a manner as to prescribe the annihilation of the defence departments. Both in internal and external affairs the utility of arrangements to deal with violence by methods of violence was recognized in his creed of non-violence in no questionable manner.

Anti-Machinism and Industrialization

The first economic fact about India is the archaic and primitive material life lived by its hundreds of millions of men, women and children in the villages. In the course of a century and a half its progress along modern, industrial and technocratic lines has not advanced far. Everybody understands that it is sheer folly to visualize India's advances in machine-industries, technically developed factories, and engineering establishments within a short period of time.

Large scale industrialization at break-neck speed is out of the question for India. It can but be a will-o-the-wisp or a wishful thinking. If the

masses are to be touched by political leaders the hope of economic amelioration and the fact of material prosperity must have to be brought home to the teeming peasants in their daily routine of agricultural life. Nobody understood this bit of economic reality more clearly and precisely than Gandhi. This is the foundation of his obsession by handicrafts, manual professions, cottage industries, and specially *khadi* (hand spinning). These are, just the occupations that touch every man, woman and child of the villages.

In spite of this obsession by anti-machinism, manualism, etc. Gandhi could function as the guide-philosopher-friend of industrialists, engineers, chemists, managers of mammoth factories, and directors of large workshops. And of course he boycotted neither the automobile nor the aeroplane. Everybody is aware that although formally and professionally anti-machinist he never declared *jihād* against machines, tools, implements, scientific instruments, workshops, factories, mines, mills and the allied installations associated with 'national economic planning.' It is during the epoch of Gandhism (1920-48) that machinism, technocracy, industrialization, rationalization and so forth have got the greatest fillip in India, sometimes under the auspices of Gandhi's own *bhaktas*, devotees and lieutenants.

The "Naked Fakir" Test

The first cultural and social fact about India is the thoroughly superstitious character of its teeming millions, both Hindu and Muslim. It is impossible for them to have confidence in anybody as a patriot or selfless worker for the national interest unless he appears to them in the external paraphernalia of the religious mendicant. The physical garb e.g., the yellow, orange or black robe of a *sanyasi*, *bhikkhu*, *fakir*, ascetic, monk or so forth is the only passport to recognition as a sincere servant of the country in their estimation. To the masses of India the "naked fakir" test is the sole touchstone of genuineness in social service or patriotism.

It is not enough for them to know that the fellow has actually renounced all his worldly ambitions and material possessions in order to serve the country as a full-timer. They must see with their own eyes that he is living every moment of his daily life in the conventional way of monastic friars or *sadhus* of ancient and medieval India. The patriots and social workers are expected not to have the standard of food, clothing and shelter higher than or different from that of the meanest individual in the country. While out on electioneering, sanitary, educational or other publicity campaigns in the rural areas the social servants must have their baths in the same dirty tanks and drink the same impure water

as the villagers themselves. Unless they suffer from malaria and catch the diseases to which the villagers fall victims on account of the insanitary conditions and absence of clean and pure water in the villages and towns the nationalist workers are not treated as qualified enough to be the advisers, guides and leaders of the Indian people.

The poverty-test and the malaria-test of Indianness for patriots and social servants were thoroughly understood and lived up to by hundreds of patriots who sacrificed their all, including health, efficiency and life during the glorious Bengali revolution (1905-14) and after. For modern times this methodology of social service and patriotic work had been discovered by Vivekananda (1863-1902). It was indeed an integral part of his intellectual and moral creed. It is only through religious movements, he was emphatic enough to observe, that substantially country-wide activities can be promoted in India. In his judgment the masses must see that the activities started by the leaders looked religious in order that they might feel inclined to respect them as worth while and useful to themselves. The religious externals were to be associated with the patriotic and self-sacrificing workers also. This ideology constituted the backbone of Vivekananda's call to Young India (1898-1902) to come forward and establish as well as develop the Ramakrishna Mission for social and spiritual service. His call found wonderful response. The social workers, medical men, teachers, relief administrators, preachers and so forth of the Ramakrishna Mission are all *sadhus*, *sanyasis*, *bhikkhus*, *fakirs*, monks and friars. The vow of poverty is inscribed on their very robes. Each one has to pass the "naked fakir" test.

It is the self-same need for modern monks and the self-same socio-cultural *milieu* that inspired Gandhi to hold forth as a "naked fakir" from 1920 to 1948. Every moment of his life it was a sociological necessity for him to demonstrate to those that run that he was living the life of the poorest Indian as indicated by the estimates of national wealth and income.

A "naked fakir" although, Gandhi found it convenient to be served by the bourgeoisie of all types, zamindari, industrial and commercial. He was not obscurantist enough to boycott millionaires and multimillionaires, Indian, Asian, African as well as Eur-American, in his daily interhuman pattern. He did not make a speciality of hobnobbing exclusively with the have-nots, domestic servants, hungry clerks, semi-starved intellectuals, and the industrial proletariat.

The Realities And The Practicables

There is only one *Rishi* who understands political science as well as the political profession. That was our old Hindu Kautalya, To him

arhashastra (politics) was the science of realities and the art of the practicable. Kautilya was reborn in Europe later as Machiavelli, whose *Prince* knew what was necessary in order to live on earth as a human being among human beings. Machiavelli did not think of the impossibles and counselled nothing but the realisable.

Both Kautilya and Machiavelli would have considered Gandhi to be the very embodiment of their science or philosophy and art. Of all the statesmen, publicists and patriots of the world nobody had a keener understanding of and a greater command over the realities of life than Gandhi. Nobody possessed a shrewder sense of the maximum that can be possibly accomplished with one's limited resources than Gandhi. Gandhi's patriotism and public life would remain one of the most marvellous achievements of Creative India. He is perhaps the most systematic and successful *Realpolitiker* of all ages.

Bengalis in Dominion India

What is the Bengali Spirit?

Bengal has no form, no profile, no contour. This is the exact opposite of India whose contour is precise, form definite, and profile remarkable. The absence of form endows the Bengali with extraordinary elasticity. It has enabled Bengalis to flow in every direction and into every hole. Bengalis are used to penetrate the nooks and corners of the surrounding regions. The expansion achieved by Bengal in all the "ten quarters" is but a synonym for her formlessness. Perhaps we may find a parallel to Bengal's absence of contour and form in the bauyan tree of the Botanical Gardens at Shibpur.

The principal trunk of this tree is almost hidden from view. It is without definition and without axis, so to say. Even its smallest twigs push in the shortest possible time their arms high up into the air and their roots down below,—growing, expanding, prospering until each becomes a forest. Something like this, indeed, is what Andre Gide, the French man of letters, wrote about Germany in *La Nouvelle Revue Française* (June 1909).

Every twig of Bengal has produced in reality a Bengal around itself. This is due to her creative urge, the drive for expansion, *l'elan de la vie*. It is here that we encounter the Bengali spirit.

The absence of well-marked boundaries has rendered Bengal fluid. There is no rigidity and there is no exclusiveness in Bengal's efforts

at *rapprochement* and achievement in assimilation. The dynamics of creative Bengal has rendered it acceptable to all and sundry. Elasticity is writ large on the brow of Young Bengal.

Bengal as a country, a territorial complex, is formless, boundless. It is hydra-headed and myriad-armed like its gods and goddesses. There are Bengals and Bengals here and there and everywhere in Eastern India. As an ethnic category, likewise, Bengal is featureless. It is a complex of races, a melting pot of peoples, a museum of somatic characteristics, cephalic indices, nasal indices and so forth. Bengali biotype is heterogeneous and multiform. The Bengali spirit or Bengalicism is independent as much of the villages and the valleys in which the numerous Bengals flourish as of the head-forms, nose-forms, and colour of the hair, skin or eyes of Bengal's inhabitants.

The Santal, the Munda, the Oraon, the Nepali, the Koch, the Tibetan, the Lepcha, the Bhutiya, the Chinese, the Burman, the Lushai, the Manipuri, the Chakma, the Khasi, the Garo and countless other tribal traits have all contributed to the formation of Bengal's men, women and children. The conglomeration of brachies and dolichocephals, mesorrhines and leptorrhines as well as their permutation and combination constitute the Bengali people. It is the Bengali spirit that moves, flows, agitates, expands, utilizes the world-forces, and conquers. The Nordic, the Mediterranean and the Mohenjodarian no less than the Austric, the Dravidian and the Mongolian are spurred on by the Bengali spirit to acculturation, miscegenation, assimilation as well as construction, of new types, patterns and forms.

In modern times down to 1905 Bengal comprised Bihar, Chhota-nagpur and Orissa to the west, as well as Assam to the east for a certain period. Bengal was shapeless, formless and boundless, independent of and indifferent to natural physiography as well as human physiognomy. The partition of 1905 failed to confer a territorial form or an ethnological pattern on Bengal. Bihar, Chhota-nagpur, Orissa as well as Western and Southern Bengal constituted one administrative unit. Assam was annexed to Northern and Eastern Bengal to constitute another administrative unit.

Bande Mataram, the national song, was the hymn not of the Bengali-speaking people alone. It was the *mantra* and war cry for seventy millions of men, women and children living in that formless Bengal. It was the slogan for Bihari (Hindi)-speaking, Assamese speaking and Oriya-speaking as well as for Bengali-speaking peoples.

And it was to inspire the Muslims as much as the Hindus. The author, Bankim Chatterji, was indifferent to language and race while composing this soul-stirring national anthem. Ardent exponent as he was of Comte's anti-theocratic positivism i.e. religion of humanity or social service, Bankim, as author of this song, was inspired exclusively by considerations of territorial and secular (i.e. non-religious) patriotism. *Bande Mataram* was in any case the embodiment of the fluid, assimilative, dynamic and elastic Bengali in a formless, multi-featured, hetero-racial and pluralistic Bengal.

What about the Bengal of 1911—47? It was as usual the land of heterogeneous races and tribes. It was, besides, deprived of a large number of little Bengals that were left out as "irredentas" among the neighbouring administrative units to the west and to the east.

Since the partition of August 1947 the boundaries of Bengal have been as deformed as ever before. The two Bengals of to-day are each equally multifarious in somatic features or racial characteristics. And each is longing for new territories or new worlds to conquer. Bengal's boundaries are mobile still. The Bengali spirit,—dynamic, expansive, fluid,—urges the men, women and children still to new, creativities and patterns of life.

Bengalicism does not know "thus far and no farther". There is no last word to its elasticity, fluidity, expansiveness as well as power of transforming the geopolitical forces and recreating the civilization of mankind. New chapters in the remaking of India and the building up of Asia bid fair to be opened by the creativities of the Bengali spirit.

The Anushilan-Jugantar Movement

The Bengali spirit does not dread opposition. It thrives inspite of enmity, nay, by overpowering opposition and conquering the enemies. The jealousies, envies and malices working against Bengalicism have but served to help forward its adaptability, elasticity and expansive drive.

An epoch-making expression of the Bengali spirit was the boycott of British goods declared in August 1905. This was too much for certain sections of non-Bengali India to understand and assimilate for some time. But ultimately the Indian National Congress had to accept this boycott movement as well as the Bengali revolution as all-Indian phenomena.

This all-Indian aspect of the success of the Bengali revolution was signalized by the emergence of the slogan "Lal-Bal-Pal" (Lala Lajpat Rai the Punjabi—Bal Gangadhar Tilak the Maratha—Bipin Chandra Pal the Bengali) in India's interprovincial politics. Bengalis had their first and foremost allies in those days among Marathas and Punjabis. The Bengali-Maratha-Punjabi alliance constituted the most solid nucleus of revolutionary India at home as in Eur-Asia and Eur-America. By 1911 the British Government had to submit to Bengalicism and Bengali creativity by annulling the partition. The Bengali-Maratha-Punjabi alliance is functioning still.

The Bengali spirit of those days (1905-14) was embodied, among other things, in the *Anushilan Samiti* (Culture Association for physical exercise, gymnastics and athletic sports) corresponding somewhat to the Sokol Organization of the Czechs. The organizer of that movement was General Pulin Das. Another embodiment of the Bengali spirit was the *Jugantar* (Transformation of Epochs, i. e. Revolution Party of Young Bengal. It was inspired and commanded by Bhupen Datta (brother of Swami Vivekananda), Barin Ghosh (brother of Aurobindo) and others. Both these movements were interested in martial exploits and preparations for war, howsoever primitive might be the methods and patterns.

Anushilan and *Jugantar* were, as attested by the *Rowlatt Report* (1918), powerful forces in Bengal and Northern India during World-War I (1914-18). Certain sections of India tried to crush these forces and co-operated with the British Government in this regard. Since 1920 Bengalicism,—especially the *Anushilan-Jugantar* spirit,—has been the butt of organized antipathies, hatreds, hostilities and attacks on the part of certain Indians in All-Indian sectors of activity. Subhas Bose, one of the greatest interpreters and representatives of the *Anushilan-Jugantar* movement, was even openly declared by some stalwarts of the Indian National Congress as the enemy of India (1935-41). The heroic efforts of *Netaji* (Field-Marshal) Subhas Bose* and his *Azad Hind Fauj* (Indian National Army) in the Battles of the Imphal-Kohima sector (March-August 1944) in Manipur and Assam in alliance with Nationalist Burma and the Japanese Empire against the British Empire were even appraised by such veterans in alliance with the British army as anti-Indian and inimical to India.

* A. C. Chatterji's: *India's Struggle for Freedom* (Calcutta 1947)

And yet in 1946 the same anti-Bengali veterans, nay, the Indian National Congress; espoused the cause of the late *Netaji* Subhas reported to be killed (killed in accident 1945) and his Indian National Army, then under trial by the British Court Martial at New-Delhi, and compelled the British Government to withdraw the cases against Major-General Anil Chatterji, Col. Shah Nawaz and other heroes of the War of Independence. Verily, the spirit of Subhas Bose and Bengalicism triumphed over the hatreds and enmities *vis-à-vis* Bengal as over the British opposition to Bengali creativities.

The Bengali Netaji of the Non-Bengali Indian Army.

The establishment of two Dominions in South Asia, India and Pakistan, is to a considerable extent an aftermath of Subhas Bose's war against the British Empire. This was conducted by the Bengali *Netaji* with the help of the Hindu-Muslim and non-Bengali Punjabi-Maratha-Madrasi, united army of Revolutionary India. Indeed, Subhas Bose's army was predominantly and almost entirely Muslim. This achievement of Subhas, the Hindu, was a terrible eye-opener to the British people. Further, the Indian National Army was composed of several thousand well-trained non-Bengali ex-soldiers and ex-officers of the British Indian Army with just a few Bengali intellectuals and medical men as raw recruits or volunteers. The Bengali spirit and creativities manifest in this armed organization and military pattern were enough to convince the shrewd statesmen of the British Empire that it could no longer depend on the formal liployalty of the Indian troops and officers in the British Indian Army. They understood that the British Indian Army had virtually ceased to exist, and that even Muslims were not friendly to the British *raj*. The astute British Empire-builders were quick enough to change their fronts and almost overnight came forward with the withdrawal of the cases against Subhas Bose's I. N. A. and the grant of Dominion liberties to Indian peoples.

The establishment of the two Dominions was considered by them to be a British Imperial necessity in order that the British Empire might safely function with the assurance of a somewhat friendly or neutral South Asia in the event of World-War III. It is the Bengali spirit, and especially the *Anushilan-Jugantar* movement, that has been in the main responsible for the Dominion Status of August 1947, frame-worked as it is within the pattern of British strategic, techno-industrial and military-naval-aerial defences. British ex-

pediency has considered the Dominion freedom of the Indian peoples to be quite consistent with and a reliable instrument for the "rationalization" and strengthening of the British Empire.

Subhas Bose (1944-45) is not the last item of the Bengali spirit as embodied in the *Anushilan-Jugantar* movement. Since 1945 and especially since August 1947 that series of Young Bengal's creativities has been in for unfolding new items according to the changed conditions of Bengal's physical and human geography.

Post-Subhas Young Bengal

The problem before post-Subhas Young Bengal is simple. Among other things it has been demonstrating to the world in industries, arts and sciences as in politics, social work and other phases of culture the old Hesiodic paradox that "part is greater than the whole." Non-Bengali India has been getting acculturated to the Bengali spirit, Bengalicism and the Bengali urges for expansion. The National Government of Dominion India at New Delhi has considered it worth while to withdraw the British ban on the heroes of Subhas Bose's I. N. A. and rehabilitate them among the masses and classes of the Indian people as honourable and patriotic citizens (29 March 1948). The *Anushilan-Jugantar* spirit is thus continuing to influence All-India.

It is the *Anushilan-Jugantar* series that is functioning in both official and non-official politics as well as culture and other phases of interhuman relations. In West Bengal, at any rate, the ministries are being made and un-made by the *Anushilan-Jugantar* movement. They are but the play-things of the spiritual children and grand-children of Pulin Das, Bhupen Dutta and Barin Ghose, although none of these fathers and grand-fathers of India's freedom have any official address in the Government buildings at Calcutta or Delhi. The revolution in China was fathered by Sun Yatsen. It was not Sun Yatsen, however, who subsequently ruled Republican China, but Yuan Shikai. The martyrdom of Sun Yatsen is a daily occurrence in the patriotic of self-sacrifice is perpetually prepared for situations in which the Yuan Shikais lord it over the material world.

Be this as it may, the slow but steady conversion of non-Bengali India and her continuous assimilation to Bengali ideas, ideals and ideologies has been proceeding in a palpable manner. Success, of course, is not to be measured by the quantity of Government loaves and fishes coming to Bengalis. The Bengali spirit continues to

be a problem of non-Bengali India. The ever-fluid, ever-elastic, ever-assimilative and ever-dynamic Bengali of formless Bengal has been ceaselessly at work to create problems for Asia and the world.

This is but in keeping with the traditions of Young Bengal which in spite of the anti-Bengali animus of certain sections of non-Bengali India succeeded in creating during 1905-47 the problems of India for the British Empire. At every step mankind in East and West is used to expecting fresh contributions to geopolitics and societal transformation as well as to arts and sciences from the *Anushilan-Jugantar* life-pattern of Young Bengal.

Hindi in the Bengali Strategy of "Delhi Chalo"

Among other things a new challenge from India and the world has been accepted by Young Bengal on account of the inclusion of West Bengal, small-sized as it is, in the extensive Union of India. This consists in the attempts of the Bengali *intelligentsia* to demonstrate that they can assimilate, think in, speak and write Hindi while preserving their own Bengali language. They are thereby to command the attention, admiration and respect of all Hindi-speaking men, women and children from Bihar to the Punjab. In the bazars of the villages as in the assemblies of learned societies, in the Courts of Law as on the platforms of the Parliaments, in University and school classes as in the discussions of political, labour, industrial and other Conferences,—no matter whether in the numerous States or in the Provinces of Northern and Western India,—Bengali men and women are called upon today to exhibit their mastery of Hindi language and literature in an unmistakable manner.

The world is getting convinced that the dynamic, elastic, fluid Bengalis who, on account of their command over English, were capable of conquering the Indian mind and enjoying the love and sympathy of myriads of non-Bengali Indians in spite of occasional jealousies and envies engendered in political circles are determined once more to re-conquer that old status by their efficiency and achievements in Hindi. It is in and through the assimilation of Hindi that Young Bengal has been being spurred on since 1947 to transform the geopolitics of India. A new form of *Delhi Chalo* (March on Delhi) is in this manner being consummated by Bengali men and women of arts and sciences, as well as of industry, commerce and politics. The cultivation of Hindi by Bengalis is a new strategy in their reconquest of Indian politics and culture.

The Partition of Bengal

The partition of Bengal (15 August 1947) bids fair to be an event of extraordinary cultural and social significance in the transformation of the Indian peoples of the South Asian region. A parallel to this phenomenon in Asia is to be sought in the transformation of the European, nay, Eur-American peoples by the partition of Germany (May 1945).

For the last three years German scientists, technicians, and experts in diverse professions have been being kidnapped, coaxed and cajoled, or invited into the Russian Empire from the Central-European borders up to the Siberian Pacific Coasts. On the other hand, they have been finding their way willy-nilly by persuasion or friendly overtures into almost every country of Western Europe including the British Isles as well as the U.S.A. Slowly and silently but by all means solidly and most effectively there has been going on a genuine and profound Germanization of the Russian Sovietic sphere of Eur-Asia as well as the non-Russian Western world in the two Hemispheres.

Germanization of the Two Hemispheres

This Germanization of the world through the influx of German men of technology and engineering as well as arts and sciences is independent of the Germanization that has been consummated on account of the settlements of German men and women in different countries of Europe from Finland to Spain during World-War II. The post-war emigrations of Germans openly *en masse* as well as secretly in groups to safer or politically more congenial territories are also to be considered as additional factors in this Germanizing process as operative among non-German peoples. The presence of untold German prisoners of war (several millions) in the East-European Empire of Soviet Russia, naturally under humiliating conditions, is no mean item in this hemispheroidal Germanization.

Last but not least in importance in this regard are the dismantlements of numerous mammoth factories and workshops on German soil by the victors of World-War II, both Russian and Anglo-American. Thousands of machineries, tools and implements have been being conveyed with or without accounts or vouchers to the countries of the victors from the Atlantic and the Trans-Atlantic territories to the Pacific. Nay, the machineries, tools and imple-

ments of the dismantled German establishments are being sold by the victors to the under-developed and undeveloped countries of Asia, Africa, South America as well as Europe. Non-Eur-American countries also are thereby being equipped with the products of German manufacture and to that extent Asia and Africa are getting Germanized in their attempts at industrialization.

The exportation of these German *Produktions-mittel* (means or instruments of production), capital goods or producers' goods does not imply the transfer exclusively of material stuff, iron and steel, hardware and other metal products. A large amount of human resources or man-power is automatically involved in this transfer. Every German machine requires very often a German *mistri* (skilled working man) to serve it, instal it, work it, and repair it. And so German *mistris*, foremen, supervisors, engineers and experts of other denominations in dozens, hundreds or thousands belong to the paraphernalia of these exportations of German machineries here and there and everywhere. This is specially the case in regard to the exports to Asia and Africa. Altogether, the entire world today is in the grip of a German invasion in men, ideas and inventions. Verily, captive Germany has captured Anglo-American, or the Western Bloc, as well as Soviet Russia. The conquests by Germany's inventions, discoveries, machines, implements, *mistris*, technologists, engineers, and scientists have already transcended in permanent values the ephemeral conquests by Hitler from the Atlantic to Stalingrad during 1939-43.

Bengali Hindu Refugees in Non-Bengali India

Corresponding to this Germanization of mankind today in East and West the world is witnessing the beginnings of a slow but steady Bengalization of the Indian people in the diverse regions of India.

On account of the partition, West Bengal (Pop: 21,2 millions; area: 28,000 sq. miles) has to support 1180 individuals per square mile of gross cropped area whereas East Bengal (Pakistan) is responsible for 1062 persons. During the last twelve months not less than 1,200,000 Bengali Hindu refugees have sought shelter in this thickly peopled area of West Bengal. The influx of immigrants is continuing unabated. Naturally the first rush is being borne by Calcutta which is said to have absorbed more than fifty per cent. The rest have been settled in the thirteen districts. But evidently

these settlements are often nothing but temporary. These Bengali Hindu immigrants from Eastern Pakistan into the West Bengal area of Dominion India are on the look out for fresh fields and pastures new.

As a matter of fact thousands of Bengali Hindu refugees have already found their way into the Assam, Bihar, Chhotanagpur, Orissa, and even U.P. areas of India. The number of such Bengali Hindu immigrants into the formally non-Bengali districts of the Indian Dominion may not be large for the time being. But their impacts on the non-Bengali men, women and children bid fair to be valuable.

The Bengali aptitude for co-operation with non-Bengali neighbours is a well known all-Bharatan fact. It is an essential factor responsible for Bengali creativities and contributions in the culture of Bharatvarsha. All-Bharatan civilization has been enriched by constructive efforts on the part of Bengalis in co-operation with non-Bengali neighbours.

This traditional fact of Bengali co-operation with non-Bengalis from the Afghan-Punjab to the Assam-Burma frontiers is going to be a creative force in the re-making of Indian peoples today and tomorrow.

The professional or occupational composition of Bengali Hindu immigrants indicates that not more than 10 per cent (some 100,000 or so) happens to belong to the cultivator community. Nearly a million is non-agricultural. Those refugees who have already migrated into the non-Bengali districts of the Indian Dominion from Assam to the U.P. are mainly non-agricultural. Many of them are relatively prosperous, some of them being artisans and traders. Mostly they belong to the literate as well as educated communities. The infiltration of such individuals, families or groups into West Bengal as well as non-Bengali India is a formative force of profound significance in the evolution of Indian economy, culture and politics during the next decade. The role of the displaced Bengali Hindu intelligentsia in the diverse districts of Dominion India from East to West is comparable to that of exported Germans or German emigrés and refugees in the different nooks and corners of the two Hemispheres.

The politics of Dominion India are likely to be favourable in the long run to the utilization of Bengali man-power for the economic, educational and cultural development of some of the under-develop-

ed areas in the Provinces and the States. The Dominion Government cannot but embark upon administrative centralization. The federalization idea is going to be factually although somewhat slowly modified and finally replaced by the thorough-going unification of India. In the interest of efficient management of affairs, industrial, sanitary, cultural as well as political, the Central Government will be forced to look for talent without reference to linguistic and provincial affiliations. The more the Dominion Government advances towards centralized administration and efficiency in organization of the services, the more the Central authorities will feel inclined to utilize the Bengali genius for co-operation with non-Bengalis.

Bengalis As Aids To Unification

The number of Bengali experts already available in manifold industries, arts, and professions is quite large. To give one instance, the Indian Science Congress Association is an organization of the scientists of all-Bharatan Universities including those of Pakistan. The membership of this Association (1947) is registered by the figure 1100. Nearly 400 are Bengali members, accounting for 36 per cent. For an All-Bharatan population of 400 millions Bengalis (60 millions) should constitute only 15 per cent. Evidently, many of the towns and villages of All-Bharat are under-supplied in the matter of scientists, as long as Bengalis alone constitute 36 per cent. For quite a long time, therefore, *Realpolitik* is sure to counsel the Central Government of Dominion India not to be misled or obsessed by anti-Bengali sentiments and prejudices of certain quarters but to take advantage of Bengali man-power for the implementation of dozens of schemes for the techno-industrial, military-naval-aerial and cultural-educational remaking of India. Bengalis will thus appear to the Central Government of India in a new role, namely, as aids to centralization and unification and instruments of efficiency in national life.

Another instance is to be found in the field of qualified medical men (graduate and licentiate) available in the different regions of Bharatvarsha. In 1941 Bengal had 26 per cent of all the doctors of India (47,524), as given in the Report (1946) of the Bhore Committee on Health Survey and Development. This means 1 medical man per 6,800 inhabitants throughout Bharatvarsha. In Bengal we have 12,276 doctors, i.e., 1 per 4913 inhabitants. The supply of

doctors in Bengal is much above the average. For areas like Assam (which has 1 for 7509), Bihar (with 1 for 11,171), United Provinces (with 1 for 13,586), C.P. and Berar (with 1 for 14,582) and Orissa (with 1 for 18,145), Bengal (with 1 for 4913) can then be of considerable service. What is needed is a planful redistribution and resettlement of medical men under the authority of the Central Government throughout the Provinces and States of the Indian Union.

Progress does not depend on the possession of money alone. Nor does it depend on the possession of political authority alone. The factual possession of scientific, artistic, technical and other professional qualifications in relatively large proportions can neither be suppressed nor ignored by the powers that be. If that were possible, the Germanization of the world today would not have been consciously and deliberately promoted by Russians and Anglo-Americans, the conquerors and wealthy rulers of the German people. Non-Bengali capitalists and political leaders likewise would feel that the Bengali capacity for co-operation with non-Bengalis in arts, sciences, social work, politics, self-sacrifice, idealism and warfare is much too valuable to be overlooked by themselves. The progress of India today and tomorrow will depend in a very great measure on the extent and kind of Bengalicization of Indian Provinces and States as well as of consular, diplomatic and cultural India abroad that is consciously promoted by the statesmen and patriots of Dominion India.

The hands of the Dominion Authorities in the matter of centralization and unification can be immensely strengthened by Bengali nationalists and publicists. The cultivation of Hindi with enthusiasm by Bengalis at home and abroad will go a long way to counteract the existing anti-Bengali spirit of non-Bengali Indians. As a preliminary measure some 500 Bengali intellectuals representing medical profession, technology, engineering, education, social work, political propaganda, rural welfare, labour movement, journalism and so forth ought to get themselves equipped with the capacity for speaking and writing Hindi. And such Hindi-commanding Bengali men and women should be rendered available on the spot as collaborators with non-Bengalis in the towns and villages of non-Bengali India.

It is in this manner that Bengali experts in diverse spheres of national service can function as effective instruments of Indian centralization and unification. They will tend then to be welcomed

with cordial appreciation by publicists and patriots of the different Provinces and States of the Indian Dominion.

1947 A New 1905 For Young Bengal

With the formation of Dominion India in 1947 a new 1905 has emerged before the patriots of Young Bengal. Bengali ideals are on the eve of a new and momentous epoch of fresh services to India. For one thing, the creation of All-Bharatan consciousness was a most characteristic achievement of Bengali idealism of the last three generations. It is the same All-Bharatan consciousness that is waiting to be promoted under the new patterns and along new channels.

The anti-Bengali animus of groups of non-Bengali publicists has indeed been militating against the consummation of Indianness among the people and obstructing the progress of unification and centralization. But it is the creativities, in large proportions, of Bengali men and women of arts and sciences, industries and professions, as well as social service and selfless work that are well calculated to foster the centralizing and unifying forces in Dominion India in spite of the prevailing anti-Bengali prejudices. It is the privilege of Bengali ideals to march on and conquer in the teeth of Himalayan opposition, thereby creating an atmosphere of friendly co-operation between Bengalis and non-Bengalis.

The Next War Against New Evils

In the second place, Dominion India has need to be enriched with epochmaking and revolutionary ideas, ideals and ideologies adapted to the new socio-economic and international conditions of the second half of the twentieth century. This enrichment demands a new devotion, a new martyrdom, and a new self-sacrifice among the Indian people.

It is not the occasion for lazily sitting tight on past achievements or for senselessly gloating and getting dizzy over perhaps unexpected success. And on the other hand, it would be unreasonable to be cynical, pessimistic or sceptical over the uptodate realizations, whatever they are. At every stage progress spells preparedness for the next war against the new evils of the day.

We have climbed a height indeed,
But alas, the highest is yet to come!

But curiously enough, the mentalities and urges of our countrymen today are not keen on service to the masses, devotion to duty, and self-denying ordinances, such as are imperative for the new wars. The greatest drive in our character is on the contrary to be found in the chase,—maddening as it is,—for personal glorification, power, position and purse. It is a disastrous situation and India will have to be saved from this calamity and disgrace. A new therapeutic has to be devised in order to combat this new megalomania and self-aggrandisement.

The emancipation of Dominion India from self-seekers, submissionists to the powers that be, and worldly-wise materialists of all sorts in places high and low ought to be the target of present-day patriots and idealists. This is a task to which Young Bengal will have to address itself in proper keeping with its tradition. Adequate responses to the demands for self-sacrifice and martyrdom are natural with Bengali intelligentsia and they will not fail to be as magnificent to-day and tomorrow as those since the glorious Bengali revolution of 1905.

The spiritual heirs and successors of the mighty Bengali heroes of the last forty three years have need to get mobilized to build up new platforms for the establishment of national prosperity, internal freedom, interhuman equality, and world-wide dignity for the masses of Dominion India. It is such self-immolating and service-conscious patriots that will rescue India from the depths of corruption, iniquity, self-aggrandisement, and humiliation to which she is being dragged in numerous sectors of public activity.

Under the British regime Bengali idealists always spurned job-hunting and worldly success and chose to leave them to the Yuan Shih-Kais of Bharatvarsha. They cannot afford today in Dominion India to be shunted off their historic role. The conquest of the mind of the Indian masses by the ideals of resistance to tyranny, manly pursuit of duty under difficulties, and self-annihilation in the interest of the country's good is the great function before Young Bengal at the present moment. Bengalis have to wake up to their tradition spiritualizing the Indian people with creative and man-making ideals.

Indo-Asian Contacts**India Contacting Asia*
(1947-48)

The establishment of the *Sino-Indian Journal* at Santi-Niketan (which is really Tagore Town or Rabindra-Nagar) in West Bengal under the directions of Professor Tan Yun-shan of China is an event of considerable importance in the evolution of Indo-Asian contacts. Another Journal of this category is *United Asia* established at Bombay, the first number of which came out a few months ago. To the same group belong *Eur-Asia*, the monthly of Calcutta, which has been functioning since 1947, as well as *Commerce Asia*, also of Calcutta, started in January of the current year. The intellectual and spiritual backbone of Young India is evidently being enriched and fortified with substantial forces of Asianization from diverse angles of vision. India is developing Indian agencies in order to bring Asia home to her people.

At the present moment Professor Probodh Bagchi of Santi-Niketan is at Peiping lecturing on Indian History and Culture at the National University of China. Professor Shiva Prasad Chatterji of Calcutta University is a Visiting Professor at Rangoon (Burma) in the Department of Geography. Young Paresh Das-Gupta has come back to Calcutta after a year of studies and investigations at Bangkok (Siam) and is engaged in awakening our interest in Thai (Siamese) language and culture.

The opening of the South East Asian Economic Exhibition, Calcutta (September 1948) under the auspices of the Commercial Museum is another social force of the same pattern by Dr. Kailas Nath Katju, Governor of West Bengal.

On the political and diplomatic plane Dominion India is today officially represented by Indians in Afghanistan, China, Iran, Egypt, Burma, Malay and so forth. The Ecafe (Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East) at Shanghai likewise had Dr. P. S. Lokanathan, the economist, as the representative of India. Altogether, India's attempts at contacting and grasping Asia are quite in evidence at different points and in diverse sectors of national life.

* Prepared with the co-operation of several Research Fellows of the Bengali Asia Academy.

The Two Asian Conferences of 1947

In the spring of 1947 (March 20-April 2) an Asian Conference was held at New Delhi under the leadership of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and Mme. Sarojini Naidu and with the blessings of Mahatma Gandhi. The comprehensive and representative character of the proceedings is to be found in the constitution of the provisional General Council. The members were as follows:—Dr. Abdul Majid Khan (Afghanistan), Taquiddeen Elsoleh (Arab League), Kalantar (Armenia), Yusufov (Azerbaijan), Justice Kyaw Myint (Burma), M. A. Raschid (Burma), S. W. D. Bandaranaike (Ceylon), George E. De Silva (Ceylon), Han Lih-Wu (China), Wen Yuan-Ning (China), Kupradze (Georgia), Dr. Abu Hanifah (Indonesia), Soeribno (Indonesia), Dr. G. H. Sadighi (Iran), Sharipov (Kazakhstan), Dr. Paik (Korea), Dr. Burhanuddin (Malaya), J. A. Thivy (Malaya), Lub Sen Vandan (Mongolia), Jung Bahadur Rana Major General Bjaya (Nepal), Prof. Hugo Bergmann (Palestine), Anastacio De Castro and A. M. Manuel S. Emerga (Philippines), Prof. Sukrit Nimanhemindran (Siam), Tarsunzada (Tadjikistan), Sarimsakov (Uzbekistan), Dr. Tran Van Luan (Viet Nam), Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru (India) and Rani Laxmi Bajwade (India).

This Conference was more or less of a nationalist complexion. It represented the intellectual and higher middle class or bourgeois phases of life in the diverse countries of Asia.

The poorer or at any rate the employee aspects of Asian men and women came in for an organized discussion in the course of a few months. A "preparatory" regional conference for Asia was held at New Delhi in October-November 1947 by the International Labour Office (Geneva). It prepared the ground for the Regional Asian Conference on labour problems to be held in China in 1949.

Big doses of Asianism were therefore administered into the socio-cultural system of India during 1947. Dominion India is in for a vast economic and political transformation in the near future.

It would be interesting at this stage to analyse this Asian-mindedness of the Indian people as a social phenomenon of modern times, and examine the diverse agencies that have led to the formation of this Indo-Asian pattern. For all practical purposes Asian consciousness is at present confined to the forward-looking intelligentsia and go-ahead publicists of India. It is an expression among

them of new inter-human relations as well as acculturation to changed world conditions. We find in it a politico-cultural evolution of the international category. It is indeed one of the new *vishwa-shakti* (world-forces) of the twentieth century.

Asianism in Hem Banerji's "Song of India" (1870)

One of the most important sources for the study of India's new inter-human relations and acculturations is to be sought in the Indian indigenous literatures in Bengali, Hindi, Urdu, Gujarati, Marathi, Tamil, Telugu and so forth. So far as Bengali is concerned the *Bharat Sangit* (Song of India, 1870) of Hem Banerji (1838-1903) is perhaps the first landmark of India's Asian-mindedness. Such landmarks in Hindi, Urdu and other languages deserve to be explored. In this Bengali song, at any rate, the poet has a verse which may be Englished as follows:

"Arabia, Egypt, Persia, Turkey,
Tartary, Tibet, what to speak of others,
China, Burma, uncivilised Japan,—
They are also free and sovereign,
They spurn slavery with all their hearts,
India alone remains asleep."

Banerji's reference to all these Asian countries is nationalistic and patriotic of the secular and territorial type. But this is of romantic character and has hardly any objective orientations.

So far as Muslim ideologies of this period are concerned, they are as a rule confined to Muslim Asia and harp almost exclusively on the past achievements of Islam. Banerji, on the other hand, is interested as much in Muslim Asia (Arabia, Egypt and so forth) as in Buddhist (Hindu) Asia (Tibet, China etc.) and is essentially modernist in his outlook.

Muslim thought is naturally Asian-minded in the restricted sense of religious affiliations with the holy places and medieval states of Islamized Asia. It has served to awaken the Muslim consciousness rather than the Asianism of Indian Muslims, and it possesses archaeological and historical value. It is only in recent years since 1905 that Muslim ideologies have in part been getting acculturated to nationalism, non-religious territorial patriotism and genuine Asianism. A number of Bengali as well as other Indian Muslims has gone out of India side by side with Hindu intellectuals, publicists and scholars as secular, un-theocratic, scientific, modern and

nationalist travellers and explorers into the different regions of Asia. But, on the whole, Muslim thought in India has been less Asian and more Islamic or theocratic.

The Asian-mindedness of Indian intellectuals is then, from the angle of the Bengali people, nearly eighty years old. It is obvious that in the poetry of Hem Banerji Asia was used as a category of thought and as an inspiration for young India.

Vivekananda and Dharmapala (1893)

It is worth while to signalize and draw special attention to the travels of Vivekananda (1863-1902) and Dharmapala (1864-1933) to Chicago in 1893 in connection with the Parliament of Religions. Both of them were apostles of a new Asia, each in his own way, and served to awaken the Asian consciousness far and wide among intellectuals and culture-leaders. The work of both contributed to the development of the Asian Monroe Doctrine which functioned as a powerful weapon against the chauvanism of Eur-America in political, cultural and racial spheres. Asia grew into a solid reality in the intellectual and moral consciousness of Young India on account of the endeavours of the Ramakrishna-Vedanta Movement established by Vivekananda and the Mahabodhi Movement inaugurated by Dharmapala. India's emancipation from foreign agencies in the matter of her contacts with Asia was accelerated by these two movements.

Indo-Asian Forces

Since 1870 Indo-Asian contacts can be found embodied in a number of directions and tendencies, as follows:—

1. Travels by Indians in Asian regions and by Asians in Indian territories for pleasure, commerce, culture, pilgrimage, politics or historico-cultural and scientific research.

A special factor in this form of interhuman intercourse between India and Western Asia is furnished by the travels of Muslims as Haj pilgrims to Mecca in Arabia. The travels of Ceylonese and East Asian Buddhists on pilgrimage to India contribute another form of the Indo-Asian movements.

2. Articles or books by Indian authors (in Indian languages or English) dealing with travels and investigations in Asian countries, or with the economic, political and cultural conditions of these regions.

3. Institutes, Academies or Research Societies established in

India with a view to carry on studies and investigations relating to Asian men, institutions and movements,—all more or less on the lines of the veteran Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal or the Oriental Societies of other countries.

4. Indian poetry, drama and fiction utilizing Asian themes as subject-matter.

5. Indian political propagandists and exiles living in Asian countries as temporary or somewhat permanent residents.

All these attempts of Indian publicists, merchants and scholars to develop firsthand intercourse with Western as well as Eastern Asia deserve each to be studied specifically and in an intensive manner. Valuable chapters in the evolution of Modern Asia are to be found in these investigations. Indian Universities ought to consider these modern expansions of India in Asia and the development of contemporary Indo-Asian contacts as substantial themes for doctoral dissertation.

*The Epoch of Krishnavarma, Mme Cama,
Rana and Chattopadhyaya (1905-14)*

A few observations about one or two of these factors of Asianism may be made here.

In regard to inter-human relations promoted by travels Indian contacts with Egypt and Turkey got a fillip on account of the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. The travels of Hindus in these Muslim countries were numerous. And Muslims from India visiting countries of Asia were not all theocrats, Mullahs and priests.

So far as Japan and China are concerned, the most important landmark of inter-human intercourse is perhaps the Chinese Boxer War against Eur-Americans (1900) or rather the *Japanese* victories over Russia (1905). Indian travellers to the Far East were not all Hindu. Contacts of Muslim and Parsi merchants with Shanghai and Yokohama are not to be ignored.

In Dr. Indu Mallik's *Cheen-bhraman* (Travels in China), published in 1901, we have an Indian record of those days. The reports of the Chinese revolution (1911-12) were broadcast, it is worth mentioning, through the pages of the monthly *Prabasi* and the *Modern Review* by Ramlal Sarkar who was then living in Yunnan to the north of Burma. It was on account of these articles that Sun Yat-sen became a household name in Bengal.

Hindu-Muslim contacts with Western Asia (the so-called Near

East and Middle East) began to be intensified about the same time on account of the nationalist activities in Egypt (1906), constitutional revolts in Iran and Turkey (1907-08) and the Italo-Turkish wars (1912-13).

Camaraderies and intimacies between Young India and Young Asia (Young Egypt, Young Turkey, Young Persia, Young China and Young Japan) were fostered somewhat effectively in the educational and political centres of *Eur-America* (London, Paris, Berlin, Vienna, New York) during this period (1905-10).

Shyamaji Krishnavarma (Rajputana), Mme Cama (Bombay), Sardarsinghji Rana (Kathiawar), Biren Chattopadhyaya (Bengal and Hyderabad), Vinayak Savarkar (Bombay), Obedulla (U.P.), Tarak Das (Bengal), Ram Chandra (Punjab), Barkatulla (U.P.), Bhupen Datta (Bengal), Sudhin Bose (Bengal), Mirza Abbas (Bihar), and others were some of India's international publicists at this time (1905-14).

It is to be understood that the name of Indian travellers, pilgrims, merchants, publicists and labour leaders in Western and Eastern Asia such as have left no written statements of their foreign (Asian) experiences is legion. The impacts of even these non-recording persons on the promotion of Asian consciousness in India is considerable. No researcher can afford to ignore drawing attention to this kind of Indo-Asian contacts in a monograph about the Asian movement of the Indian people.

Indian sailors in European and American ships as well as other workingmen of India have come into contact with the port towns of Asia and carried material and cultural news about diverse Asian regions back to the villages and towns of India.

*India's Asian Allies during and since
World-War I (1914-18)*

During World-War I (1914-18) Young India's alliance with Western Asia (Turkey, Egypt, Iran and Afghanistan) as well as the Far East (Japan and China) was organized by Biren Chattopadhyaya (Bengal and Hyderabad), Dr. Vishnu Sukthankar (Bombay), Dhiren Sarkar (Bengal), Ajit Singh (Punjab), Pramatha Datta (Bengal), Pandurang Khankhoje (Bombay), Barkatulla (U.P.), Varma (U.P.), Acharya (Madras), Mahendra Pratap (U.P.), Lajpat Rai (Punjab), Shivaprasad Gupta (U.P.), Zafar Ali Khan (U.P.), Hrishikesh Latta (Punjab), Dr. Hafiz (U.P.), Hormasji Kershap (Bombay)

Tarak Das (Bengal), Rajabali (Punjab), Heramba Gupta (Bengal), Nanderkar (Bombay), Biren Das Gupta (Bengal), Chanchaya (Madras), Rashbehari Bose (Bengal), Manab Roy (Bengal), Abdul Wahed (Bihar), Bhupen Datta (Bengal), Dr. Mansur (U.P.), Rama Chandra (Punjab), Bhagwan Singh (Punjab), Abani Mukerji (Bengal), Har Dayal (Punjab), Champak Ram Pillai (Travancore), Dr. Moreswar Probhakar (Bombay), Sardar Omrao Singh (Punjab), and many others mentioned in Rowlatt's *Report on Revolutionary Conspiracies in India* (1919). Manab Roy (Bengal) was later the pioneer of India's liaisons with Soviet Russia (1920) and thereby with Soviet Asia as well as the Far East.

The present author's travels and investigations in Egypt, Japan, Korea, Manchuria and North China during 1914-16 formed the basis of his publications in Bengali in several volumes. They constituted likewise the subject of his lectures in the Universities of the U.S.A. and of papers in American journals of international relations and political science during 1917-20. His *Chinese Religion through Hindu Eyes* (Shanghai 1916) and *Futurism of Young Asia* (Leipzig 1922) may be referred to.

Tagore in Japan, China, and Iran (1919-1924, 1932)

With Young Indonesia (Sumatra, Java, etc) Young India's social and political *liaisons* are perhaps not older than 1919 (the end of World-War I). It was at Paris, Berlin and Amsterdam that these personal contacts were established.

A somewhat popular interest of Young India in Northern Asia is chiefly a phenomenon since 1933, after the publication of the results of the First Five Year Plan by Soviet Russia.

The Post-World-War I period is marked by the visit of Rabi Tagore to Japan (1919), China (1924) and Iran (1932). It has been the starting point of profound and extensive relations between India and Iran as well as the Far East on cultural as on other planes. Tagore the traveller was, among other things, Asia personified. The ideological beginnings of *Chcena-Bhavana* (1937) and the *Sino-Indian Journal* (1948) have to be traced back to this memorable event.

Institutes and Publications (1926-48)

For the archaeological, historical, anthropological, geographical and other studies of Indian research societies about Asia the begin-

nings are to be placed in the main about the end of World-War I (1914-18). It is at this time that Calcutta and other Indian Universities virtually commenced taking interest in researches and publications.

The lectures and publications of the Greater India Society (Calcutta 1926), Bengali Asia Academy (Calcutta 1931), Branches of the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House, London) at Calcutta, Bombay and New Delhi (1936), *Cheena Bhavan* (China Institute at Rabindranath Tagore's *Vishwabharati* (1937), Ramakrishna Mission Institute of Culture (Calcutta 1937), Indian Council of World Affairs (New Delhi 1943) and Iran Society (Calcutta 1944) have to be listed in the same context.

During the last twenty years or so Asia has been the subject-matter of studies and investigations by Indians on a somewhat mentionable scale. We may single out the publications of Ramesh Majumdar (regarding Indo-China and Siam, 1927-38), Pramatha Bose (Siam, 1927), Niranjana Chakravarti (Central Asia, 1928), Upen Ghoshal (Afghanistan, 1928), Bijan Chatterji (Cambodia, 1928), Dhiren Roy (Philippines, 1930-36), Manab Roy (China, 1931, 1938, 1947, Islamic Asia 1943), Nihar Roy (Burma, 1932), Asanulla (Turkey, 1933-34), Himansu Sarkar (Java and Bali, 1934), Md. Ishaque (Iran, 1935), Tarak Das (Far East, 1936), Radhakamal Mukerji (Asian emigrants, 1936), Rabi Tagore (Japan and Persia, 1936), Probodh Bagchi (Central Asia, 1937, China 1944), Keshab Gupta (Malaya, 1938), Amar Lahiri (Japan, 1939, Western Asia, 1948), Saura Chowdhury (Turkey, 1940. Suniti Chatterji (Indonesia, 1941), Kalidas Nag (Pacific World 1941), Vivekananda Mukerji (Japan, 1943), Beni Barua (Ceylon, 1945), I. H. Qureshi (Iran, 1945), Zafrulla Khan (China, 1945), Rajnarayan Gupta (Iran, 1946), Arun Datta-Majumdar (South East Asia, 1946), Kodanda Rao (Malay, 1946), Makhana Roy-Chowdhury (Egypt, 1946), I. H. Baqai (Iran, 1947), P. S. Narasimhan (South East Asia, 1947), Kshitish Banerji (Western Asia, 1947), Manoranjan Chowdhury (Burma, 1947), Bijan Sen-Gupta (South East Asia, 1947), Bisweswar Prasad (Palestine, 1947), Biswa Biswas (Central Asia, 1947), P. S. Lokanathan (Far East, 1947), Barin Das (Siam 1948), Ajit Ghosh (Indonesia, 1948), Bijan Banerjee (China, 1948 and South East Asia, 1948). Not all the publications of the period have been included in the above enumeration. Some of these works are travel-books or magazine articles.

Attention may also be drawn to the chapters on Turkey, China, Japan, and Singapore in the present author's *Politics of Boundaries* (1926).

The Milieu of World-War II (1939-45)

India's Medical Mission to China (1938) was a means of promoting large scale Indian contacts with Asia. The Goodwill Missions from China and Siam (in 1940) and Iran in 1944 as well as the visit of Turkish journalists in 1943 were Asianizing agencies of the same order. The presence of Chinese soldiers, businessmen and industrialists as well as of Burmese evacuees during 1942-45 has also served to promote Asian-mindedness to a somewhat considerable extent.

Indian newspaper correspondents in foreign countries reporting on Asia have been coming into prominence since 1925. But it is worth while to observe that the Asianism of Indian masses has been substantially promoted by reports sent by foreign journalists also to Indian newspapers. The role of journalists, both Indian and non-Indian, on the growth of the Asian movement in India is by all means creative and profound.

Young India's alliance with Japan, the Far East, Western Asia and the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem during World-War II (1939-45) was the achievement of Mohan Singh (Punjab), Swami Satyananda, Akram Khan (U.P.), Nilkanta (Madras), Rashbehari Bose (Bengal), Subhas Bose (Bengal), Ananda Sahay (Bihar), Dr. Kalyan Bose (Bengal), Debnath Das (Bengal), Sohan Singh (Punjab), Promode Sen (Bengal), Mahendra Pratap (U.P.), Nambiar (Madras), Abid Hasan (Punjab), Gora De (Bengal), Ali Khan (Punjab), Dr. Anil Chatterji (Bengal), Shah Nawaz (Punjab), Dhillon (Punjab), Prem Saigal (U.P.), Mme. Luxmi (Madras), Burnanuddin (Punjab), Rashid Ali (Punjab) and others associated with the *Azad Hind Fauj* (Revolutionary Indian National Army). This was the epoch par excellence of Subhas Bose.

Asianism a Pluralistic Movement

The activities and biography of each one of these and other persons deserve to be separately studied with special reference to the promotion of Asianism among the Indian people between 1905 and 1948. The enumeration of names is not at all exhaustive. Be it added that they have functioned as ambassadors, political and cultural, of India in foreign countries at a time when the Indian

publicists and political parties were as a rule hostile to activities on the international plane.

Recent travellers to Iran and Western Asia comprise a large number of Parsis. Mr. and Mrs. Dastur Sir Hormosjee Dinshaw, J. K. Nariman, Bustanjee Marker, Dr. Sir Jiwanjee Modi, L. Dinshaw Irani, Sir Rustom Masani and Dr. Jal Pavri, all of Bombay may be singled out. Among others Professor Hadi Hussan (Lucknow), the Maharajas of Jaipur and Kashmir, Dr. Sir Hassan Suhrawardy (Calcutta), Major-General El-Edroos of Hyderabad, Rabindranath Tagore, and Sir Firoze Khan Noon are known to have travelled in Iran for first-hand knowledge and culture-contacts.

It should appear that there is hardly any Indian whose travels and adventures in Asia, both East and West can compare in duration and extensiveness with those of Raja Mohendra Pratap of Brindaban (U.P.), the "Marco Polo of the East", as described in his *Life Story of Fifty-five Years* (Dehra Dun, 1947). His Asian experiences are to be placed between 1915 (the second year of World-War I) and 1947 (the second year after World-War II).

The feeders of the Asian movement in India are then diverse and heterogeneous. The channels along which Asianism has grown and developed are by all means multifarious and pluralistic. No particular person, institution or movement of India can be reasonably singled out as the most valuable or the only worth while father, pioneer or representative of Asianism among the Indian people.

Iran Society

It is worthwhile to say a word about the Iran Society established at Calcutta (1944) with Dr. Bimala Law as President and Dr. Md. Ishaque as Secretary. The scholars seek to place Iran in the perspectives of her neighbours. It has been serving the geographers, historians, anthropologists and linguists. Scholars in Buddhist lore are interested in it as much as those in Islamic culture. It is this liberal, interhuman, scientific standpoint in regard to things Iranian that is the chief ingredient in the *milieu* of the Society.

We have need to emphasize these cultural and scientific aspects of the Iran Society of Calcutta, for it is very easy for even intellectuals and scholars, especially among Hindus, to suspect that this Society is perhaps a non-Hindu institution. Among Muslims it is likely to be treated as something calculated to promote the Shiahism of Iranian Islam as contrasted with the Sunni-ism of the general masses in Muslim India. There are other Muslims who might be-

lieve that Zoroastrianism of the Parsees is a dominant ingredient in its ideological set-up. Then, in politically minded circles, again something of pro-Russianism or its opposite, pro-Britishism, may likewise be smelt in its atmosphere. In certain quarters, finally, people might feel that antiquarian interests are the chief features of this institute. In reality Iran Society is not obsessed by antiquarian activities nor are its ideologies religionistic or political. Many Bengalis, especially Hindus, should become interested in the affairs of Iran Society, Bengali Muslims also should likewise interest themselves in the affairs of the *Checa-Bhavan* and Sino-Indian Association of Tagore's *Vishwa-Bharati*. There, as we have pointed out, they study India's relations with China.

This interest in Islamic as well as Buddhist Asia is as old in the present author as the birth of the National Council of Education (1905-06) which was established under the inspiration and constructive guidance, among others, of Satish Mukerjee, of the Dawn Society. Again, while publicity work for the Hindu University of Benares was being carried on during 1910-11 under Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya of Allahabad, I was privileged to travel with him far and wide in Northern India as far as Rawalpindi as one of the lieutenants. In the course of those travels it was my habit to harp upon the necessity of making Arabic and Persian languages compulsory for highest culture courses among Hindu students, especially in the fields of literature, fine arts, history, linguistics and politics.

This viewpoint of mine was known to Drs. Abdulla Suhrawardy, Ashutosh Mookerjee, and Khuda Buksh and is to be found recorded in my *Futurism of Young Asia* (Berlin 1922). That position I have maintained up till today. The University authorities at Calcutta as well as my colleagues and friends of *Bangiya Asia Parishad* (Bengali Asia Academy) including Drs. Naren and Bimala Law, Rafi Ahmed and Md. Ishaque, are well aware of my generation-long viewpoint in this regard.

In England, France, Germany, Italy, Russia and the U.S.A. what kind of people take interest in Iran? They are neither Parsees, nor Shiahhs nor Sunnis nor Sufis, nor of course Hindus. It is the medical men, engineers, geographers, botanists, merchants, archaeologists, artists, sociologists, culture-historians, religious missionaries, consuls, diplomatists, and statesmen of Eur-America that try to study Iran or come into contact with things Iranian. It is the same class of people in India also that should take interest in the Iran Society of Calcutta. Indian geographers and anthropologists, engineers and industrialists, historians and linguists, educa-

tors and culture-leaders, economists and publicists ought to come forward in large numbers and get themselves acculturated to the atmosphere of Iranic studies. In the *milieu* of Iran Society, they will gradually find the facilities for watching the transformation of old Iranian institutions. They will not fail to observe how the men and women of Iran today are uptodatizing their culture and rendering themselves capable of collaborating with their neighbours to the north, west as well as east in the task of reconstructing Asia and the world.

In international culture and politics no Indian is likely to be of much significance with special reference to the Dominion problems of today and tomorrow who is not well up in the questions relating to Iran and Western Asia. The Iran Society of Calcutta has been rendering immense service to Young India by generating reorientations in its intellectual and inter-human pattern.

South East Asia

There is no Institute, Association, Academy or Society in India relating to the countries now known as South-East Asia in American geopolitical terminology. But certain scholars associated with the Indian Council of World-affairs (Delhi) and the Bengali Asia Academy have been taking interest in writing and speaking about the South-East Asian Complex. The contributions of Bhupen Das, Santosh Chatterjee, Ajit Ghosh, Bijon Banerjee, Arunendu Datta-Majumdar, Barin Das and Bimalendu Ghosh, although of a preliminary character, may be noticed in this connection. Their writings are published, as a rule, in the monthly journals, *Arthik Unnati* (Economic Progress) and *Eur-Asia*. There is an attempt also on the part of some of these writers to master the languages of this region.

In June 1947 representatives of Burma, Siam, Indo-China, Malay and Indonesia met in Madras under the auspices of the International Student Service of Geneva. This was the first South East Asian Regional Conference and in the course of a week (10-16 June) covered an extensive ground relating to education and culture. The topics comprised (1) expansion of University education, (2) technological *vs* general University education, (3) student movements and student organizations, (4) social transformation, (5) cultural autonomy and political unity, (6) University curricula and social structure, and (7) I.S.S. programme in South East Asia. The president was Dr. Zakir Hussain of Delhi. The Chairman of

the Reception Committee was Professor Narayanaswamy Naidu of Madras. Leading part was taken by Dr. M. S. Adiseshiah and Miss Elizabeth Pothan, likewise of Madras. The speakers and reporters were mostly students and professors.

It is worth while to observe that an Exhibition* of the South-East Asian Economic Resources was organized by the Commercial Museum of Calcutta (26 September-30 October, 1948). The opening was done by the Governor of West Bengal, Dr. Kailashnath Katju. As a sign of the times may be mentioned the fact that the teaching of Burmese, Siamese, Indo-Chinese, Malayan, and Javanese languages is being organized at Calcutta University.

Bengali Asia Academy

A few words may now be added about the *Bangiya Asia Parishat* (Bengali Asia Academy) which has been functioning since 1931. It is a purely cultural and scientific institution and is not interested in promoting the practical politics of one type or other. Its sole object is to encourage the study of facts, ideas and ideologies about Asia. Many of the economic and commercial articles about Egypt, Iran, China, Japan, Siam, Indonesia, Malay, Burma and Indo-China have appeared in *Arthik Unnati* (Economic Progress).

In this work of scientific and cultural interest friendly co-operation has been extended by the late Bejoy Chatterjee (Bar-at-Law) as well as by Drs. Naren Law, Amulya Ukil, Rafi Ahmed, Bhupen Datta, and Nalinaksha Dutt, Messrs. Ordhendro Gangoly (artist and art-historian), Satya Deb (ceramic engineer from Tokiyo), Suren Bose (chemical engineer from California, Bengal Water-proof Works Ltd.) and Biren Das-Gupta (electrical engineer from Purdue, Chairman, Indo-Europa Trading Co.), Advocates Keshab Gupta and Nalin Paul (Councillor, Calcutta Corporation), Professor Banesvar Dass (College of Engineering and Technology, Jadavpur) and Humayun Kabir (Calcutta University) as well as Satin Das-Gupta (Managing Director of Indo-Swiss Trading Co. Ltd.).

The talks and papers discussed at the Academy have dealt with such topics as the following: Indians in South East Asia, Economic Expansion of the Japanese people; Travels in Iran with Tagore; Sociologies in Ibn Khaldun's *Mokaddemah* and Abul Fazl's *Ain-i-Akbari*; Economic Condition of the Turkish people; Labour Conditions in Kenya and Palestine; Asia in Bengali Thought;

* The present chapter is based on two lectures delivered at this Exhibition by the author.

The Muslim States of Asia and Africa; India's Trade with Iran, Iraq, Arabia and Turkey; Indonesia; Asia as the subject for Italian researches; Social Reform in Turkey; The Industrialization of Iran; The Economics of Post-War Egypt and Arabia; The Asian Movement in India; Zaghul Pasha of Egypt and Sun Yat-sen of China as Contemporaries of Chittaranjan Das; The Foreign Trade of China; Journalism in Egypt; Siam in World-Politics; The Andamans as a Prospective colony for Indians.

Participants at these functions have comprised, among others, Dr. Lanka Sundaram of Andhra University (Bezwada), Dr. R. Soetomo of Sourabaya (Java), Mr. Osman of Istanbul (Turkey), Mustafa Fadal Bey, journalist of Cairo (Egypt), Consul General Dr. Chang-lok Chen of China, Md. H. Kashani, merchant of Yezd (Iran), Prof. Yusuf Bagdadi of Bagdad (Iraq), Mr. Marjoenani of Java, Dr. Mario Carelli of the University of Rome, Mr. Y. Imagawa of the Yokohama Specie Bank, Tokyo (Japan), Dr. J. J. Brugmans of the Education Department, Batavia (Java).

The Research Fellows also have contributed to the intellectual output about Asia during these years. Some of their papers are available as articles in magazines and brochures, both in Bengali and English.

Dominion India's Orientations to Asian Politics

The affiliations of Dominion India with Asian Politics deserve a special study. They are to be treated as something distinct from and independent of affiliations with culture. The Political affiliations, again require to be investigated on *Realpolitik* considerations unclouded by vague idealistic speculations.

Asia Secular, Democratic and Socialist

On the positive basis of interhuman contacts Hindu *liaisons* with the Muslims of Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Turkey, Egypt and Indonesia are found to be extensive and long-standing, and their foundations are essentially modernistic, political and cultural. In the Hindus of Dominion India the Muslims of Western Asia from Kabul to Cairo and of South East Asia (Sumatra, Java) have found some of their greatest allies and collaborators in regard to the modernization of Asia as well as her emancipation from albinocracy, the regime of the "white man's burthen." The slogan of the Young Muslim in Asia is not pan-Islam but Sovereign Asia, Secularized

Asia, Democratic Asia, Socialist Asia,—this has been the cry of Amanulla, Kemal, Zaghlul, Riza and others, as well as their successors in Western Asia.

In dealing with Iranians or Afghans the modern Egyptians do not exhibit any specially "favoured nation" treatment on account of common faith in Islam. The Hindus are accepted by Afghans and Iranians no less than by Turks, Egyptians and Arabs as worth while allies (comrades and collaborators) in the cause of new morals, manners and sentiments for Asia.

In modern interhuman relations the role of formal and traditional religion, based as it is on medieval texts, should appear to have been receding gradually into the background. It is being replaced, as a rule, throughout Asia by the new spirituality of human rights, personal equality, individual freedom, and social work. There is no natural and necessary course for alliance between Afghanistan and Pakistan or between Turkey and Iran. Links of narrowly religious or sectarian affinity between one Muslim people and another Muslim people can hardly be the basis of effective co-operation or alliance between them in economic, cultural, political and military affairs. Religious fanaticism can be awakened in a certain number of states by or through 'non-Muslim financial agencies for temporary war political purposes. They can have no profound foundations as the basis of Asian or world politics.

Conflicts in Muslim Asia

The fundamental interests of life, self-preservation and self-assertion, differ considerably from one Muslim state to another Muslim state. This is the first and foremost item in Dominion India's orientations to Asian politics.

For one thing, whenever any Muslim state of Western Asia (say, the Arab League) becomes anti-British or anti-American on a war-level, Pakistan cannot afford to join it as ally or exhibit *camaraderie* and sympathy. It will have to remain neutral or incur the enmity of England and the U.S.A. which it can hardly contemplate. Then, again, if any Muslim state (say, Afghanistan or Iran) is transformed into an ally or protege of Soviet Russia, Pakistan can never think of joining it either, because in that case the Anglo-American enemies of Soviet Russia are bound to treat Pakistan and the other Pro-Russian Muslim states as enemies.

In both such eventualities the Muslim states are bound to belong to at least two different groups. A Pan-Islam or Muslim federation

of any sort comprising all West-Asia or a great part of it cannot therefore come into existence.

There is the constant possibility of Pakistan remaining part and parcel of the Anglo-American bloc in the Asian complex and world-grouping. This implies that all those Muslim states like Afghanistan, Iran and Iraq which are sentimentally enemies of the Anglo-American albinocracy and eventual allies of Soviet Russia by interest or its proteges on account of geographical propinquity are bound to treat Pakistan as enemy. An alliance of all or a large number of Muslim states from the Indus to the Nile on a politico-military basis, offensive or defensive, is an impossibility under this conjuncture of circumstances also.

Altogether, no student of Asianism or Asian-mindedness as prevailing in Dominion India should be naive enough to believe that a united Asian or part-Asian league is a question of practical politics. The unification of all the Muslim states from Pakistan to Egypt can be consummated only when they are conquered by Anglo-American armies for utilization as base against Soviet Russia or by the latter as base against the former. But then, all of them lose their self-determination and freedom of action as a matter of course.

The power that governs and dominates international politics is not to be found in religion, and is not dictated by religious considerations. A Muslim West Asia Bloc in international diplomacy, politics or war is today as inconceivable as a Buddhist East Asia League. Equally unthinkable as a politico-diplomatic-militaristic category is an All-Asian Alliance or an All-European Federation. A Muslim state at war with Muslim states and in alliance with non-Muslim states is as much a possibility today and tomorrow as it was a fact yesterday or day before yesterday.

What is Asianism?

The growth and development of Asian consciousness, Asian-mindedness or Asianism among the Indian bourgeoisie, proletariat or intelligentsia is not to be thoughtlessly understood as the consummation of an Asian, semi-Asian or quater-Asian *Entente* (Federation or Alliance) on racial or religionistic lines. Continental or sub-continental alliances are myths and will-o-the-wisps of politics planning. The world is much too complicated and pluralistic for such simplicist solutions in diplomacy or politics as Pan-Europa, Pan-Islam, Pan-America, Pan-Buddhism or Pan-Asia.

Indian Asianism is to be treated as but a new phase of India's expansion in interhuman contacts and nothing more.

In every war of today, tomorrow and day after tomorrow a certain number of Muslims as states, groups, parties or individuals will operate on the non-Muslim (Christian, Hindu or Buddhist) side. Likewise are certain European or American states likely to be allies of Asian states or maintain friendly neutrality to the latter. Nay, communists will join the bourgeois states, and democrats will add to the strength of the fascists. The alliances, ententes and groupings of the future, immediate or remote, will always be dictated as ever in the past by the fundamental considerations of military, naval and air strength of the prospective enemies in the eventual tug of war. And these imply, as a matter of course, a comparative estimate of and shrewd judgment on the techno-industrial equipments as well as economic and financial resources of the rival groups.

Neither religion, nor race, nor the fact of accidentally belonging to a particular surface of the earth nor even the self-determined adhesion to a certain ideology (communistic, socialistic, nationalistic or fascistic) can ever be the sole or even chief determinant in the formation of alliances or federations as international patterns. The utilization of *vishwa-shakti* (world forces) in the interest of one's own self-assertion and progress is to remain the principal urge for each and every state, region, race, group or party throughout the world in the choice of its allies and enemies. This is the *Realpolitik* of Dominion India's orientations to Asian politics.

Eur-American Capital in South East Asia

The population of the geopolitical complex known as South East Asia is near about 150 millions (Indonesia, 70 millions, Indo-China 24, Burma 17, Philippines 16, Thailand or Siam 16, and Malay 5). The most important economic fact about this region is its dependence on Eur-American finance for its fundamental agriculture, industry and commerce. Foreign capital worth about Rs. 9,000,000,000 is operating in these six countries (Indonesia, Rs. 5,700 millions. Indo-China, Rs. 960 millions, Philippines, Rs. 940 millions, Burma, Rs. 580 millions, Thailand Rs. 310 millions, and Malay, Rs. 114 millions).

The foreign sources are of course Holland in Indonesia. France in Indo-China, U.S.A. in the Philippines, and the U.K. in Burma and Malay. In each of these regions an inconsiderable portion of

foreign finance is supplied by countries outside the ruling powers. It should not be overlooked that Chinese capital worth Rs. 1,000 millions has been functioning in Malay, Philippines, Indo-China and Indonesia.

In this context the role of foreign (mostly British) capital in Bharatvarsha (comprising India and Pakistan, 400 millions) may not be out of place. Generally speaking, the amount is considered to be nearly £1,000,000,000 (i.e. say, Rs. 14,000 millions). This implies approximately and roughly Rs. 35 per head of Bharatvarsha (comprising India and Pakistan). For comparative purposes the per head foreign finance may be indicated as follows: Indonesia, Rs. 80, Philippines, Rs. 58, Indo-China, Rs. 40, India, Rs. 35, Burma, Rs. 34, Malay Rs. 23, Thailand Rs. 20. The figures are to be taken as but near approaches to the somewhat correct position.

In India as in the other countries of Asia economic sentiments, ideologies and scientific research have been vehemently directed against the employment of foreign capital.

It has been the tendency to condemn this situation as the sheer exploitation and ruination of the indigenous peoples by foreigners. The present author's viewpoint has been entirely opposite (*Economic Development*, Vol. I. Madras, 1926). Foreign capital is to be treated as a godsend for entire Asia, as far Latin America, the Balkan Complex of Europe, as well as Africa. No primitive, backward, underdeveloped and undeveloped people or region can possibly save and accumulate capital such as may enable it to develop the natural resources in an appreciable measure. It is the scientifically and techno-industrially developed peoples that can loan capital, skill, talent, organization, and so forth to the needy regions and help forward their advance in material, cultural and political fields. Improvements in the standard of living of agricultural communities as well as the growth of factory population and industrial workers have been consummated in Asia, Africa, Eastern Europe and Latin America from Mexico downwards on account of this co-operation with the finance furnished by more favourably placed peoples. In future also the co-operation of Eur-American capital in the interest of South East Asia's as well as India's progress ought to be welcome by exponents of capitalism as well as of socialism as a fundamental desideratum. This is the economic *Realpolitik* of entire Asia. Dominion India's orientations to Asian politics will be influenced by this fundamental reality.

The chief concern today and tomorrow in India as in South East Asia and Africa as well the Balkan Complex and so forth is to derive political domination by foreigners out of each and every region. Co-operation in finance without political domination is to be the slogan. This is to replace the century-old cooperation in finance with political domination. It is the problem of the second half of the twentieth century to develop this new technique of international and inter-racial alliance. The Asian statesmen of today from the West to the Farthest East and the South East will have to attitudinize themselves to this realistic viewpoint about world-economic collaboration.

South East Asia as a Problem for India

In this international cooperation India's role in South East Asia is likely to be quite significant. India can function creatively as a "big brother", so to say, to the entire complex. South East Asia was for centuries a part, province or district of Indian culture-systems, a territory of "Greater India".* Today India happens to be, relatively speaking, somewhat advanced in modern science and technocracy. South East Asia is therefore in a certain measure one of the problems for India. The brethren of South East Asia can be helped to some extent by the inhabitants of Dominion India with machineries, tools, implements, drugs, chemicals, consumers' goods, technical knowledge and even finance capital. In this regard the role of India is tending to grow into something like that of Japan. In competition with Eur-America, India and Japan are well calculated to deliver goods to South East Asia and otherwise serve the peoples of this region in a somewhat convenient, and inexpensive manner. Indian businessmen are likely to find opportunities for cooperation with South East Asia as mutually helpful as with Iran, Iraq, Western Asia and East Africa.

Eur-American Antipathy to Asian Independence

In 1948 there is a tendency among politicians, businessmen, orientalistes as well as other schools of Eur-America to look upon every attempt at national emancipation in South East Asia and elsewhere from the political thralldom of Eur-American masters as bolshevistic, communistic and red. This attitude is sheer nonsense.

* B. K. Sarkar: *Creative India* (Lahore 1937).

The exponents of albinocracy, "white man's burthen", colonialism and political domination were the enemies of Asia's self-assertion and nationalistic endeavours in the nineteenth and early years of the twentieth century down to World-War II (1939-45). The same anti-Asian feelings, sentiments and interests are at work today among the conservatives, diehards, reactionaries of Eur-America. At the present moment it is convenient for all of them,—whether publicists or scholars and academicians as well as experts in Asian languages and manners and customs,—to talk glibly of communism, Red-domination and Soviet Russia's conspiracy in the anti-Eur-American activities and movements of Asia. The world will have to get used to the idea that the Asian Monroe Doctrine for the political liberation of Asia from the Empire-holding systems of Eur-America has been the most spiritualizing force in Asia since as early as the middle of the nineteenth century. In Indonesia, Indo-China, Malay, Burma, Iran, Iraq and so forth as well as India it is the same Asian Monroe Doctrine or the "Asia for Asians" ideology that is inspiring the millions of human beings in 1948. The nationalistic war efforts of Asia and her armed risings against Eur-American world-domination constitute the greatest single factor in the world-politics of today. The United Nations Organization and its Security Council must not keep themselves blind to the realities of the present international set-up. Revolutionary Asia is not all red. It is exclusively against Eur-American political domination that Asia is militant.

The honest intellectuals and liberal-minded statesmen among the Eur-American members of the U.N. should make special efforts to educate themselves as well as their white colleagues to get relieved of the traditional Eur-American antipathy to Asian independence. Their talks of world-peace require to be implemented by such positive endeavours as are calculated to promote the political emancipation of Asia from the thralldom of white powers. So far as economic or materialistic and cultural or spiritual interests are concerned Asia does not follow the "Hands off" policy with regard to Eur-America, but is positively eager to cultivate *rapprochement* with Eur-American men, institutions and movements. The economic and cultural acculturation of Asia to Eur-America is indeed the very fountain of her existence and self-assertion.

The scholars and publicists of Eur-America have got to be emancipated from their *idols* about Asia such as have been vitiating

their mentalities, viewpoints, political ideologies and academic activities since the beginnings of the nineteenth century. The freedom movements of Young Asia have been serving somewhat to usher in an intellectual, moral and spiritual Renaissance among Eur-Americans by demolishing their arrogance and chauvinism.

A new Reformation is likely to emerge for the Western world in the second half of the twentieth century as soon as entire Asia becomes a continent of hundred per cent sovereign states functioning on terms of unconditioned equality with the whilom empire-holders and colonialists of Eur-America. Regular and systematic cooperation and "shared-activity" of Asians with Eur-Americans on the four or five platforms of the UNO has to be appraised as one of the factors helping forward this Reformation.

Eur-America Not United visàvis Asia

Among Indian as other Asian publicists and scholars there is a tendency to believe that all Eur-America is united in economic or political policies *visàvis* South East Asia, Far East, Western Asia, or India. This is a tremendous fallacy. For all practical purposes we must be reasonable enough to understand the *Realpolitik* of the diverse Eur-American empire-holders. Each one has been following its own interests and utilizing the *vishwa-shakti* (world-forces) with a view to its own self-assertion and expansion. American influence in Japan is not much liked by the British people. British influence in Siam (Thailand) is not congenial to the American. France hates the expansion of Anglo-American authority in Siam as well as in China.

The attempt to rehabilitate Holland in Indonesia and crush Indonesian independence is perhaps as agreeable to U. K. as to U.S.A. But are these two big bosses quite united in regard to the dose of Dutch domination or its methodology *visàvis* Indonesia? Holland like France has been smarting under the humiliation to which both these European empire-holders have to submit in Europe and Asia on account of the constant dictations from the Anglo-American financial magnates through the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank.

American economic and financial inroads into India, Burma and Pakistan may not be very agreeable in British strategy and *haute finance*. The U.K. is not perhaps thoroughly enamoured of U.S. participation in the affairs of Iraq and Iran. As for the Arab

League *visàvis* Jews America *vs.* U.K. has been openly known to be a fact of *Realpolitik*. The utilization of India and Pakistan as well as of entire Western Asia and South East Asia by the Anglo-American world-system against the Soviet Russian world-system is the fundamental reality of world-politics for today, tomorrow and day after tomorrow. But this does not exclude the daily economic conflicts and power-political frictions between U.K. and U.S.A. as a basic item of the rivalry-pattern.

Asia does not have to experience the united strategy of all Eur-American powers with a view to crushing her liberties. That is why Indo-China can view still to fight, and the Arabs and Jews both defy the UNO. This explains, again, why Holland in spite of all the sympathies and aids from the U.K. and the U.S. has failed as yet to crush the war of independence carried on by Indonesians since 1945. Evidently there is no unity among Eur-American powers. During World-War I (1914-18) Japan was the ally of England, France Russia and U.S.A. against Germany. During World-War II (1939-45) she was the ally of Germany against all these countries. This is why it was possible for Japan and Germany to help forward the nationalists and revolutionists of Asia in diverse sectors against Eur-American masters.

The absence of Eur-American unity in regard to Asia is well brought out by Professor J. Ph. Vogel, the Dutch scholar, in *The Indonesian Question* (Leyden, July 1948). He complains that Australia's action at the Security Council (30 July 1947) was a "step decidedly hostile to Holland." Australia was ungrateful, says he, because if "Holland" had followed the example of the French in Indo-China and allowed the Japanese to land in Java unopposed (1942, it is questionable whether Australia would have escaped the horrors of an invasion" (p. 10). He complains further, that the "Security Council also is largely swayed by political passions and selfish motives" in its pro-Indonesian tendencies. "By admitting Dr. Shahir and refusing admittance to the other (pro-Dutch) deputations from Indonesia" the Council is alleged to have shown "a deplorable partiality" (p. 12).

Soviet Russia in Asian Politics

In regard to Soviet Russia's activities in world-politics there is a fallacy prevalent as much in Eur-America as in Asia and the rest of the two hemispheres. Peoples believe that it is only in

order to help the communists as a political party and promote communism as a socio-economic philosophy or way of life that Soviet Russia looks for allies and supporters in the ten directions of the globe. This is a fundamental misconception and wrong view of the world-political set-up. Factually Soviet Russia does nothing but follow *Realpolitik*. It is the interest of their own state, country or people that Soviet statesmen have been promoting by hook or by crook.

U.K. and U.S.A. have been looking for allies, friends and collaborators here and there and everywhere for their eventual war against Soviet Russia. Anglo-American financiers and statesmen do not care to inquire whether Turks are democrats or liberals, whether Siam is an enslaved country or free and so forth. They care only to discover whether these regions, races, nations or peoples are capable of being utilized by U.K. and U.S.A. as effective instruments in World-War III. There is no question of an economic, political, social or cultural philosophy entering their brains when they offer friendship or alliance to Toms, Dicks and Harrys, no matter whether in Asia, Europe, Africa or America.

Exactly the same non-philosophical, non-ideological, nay, non-economic and non-political mentality pervades Soviet Russia in her attempts at collaboration and *rapprochement* with Asians, Africans or Eur-Americans. It is the most colourlessly, objectively and realistically militaristic viewpoint that Soviet statesmen follow in their *camaraderies* with the browns, blacks, yellows and whites. They help or offer friendship to such Asians as are likely to offer obstructions to Anglo-American military preparedness and war-effort. French people in France, English people in England, and Americans in the U.S.A. can be and are perhaps actually in the service of Soviet Russia. It is not Asians alone who sympathise with Soviet Russia. Large numbers of French men, Englishmen and Americans are allies of Soviet Russia because somehow or other they want to prevent France, U.K. and U.S.A. from making war-preparations or developing the war-effort.

India's Interest in Anglo-American

It is India's interest,—*Realpolitik*,—to cultivate friendship and alliance with the U.K. and the U.S.A. The world today, tomorrow and day after tomorrow happens to be so situated that it is impossible for any other country in the world to help the Indian people with

capital goods, consumers' goods, scientific skill, technocratic management and such other items for a long period or time. For Soviet Russia it is out of the question to think of coming to help adequately forward the industrialization and modernization in other ways of India's teeming millions. This is exactly the attitude of Pakistan. Neither India nor Pakistan,—although formally and in newspapers they pretend to be enemies to each other,—can afford to have U.K. and U.S.A. as anything but direct and pronounced friends and allies. It is here that we encounter the first postulate of Dominion India while cultivating affiliations with Asian politics.

Alliance with U.K. and U.S.A. is bound to remain the sheet anchor of Dominion India's economic policy and international fellowship for a considerable period. Both India and Pakistan may choose to remain neutral in the event of a war between Anglo-America and Soviet Russia. But such an eventual neutrality of India and/or Pakistan will be directed by Anglo-American considerations of the best strategy against Soviet Russia.

Afghan Interest Different from Turkish

On the other hand, Afghanistan cannot afford to be definitely pro-British or pro-American. Her geopolitical position *vis-à-vis* Soviet Russia counsels her to be as friendly to the Russians as possible. Before the Anglo-American Powers can advance enough to be of substantial help to Afghanistan she will already have been in the aerial and military occupation of Soviet Russia. That is the geopolitical position of Iran and Iraq also. It is only the southern, the Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf—regions of these two states that can be conveniently commanded and almost automatically commandeered by the Anglo-American Powers. But northern Iran and northern Iraq are practically already within the zone of Soviet Russia's domination. The virtual occupation of Turkey, Greece and Italy by Anglo-American forces has served to seal these regions of South East Europe against Soviet Russia's advance.

In all these instances it is not communistic philosophy that renders Afghanistan, northern Iran and northern Iraq as well as the Jews of Palestine friendly or sympathetic to Soviet Russia. The fundamental reason is the fact that the Anglo-American Powers *may not be in the very first stages* of the war strong enough to occupy these territories and liquidate the authority of Soviet Russia.

Similarly neither Turkey nor Greece nor Italy is hundred per cent ignorant of or indifferent to communism as a social philosophy or an economic system. But *Realpolitik* has counselled large numbers of people in each one of these countries to understand that the command of the Mediterranean will enable Anglo-America to function more easily and successfully on their soils than far-off land-locked Soviet Russia.

Korea, Manchuria and China as Russia's Prize

In the Asian sectors, again, entire northern China is within the grasp of Soviet Russia. The power of Anglo-America to penetrate so far into the north in quite an adequate manner is eminently questionable. Geopolitically, therefore, North China has reasons to be pro-Soviet. Japanese rights in Korea, Manchuria and North China had to be given away by Anglo-America to Soviet Russia during 1944-45 in order to annihilate Japanese Power. There is nothing specifically communist in the Russian occupation of China, Manchuria, and Korea. To what extent the Chinese people in the north or the south is communistically-minded is a question that does not have to be discussed for the time being. Indeed, this is almost an irrelevant issue in the present conjuncture.

It is Anglo-America that has actively helped forward the expansion of Soviet Russia in Europe up to Berlin and Vienna and in Asia up to Manchuria and Korea. And yet neither U.K. nor U.S. was bolshevik, communist or red. Nor was Soviet Russia certified to be democratic by Churchill or Roosevelt. Anglo-America had failed to defeat Germany and was compelled to beg Soviet Russia for assistance. And without Anglo-America's constructive alliance and support Soviet Russia would have been annihilated by Germany and perhaps broken up into myriads of states in Eastern Europe (1942). It was a joint enterprise, a common *Realpolitik* for communist Russia and anti-communist Anglo-America to embark upon the annihilation of Germany by any and every means. Hence the occupation of entire Eastern Europe (comprising Germany) as well as of Manchuria, Korea and North China by Soviet Russia. All these territories constituted her prize for assistance to Anglo-America. It is unthinking anti-Asianism on the part of Eur-American statesmen today in 1948 to smell Sovietism wherever in Indo-China, Indonesia and other regions of Asia there is a revolt against Eur-American masters.

In Dominion India's orientations to the politics of Manchuria, Korea and North China it is impossible even to overlook the fact that virtually a blank cheque was signed by Anglo-America in favour of Soviet Russia in order to annihilate by hook or by crook the power, prestige and privileges of Japan in this part of Asia.

The United Nations from an Indian Viewpoint

The objective relations between the states, large, medium and small, are neither determined by colour, nor by religion, nor by the alleged ideological considerations. The key to the complicated inter-statal complex is to be found in the pursuit of one's interests by each and every people organized as the nation or the state.¹ This is why the United Nations of today (estd. at Lake Success, New York 1945) as the League of Nations of yesterday can but be a replica or an epitome of the prevailing hatreds, jealousies and rivalries between organized groups. It is impossible for the Security Council authorities of the United Nations,—whether they be fifty or five,—to come to any respectable and united decision about Palestine, Iran, Kashmir, Indo-China, Indonesia or China. Whose security in Asia is in danger? And who is to judge as to whether some Asian's security is likely to be jeopardized? Every little region in Asia,—Pakistan or Siam,—Korea or Iraq,—is the battleground of conflicting Eur-American interests.

In regard to Europe, for instance, can France's security be fully understood and appreciated by the U.S.A.? It is too well known that the Anglo-American plan to give Germans control over the steel and coal works of the Ruhr has encountered systematic opposition from the French side. The foreign friends of France are alleged not to understand her security problems and to be "giving way to illusions". Is it possible for the French people wholeheartedly to depend on American man-power and to antagonize Soviet Russia as the U.S.A. would like?

Is the West-European bloc as designed by the U.S. in and through the Marshall Plan decent and honourable enough for the different countries of this region to accept and follow without hesitation?

¹ B. K. Sarkar: *The Science of History and the Hope of Mankind* (London 1912). *The Politics of Boundaries and Tendencies in International Relations* (Calcutta 1926).

Does Italy feel secure while she is being equipped as the base for Anglo-American campaigns against Soviet Russia? France understands her own security in the French way, Italy her own security in the Italian way. The French and the Italian ways of security may not be identical with the British way and the American way.

Is it possible, again, for the British people to feel secure while an inter-hemispheroidal armageddon is in progress or preparation on account of American-Russian conflicts? The British viewpoint of world-peace may widely differ from the American in Western Asia, in Palestine, for instance. Why has it become necessary to manufacture a so-called Third Factor or Third Power as a buffer, shall we say, between U.S.A. and Soviet Russia?

Naturally, therefore, the United Nations cannot achieve as much success in its political programme as in its economic, social, sanitary and health or humanitarian programmes. Does it, therefore, deserve to be condemned as an unnecessary and fruitless institution so far as politics are concerned? This is an intriguing problem.

The League of Nations (Geneva) used to be, generally speaking, hated by Asians because it was in the main an association of non-Asian empire-holders and colonialists. The rights and privileges of Eur-American powers in Asia and Africa hardly ever could be challenged under its auspices. The position of Asia as the colony, dependency or mandated territory of Western states was an *idée fixe* and the first postulate in its intellectual and moral *milieu*. But the most fundamental reason for Asia's antipathy to and disgust with the League of Nations as a political body was its systematic failure to prevent war on any worthwhile scale. The avowed and ostensible function of promoting and preserving world-peace was the least item in its achievements.

The United Nations has been the butt of the same pattern of criticism from Asians. Those Asians who are associated with the UNO as job-holders or happen to be highly placed in the administrative systems of their own countries and have to deal with the UNO in an official capacity do not of course speak out. But others do.

For instance, the Security Council is being regarded as the greatest instrument for the promotion of insecurity between nations. It is not peace but war, say they, that is being hatched in and through the Security Council. The right of veto exercised by any of the big bosses can automatically produce a stalemate; and nothing

substantial can even be accomplished except on a war basis. The doctrine of unanimity among great powers is essentially a spur to war against the recalcitrant.

The League of Nations was condemned in Asia as the organization for the pooling of the allied victors' resources against the overpowered German, Austrian and Turkish enemies. But the Security Council of the United Nations is being condemned as the veritable agent for the instigation of war between the victors themselves. It is under the auspices and with the blessings of the Security Council that the world has been transformed, it is alleged by such critics, into two huge blocs, the Anglo-American and the Soviet Russian. The European Recovery Plan is being interpreted as the economic-financial and techno-military equipment of 16 countries (250 millions) as a powerful base against Soviet Russia. Further, the right of regional alliances to carry on the war of self-defence militates against the foundation of the U.N.O. itself.

The present writer's attitude to the League of Nations² was entirely different from that of these critics. Geneva used to be treated by him as the common capital of a large number of, (not of course all), countries of the world. And the Secretariat of the League was appraised in his judgment as the Common Foreign Office of many peoples, nations or states. This Secretariat functioned regularly from year's end to year's end as the permanent clearing house or exchange for the transaction of inter-statal dealings. The prevention of wars or the promotion of peace was certainly the declared goal of its activities. But the Common Council of Nations could not possibly go beyond the fundamental likes and dislikes,—i.e. the belligerent attitudes of its components. The League failed. But if people have to fail, it is worth while to fail in a cause like the League's. This attitude to the Geneva Complex was of course that of a person in the minority of one.³

The United Nations is to be appreciated in exactly the same manner and because of the same functions. Its technique is perhaps more practical and is likely to be more effective. Lake Success is the common capital of many countries. Its limitations are too well known. It excludes Germans, Japanese and Italians, in the first instance. And in the second place, it excludes virtually,—if not

² B. K. Sarkar: *The Political Philosophies Since 1905*, vol. II, part II (Lahore 1942).

³ Sections on "Geneva Complex in World-Economy, World-Politics" and World-Culture."

constitutionally and formally,—the whole of the Soviet Russian sphere. All the same, it is an organization of nearly fifty five to sixty per cent of the world.

Now, we must not be blind to the brass tags. Mankind is not yet anxious for world-peace nor for unanimity in World organization.

Even this fifty five to sixty per cent is not all mad in love with world-peace and the abolition of hatred and self-seeking. As long as the component members happen to be guided by baser motives and selfish interests it is unreasonable to expect the composite structure to be an organization of idealists, i.e. self-denying saints and angels. It should be conceded that there are certain doses of idealism, liberalism or radicalism prevailing in every people as in every individual. But in groups as in individuals the idealistic, saintly, the self-sacrificing ideologies and temperaments are multiplied and modified by their antitheses, the materialistic, the knavish and the self-aggrandizing incentives and urges. The idealism of world-security, world-peace, world-organization and world-state cannot possibly approach its complete realization as long as the components of the world happen to be but saints multiplied by scoundrels or scoundrels multiplied by saints. The strong words, "saints" and "scoundrels" are not to be understood in the dangerously radical sense.

It should not be reasonable, therefore, to condemn the United Nations as politically superfluous or unnecessary. Nor can it be treated as entirely unproductive in the political domain. Human beings individually as well as collectively being what they are,—neither wholly saints nor wholly scoundrels,—it is a tremendous achievement if these diverse collectivities, groups, peoples, nations or states can be brought together regularly and can be enabled to function from year's end to year's end on a common platform. The very bringing together of such groups at a round table in order to hold *tête-à-têtes* on the problems common to them all or on the disputes separating them from each other is a worth-while consummation of the highest order.

In the internal affairs of states, the parliaments function regularly, the police function regularly, the law courts function regularly. And yet laws are being broken every day and crimes are being committed every day. The existence of crimes and criminals does not automatically imply the futility of laws and parliaments or the worthlessness of police officers and courts of justice.

The sinister elements in the composition of many of the nations who sponsored the high aspirations and noble ideals of the U.N. have been honestly laid bare by a foundation member.³ "Many of the governments proposing or supporting such objectives", says he, "denied them to those over whom they were ruling: sometimes to all their citizens, sometimes to large minorities living within their jurisdiction. How could it be expected that by writing such things into a Charter they could transform the habits of the world in any immediate future?"

Asians have not as yet got as much justice from the U.N. as they desire. Even many Europeans (French and Italians) and Latin Americans likewise complain against the U.N.'s failing to do justice to their interests. But in this as in other spheres we have to take the view of "relative" justice, "relative" freedom and "relative" progress. The position of Asians *vis-à-vis* Eur-Americans in world-politics and world-culture is not as despicable today in 1948 as it was, say, in 1848 or even 1905. Neither Holland nor France dare do whatever each wishes in Indonesia or Indo-China. England has cared to deal with India in a manner which is causing anxieties not only in France and Holland but in the entire world of white men and empire-holders or colonialists. Eur-America's treatment of China at the Boxer War which marked the beginning of the twentieth century is a thing of the past. From the Asian standpoint the world has factually grown into something more decent and more agreeable to live in. Naturally the higher and higher doses of freedom, equality, liberalism and security have yet to come. South Africa's treatment of Indians (and other Asians) is a standing inter-racial and international scandal. The League of Nations was one step. The second step is the U.N. A third step may also be envisaged as well as a fourth and a fifth and so on. The U.N. deserves therefore substantial sympathy and support from India as the rest of Asia.

An instance of relative progress may be cited here. Non-self-governing countries, i.e. foreign-ruled territories have not ceased to exist. That is a fact. And, therefore, a new category, "trust territories", has been created by the U.N. (Articles 73-91). But these trust territories are formally and legally not identical with the

4 C. Webster: "The United Nations Reviewed" in *International Conciliation* (New York), September 1948, p. 442. See also "A European Point of View on the U. N." by the French Ambassador in Italy, M. J. Fouques-Dupare in the same number, pp. 453-457.

mandated areas or dependencies of yesterday and day before yesterday. This also is a fact, but a new fact with a new idea. Among other things they are to be supervised by the Trusteeship Council which comprises as many non-ruling states as ruling (administering) states. The visits and criticisms, constituting the supervision by the Trusteeship Council, do not of course amount to the exclusion of the ruling states' authority in regard to the trust territories. But they are by all means some checks to the exclusive and monopolistic exercise of power by the administrators.

It is, therefore, possible for eight non-administering and non-colonial states like India, China and Egypt of Asia and Africa along with Brazil, Venezuela, the Dominican Republic, Sweden, and Soviet Russia to sit on the same committee with eight administering and colonial states such as Australia, Belgium, Denmark, France Netherlands, New Zealand, U.K. and U.S. (9 November 1948). The technique of international *tête-à-têtes* furnishes, as matters of daily concern, the permanent possibility of such round-table conferences between ruling and non-ruling states in regard to the progress and prosperity of what used to be called dependencies and mandated areas. The publicists of Asia cannot afford to ignore the slow but effective approaches towards relative freedom and partial world-peace as embodied in such regular and permanent conferences. The advances in international relationship since the conditions of 1914, nay, 1939 should be obvious to students of world-politics.

New Political Categories for Dominion India

A fundamental shortcoming in the political ideology of the present set of Indian publicists in its obsession by the past, and especially by the beginnings of their activities in 1920. That is the Year I of history in their conception of India and the world. This is an idola which clouds the imagination as well as reasoning faculties of our countrymen in a mischievous manner. We are apt to forget that 1920 was preceded by the events of 1905. The heroes and martyrs of 1905-14 had glorious contributions to the making and evolution of Indian freedom. We are often oblivious likewise of the fact that there was an 1885 which preceded both 1920 and 1905. And of course it is easy for us to forget, as perhaps too old, the tremendous reality of 1857. *Swadhunata* (freedom) was the war-cry al-

ready formulated at that time. Rangalal Banerji's *Swadhinata-hinatay ke banchite chay re ke banchite chay?* (With freedom's loss who would like to live, O, who would live?) has been living in the blood of freedom's fighters since then.

It is a political as well as a scientific necessity to recall those realities. And of course it should not be decent to obliterate from the picture of freedom's evolution the figure of Subhas Bose and his *Azad Hind Fauj* (Indian National Army), his Japanese and German allies as well as his achievements at Imphal and Kohima (1943-45). Further, historically speaking, nobody can afford to ignore the exploits of Revolutionary India and its effective alliance with Germany and Turkey during World-War I (1914-18). The story of that contribution to Indian freedom has been told by Rowlatt in *Revolutionary Conspiracies in India* (Calcutta 1918).

While obsessed by the past history we do not thus attach due importance to the diverse factors and forces as constituting the web of that history. We happen to be monistic in our world-political orientations and thoroughly indifferent to the achievements of myriads of our countrymen in the past. As for the present and the future we do not seem yet to understand the significance of the formal withdrawal of the U.K. from the Indian scene. Some of the nationally and socially objectionable features of the British regime are being perpetuated by the new regime as a matter of course, as if nothing new has happened. This is regrettable.

Idealists will have to educate the publicists and patriots of Dominion India to understand the new world-political forces and feel their impacts on India. The political categories which were invented and popularized by Indians in order to counteract and militate against the British Empire cannot be useful and life-promoting today. British domination has formally ceased to exist in India. This is the greatest single fact of *vishwa-shakti* (world forces) to which adequate orientations remain yet to be established. The old categories and the old ways of thinking and administering will have to be replaced by new categories and new ways of thinking and administering. The existing ideas about nationalism, language, boundaries of states, provinces, provincial autonomies, state sovereignty, relations between the centre and the periphery, financial structure, defence, diplomatic intercourse, and so forth have come down to us through generations used to British mastery. These ideas are in need of thorough overhauling. *Realpolitik* is entirely different at the present time.

In November 1948 many circles in both U.K. and U.S.A. have relieved themselves of their anti-German and anti-Japanese fetishes. Indeed, very many of them today have been cultivating pro-German and pro-Japanese propensities. But in our country many of the experts in foreign relations exhibit greater Germanophobia and Japanophobia than English and Americans ever did. They are still living in the milieu of Anglo-American propagandas of 1939-45. They have yet to attempt catching up with the Anglo-America of today in the realistic world-view.

Our publicists and statesmen of today seem yet to harbour their old-world orientations to British Viceroys and the British Empire strategy. Some of us are perhaps living in the epoch of Shivaji and Aurangzeb (seventeenth century). Such obscurantist and reactionary orientations have got to be knocked out of our brains if Dominion India's political, cultural, financial and military-naval-aerial general staff is to function in an adequately serviceable manner.

The futurism such as can inspire the formulation of a constitution as well as a foreign policy adapted to the new world-conditions remains yet to be generated among the large masses of political thinkers and workers. In the course of something over a year since August 1947 Dominion India has found it hardly possible to experience anything more than a simple administrative change or rather a change in the colour of the higher administrative personnel.

A Unitary State Language Unnecessary

The fetish of a unitary state-language will have to be demolished. In a small country like Belgium all the three languages, Flemish, Walloon and French are equally valid, i.e., state languages. For all practical purposes, however, nobody speaks more than one language. In Switzerland, likewise, German, French, Italian and Romansch are four languages normally and popularly spoken in four different areas. No language is imposed upon all the areas in Switzerland for administrative purposes. Political unity is prevalent in these countries in spite of the plurality of languages.

In the elementary schools of Belgium and Switzerland a second language of the country is taught. But as a rule hardly anybody remembers the second language after leaving the school. It is only in the interest of business, government administration, foreign service and so forth that Belgians and Swiss voluntarily choose a second or third language according to requirements.

In India Hindi must not be imposed upon Marathi-speaking, Tamil-speaking, Telugu-speaking, Canarese-speaking, Gujarati-speaking, Assamese-speaking, Oriya-speaking and Bengali-speaking peoples. The despotism of Hindi can lead to far-reaching complications.

It is a disgraceful fact that the money order forms issued by the Post-Offices of Hindi-speaking areas have been printed exclusively in Hindi and are being circulated even in those areas which are entirely ignorant of Hindi. Perhaps Hindiwallahs believe that they have conquered the Marathas, Tamils, Bengalis and other non-Hindi-speaking peoples of Dominion India. This autocracy cannot and will not be tolerated. Every law passed by the Dominion Parliament will have to be translated into the principal languages of India. Hindi must not be accorded the exclusive privilege.

As for mastering Hindi language, those Bengalis who as engineers, scientists, medical men, journalists, Central Government servants etc. are candidates for jobs in Hindi-speaking areas must make it a point in sheer self-interest to be proficient in Hindi. Perhaps every Post-Graduate student of arts, science, medicine, engineering and so forth should consider it worthwhile to add to his qualifications by proficiency in Hindi speaking and writing. In the course of the next few years some 5000 Bengalis of West Bengal ought to be ambitious enough to cultivate Hindi to the extent of being able to command the admiration of Hindi speakers and writers at Benares and Allahabad.

But generally speaking, every language is to be regarded as a state-language for the area where it is spoken by large masses of people. The establishment of Hindi as the unitary state language of India will be detested in Marathi-speaking, Tamil-speaking, Bengali-speaking and other linguistic areas.

Linguistically Homogeneous Provinces Unrealizable

The fetish of linguistic boundaries of provinces is likewise to be subverted. The boundaries of languages and the boundaries of states can never be identical except under peculiarly exceptional circumstances. The slogan, "another language, another state," is an absurdity unrealized and unrealizable on earth.

French, the language of France, is spoken in parts of Belgium as well as of Germany, Switzerland, Italy and Spain. But the French-speaking areas or peoples of Belgium, Germany, Switzerland, Italy

and Spain are not and cannot become districts or villages of the French state. The history of Europe since Louis XIV bears this out. German is spoken in areas of Denmark, Holland, Belgium, France, Switzerland, Italy, Lithuania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Jugoslavia. But those German-speaking areas and peoples are not and cannot be incorporated as parts of a German state. The three great wars since 1870 furnish solid evidences.

Bengali will be spoken in non-Bengali areas, like Assam, Bihar and Orissa. Similarly Hindi will be spoken in Assam, Bengal, Orissa and so forth. Marathi will likewise be spoken in Gujarat, Central India, Central Provinces, Deccan and Southern India. The consolidation of all Marathi-speaking, Bengali-speaking areas within water-tight political compartments for each language would be a sheer impossibility. Every state or province is bound to be a hotch-potch of languages, polyglot. The attempt to establish linguistically homogeneous provinces or states with Marathi, Bengali or some other linguistic bases is a wild goose chase. The Herderian doctrine of the linguistic nation has no place in the twentieth century.¹

Abolish the Provinces

The fetish of provinces, provincial boundaries, provincial assemblies, provincial ministries, provincial finance, and provincial Governors will have to be annihilated. Each of the existing provinces and states should be treated as a district or divided up into a number of districts. The entire responsibility in regard to finance, health, agriculture, irrigation, migration, education, transportation; industry; labour, social services and what not should rest with the Centre. The unification of India by a centralized administration is to be the fundamental target of Bengali as of other publicists and patriots.

Delhi is reached from Calcutta in six hours. It is senseless to think of India in terms of Sher Shah's provincialism or Asoka's local liberties. Localism of every sort in administration has to be extirpated in all possible ways. It is only under such conditions that Bengalis will have the normal chances of functioning in Himachal-pradesh, Vindhya-pradesh, Rajasthan, Saurashtra and elsewhere in India and abroad.

1 B. K. Sarkar: "Herder the Philosopher of the Folk" Preface to Dilip Malakar's *Jatiyatar Vani-Murti Herder (Herder the Vocal Embodiment of Nationalism, Calcutta 1916)*.

Bengalis such as will have to live in non-Bengali-speaking *milieu* will have to cultivate acculturation to non-Bengali language, culture and *mores*. This is the new reality of Dominion India. In case they be rich enough or numerous enough to establish purely and exclusively Bengali educational institutions, recreation centres, athletic clubs, they may do so at their own initiative and on their own responsibility. These will have to be appreciated as some of their cultural luxuries. But the general run of Bengalis ought as a rule to get assimilated to local conditions.

Non-Bengali Indians,—Gujaratis, Madrasis, Marathas,—whose activities compel them to live in Bengali-speaking areas will likewise be required to get Bengalicized in language, morals, manners and customs. In case they be anxious to preserve some of their traditional *mores* they are at liberty to do so on their own risk and at their own cost.

Wanted a Central Culture Department

The Central Government ought to have a Culture-Department to investigate the number and condition of non-Bengalis in Bengali-speaking areas as of Bengalis in non-Bengali-speaking areas, Marathi-speaking people in non-Marathi areas, and non-Marathi-speaking people in Marathi areas and so forth. It should be a function of this Central Culture Department to come to the help of such minorities in cases deserving sympathy and support. The fears and suspicions of the minorities about the eventual loss of their languages, cultures and *mores* may thereby be somewhat counteracted.

But in any case the provincial idea in language and culture will have to be thoroughly polished off. The languages and cultures are not to be treated as territorial phenomena or provincial interests. They deserve to be recognized merely as some of the survivals of birth conditions which may eventually disappear through contacts with others.

In order to facilitate the self-expression of diverse languages and cultures in every educational area of Dominion India the Central Culture Department will have to endow each of the different Universities with "extra-territorial jurisdiction" to be exercised throughout India according to requirements. The University of Bombay may then be enabled to make arrangements for teaching and examination in regard to Marathi and Gujarati at Calcutta, should Calcutta University find it inconvenient to do so. Arrange-

ments for teaching Bengali at Bombay may correspondingly be entrusted to Calcutta University in case Bombay University should like to be relieved of this responsibility.

A concrete suggestion for cultural work may be made to the lovers of Bengali language and people. They should devote their energies to the institution of Chairs for Bengali Language and Culture at some of the prominent Universities of Dominion India. Delhi, Nagpur, Benares and Patna in the north as well as Bombay, Hyderabad and Madras in the south ought to be equipped each with a Professorship and Department of Bengali language and culture.

The States Abolished

It is certainly extremely difficult for our countrymen, used as they are to the political categories of the Indian National Congress, to appreciate and sympathize with the new categories of political thought and life enunciated here. But in one field, at any rate, even the septuagenarian Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel has succeeded in demonstrating that the ideologies which ruled Bharatvarsha down to August 1947 can be uprooted almost overnight. The Princedom and the "State-idea" have been ruthlessly annihilated by him. He has out-Bismarcked Bismarck in the successful geopolitical reconstruction of Indian States. And the unification of India already consummated by him—from Junagadh to Hyderabad and Mayurbhanj—has been accomplished without blood and iron. A miracle of this pattern has been unknown in the history of political remakings during millenniums.

It may not be inconceivable for Young India today to appreciate the political wisdom of abolishing the fetishes of state-language, states according to languages, and provincial entity, and go ahead with the scheme of a unified, consolidated and centralized India from top to bottom and in every possible sector.

Bengalis of Pakistan as Pakistanis

Pakistan is an entirely new category of political thought and life. The world has got used to it in all international transactions. The sooner Dominion India gets used to it the better for us all. There was a time when Afghanistan used to be a part of India. Nay, Central Asia also was a province of Indian culture and political system. But nobody in India sentimentalizes over Afghanistan and Central Asia as lost territories

From the standpoint of Bengal and Bengalis we have today to get orientated to Pakistan in a new realistic and unsentimental manner. We should admit at once that the Bengalis of Eastern Pakistan are not Bengalis in the conventional meaning of the word. They are Pakistanis. The Bengalis of Dominion India also are not Bengalis of the *Sonar Bangla* (Golden Bengal) of 1905, or of *Subah Bangla* of 1757, or of *Banga* of the Pala and Sena Dynasties of the eighth to the twelfth century, or of the *Banga* (*Prachya*) of the Vedic and Buddhist ages.

French-speaking men and women live in Belgium. They often get married to French people in France. And of course French books published in Belgium are read in France as French books published in France are read in Belgium. And yet the French people of Belgium are not French. They are Belgians. It would be sheer stupidity on the part of the French people in France to sentimentalize over their racial, linguistic or cultural kith and kin in Belgium. Indeed, they don't sentimentalize.

Again, the French-speaking men and women of Geneva, Lausanne, Neuchatel and other towns or villages of Southwestern Switzerland are hundred per cent French in language, culture and *mores*. But no Frenchman of France dare call those kith and kin French people. They are Swiss and nothing but Swiss. They themselves would resent being described as French.

The German-speaking men and women of Austria are historically speaking the pioneers of Germanic civilisation in many respects. Today also they continue to be the creators of German *Kultur* in literature, arts, philosophy, science, medicine and engineering. But no German of Germany (Prussia, Bavaria, Saxony or Wuerttemberg) would dare call these Germans of the Inn Valley and the Danube Valley Germans. They are Austrians. And the Germans of Austria would never call themselves Germans. They are proud of their designation as Austrians.

French and German have meant different things in different epochs. The meaning of Bengali also has been diverse in diverse periods of history. It is necessary for the Bengalis of Dominion India to get used to the new situation and look for fresh fields and pastures new in the vast territories of the Indian subcontinent. The Bengalis of Pakistan likewise have need to cultivate acculturation to their new *Sonar Bangla*. One must not make too much of the geographical expression, Bengal.

Bengals may come and Bengal may go. But Bengali culture goes on for ever. The Bengali people goes on for ever.

The Muslims of India and Pakistan

What about Muslims? The Muslims of Dominion India are Indians. The Muslims of Dominion Pakistan are Pakistanis. And this is an end of the matter. The Muslims of Afghanistan are Afghans. The Muslims of Iran are Iranians. The Iranians and the Afghans are politically and militarily rivals and enemies. They do not work as friends and allies simply because they happen to be Muslims. The Muslims of Turkey are Turks and the Muslims of Egypt are Egyptians. The Egyptians and the Turks have not been friends to each other on account of their common Islamic faith. The Muslims of Arabia are Saudi-Arabs, Syrians, Iraqis, and so forth. They are not allies of the Muslims of Iran who are Iranians.

The Muslims of Dominion India will accordingly have to get used to the new category, "Indians". They are entirely independent of Pakistanis although they happen to be Muslims.

If a Pathanistan be created on account of Anglo-American strategy *vis-à-vis* Soviet Russia the Pathans will not necessarily be the allies and friends of Pakistanis or Afghans simply because all the three are believers in Islam. In case, further, a part of Kashmir be separated from the Indian Dominion it is likely to be made perhaps into a new state, however small, which will have a new name. Pakistan, Pathanistan and this new "Stan" will be three new political categories independent of one another as well as of Afghanistan. All of them will but be buffer-states between Soviet Russia and Anglo-America's South-Asian bases. But the possibility of a friendship or alliance between Pakistan, Afghanistan, Pathanistan and the fourth "Stan" is as remote as that of an alliance between Turkey and Egypt, or Arabia and Iran, or Iran and Afghanistan. Alliance does not depend on religion alone.

The Muslims of Dominion India as well as of Pakistan ought to possess this pattern of orientation in regard to Asian Politics. Once in a while some of the petty districts of Arabia known as states like Lebanon, Syria, Transjordan, Yemen, Saudi-Arabia, etc. may happen to be politically and militarily united. The reason will not be religious or Islamic. The unity will not be achieved because they are all Muslims and hence supposed to be comrades in arms. The unity may be temporarily brought about because they can be utilized as

tools and instruments by foreign, non-Islamic powers. These seven million Muslims may be made to serve British or American or combined Anglo-American strategy in Asian and world-politics. The sooner the Muslims of India and Pakistan understand this *Realpolitik*, the sooner will they learn to place themselves on secular, territorial, anti-theocratic, anti-medieval and the allied paths to progress.

Wanted a Re-interpretation of Indian History
(1200-1947)

Another field in which our publicists, patriots, statesmen, culture leaders and educators have need to emancipate themselves from the ideologies of the past two generations and develop a futuristic viewpoint in thought and method of work is the domain of England's role in India. In this connection we are called upon also to get fresh orientations to the pre-British periods of Indian history. Old shibboleths about freedom and subjection, or independence and slavery familiar to us from 1885 to 1947 have to be thrown into the melting pots.² For tomorrow and day after tomorrow we have to get equipped with new categories of thought.

For quite a long time Indian intellectuals, publicists and patriots have been specializing in the drawing up of a somewhat rosy picture about the medieval periods of our history. The object has been sub-consciously as well as consciously and deliberately to throw the British regime into the shade in the perspective of the free India of bygone days. Our historians and politicians, research scholars and educators, all combined to demonstrate that the India of medieval Hindus and Muslims was a subcontinent of democracy, equality, freedom and such like things. Now that the British regime has formally gone out of the picture it is time for archaeologists, antiquarians and other research scholars about India to re-examine the archives and other objective evidences.

We have to write a new history of India from the thirteenth to the eighteenth century.³ The historical, nationalistic and political

² From a lecture at the inauguration of the Diamond Jubilee Celebrations of Bangabasi College on 29 November 1948 at the Senate House, Calcutta University.

³ An attempt in the right direction is D. Burman: *Indo-Muslim Relations* (Calcutta 1948).

categories engendered in our brains on account of antipathy to and hatred of the British domination may now be safely re-examined in a dispassionate manner. It is desirable to emancipate ourselves from the attitudes and reactions produced by the situation of enmity to England's role in India.

Along with new objective lights thrown on the pre-British regime the British regime itself is in for new valuations. A reinterpretation of India from 1757 to 1947 is sure to be a concomitant of the re-interpretation from 1200 to 1757.

Freedom Advancing in India
(1757-1947)

People are not satisfied with Dominion Status. The cry for complete freedom is in the air. Total separation from the British Empire (or British Commonwealth of Nations) or, simply the Commonwealth (without the adjective British) is being demanded on our side. And, on the other hand, the Attlee Government in the United Kingdom is emphatic that even the relations, as they exist today, between India or Pakistan and the U.K., Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa are the relations of full freedom and complete equality. India is alleged to be as free as the U.K. and the other Dominions and equal to the U.K. and the rest of the Commonwealth.

Both the Indian Nationalist and the British Government viewpoints deserve critical analysis from the platform of *Realpolitik*. The statesmen and patriots of Dominion India have need to thoroughly emancipate themselves from the despotism of the word "freedom", whether used by our countrymen or by the British diplomats. The category, freedom (swadhinata) is very simple and can be spelt without much difficulty as a word of the English or the Bengali language. But the "contents" of freedom are diverse, heterogeneous, multiform and varied. Freedom has many forms and many doses. There is no single or unified pattern of freedom as a fact of interhuman or inter-racial or international relations. There are freedoms and freedoms, even when they are alleged to be formally and legally complete, full and unconditioned.

The Dominion freedom instituted on 15 August 1947 is just one of the thousand patterns of freedom. It should be silliness to attempt discovering anything extraordinary or unique in this pattern. The British people has hardly anything substantial to lose because of

the jubilations of the Indian people. Indeed, the situation is somewhat profitable to the U.K.

In 1757 at the Battle of Plassey the men and women of India although vanquished, both Hindus and Muslims, acquired a particular form of freedom. That was just a dream of the British pattern of freedom. The freedom granted by the British people to the Indian people in that conjuncture was considerably different from the freedom of the Maratha, Sikh and Moghul epochs. But this British freedom in India was undoubtedly also a type of freedom.

Hindus as well as Muslims had in reality been slaves or unfree people, so to say, in these Maratha, Sikh and Moghul periods of Indian history. They were virtually slaves to Kings or Emperors or Nawabs or Maharajas, to put it in the extremist or radical manner. They were slaves of the Wazirs, Nazirs, Kazis, Kotwals and other functionaries of the executive, judicial, administrative hierarchy or official oligarchy. They were slaves likewise of the propertied aristocracy, the moneyed groups, the landed groups, the commercial communities and so forth. The Indians of today, used as they are to the British regime,—could not have tolerated the slavery of the Maratha, Sikh and Moghul ages. In those periods there was hardly any individual or family security. Movements were as a rule not free and unobstructed. Chances and opportunities for enjoying one's wealth in a secure manner were practically non-existent. Whims, caprices arbitrary ordinances, and indifferences to established law were, for all intents and purposes, the order or custom of the day. It would have been difficult to detect acts, regulations or statutes such as were really independent of family considerations, really independent of castes, really independent of races, and really independent of religions. Further, the unrestricted and free enjoyment of religious festivities and social customs was a rare phenomenon. Both Hindus and Muslims had to live, move and have their beings in the *milieu* of absence of freedom. In the pre-British periods of Indian freedom,—whether Maratha, Sikh or Moghul,—neither Hindus nor Muslims knew how to taste freedom in any of the daily transactions of life. The picture is being drawn in an exaggeratedly sombre colour with the object of indicating that the truth was very much nearby.

But many of the untasted freedoms of pre-British or free India have made their appearance in the daily lives of Hindus and Muslims after Plassey as a result of the foreign dependence initiated by British rule. This dependence on the British people is thus evidently

also one of the types or forms of freedom. These liberties can in one word be described as freedom in the interhuman relations of people living in a country. We have what may be called internal freedom. The simple meaning of British freedom is the freedom of every individual in the eye of law. It is in the *milieu* of British freedom that a tremendous spiritual revolution has been consummated in India.

In pre-British India the country did not happen to belong politically to geographical outsiders. There was thus in India what may be described as "external" freedom or freedom in the international sense. But "internal" (civil and constitutional) freedom was almost nil.

Be it observed that the absence of internal (civil and constitutional) freedom was as bad a feature of the European sub-continent in the Middle Ages as of the Indian during the same period. On the other hand, the discrimination in favour of the English people as against the Indian (both Hindu and Muslim) was an ugly fact of the British regime in spite of its promotion of internal freedom and equality as between Indian and Indian.

After 1757 there was passed a fundamental Act in India by the British people. This was the Regulating Act which in 1772 laid the foundations, so to say, of modern Indian administration. The sphere of British liberties was considerably extended by the Act. The Hindus and Muslims of India got used to the tasting of freedom in and through legislation. Since then gradually,—in snail-like pace,—the freedom of interhuman relations within Indian territories has been expanding. Diverse forms of British freedom have manifested themselves in the routine of Indian life. The witnesses and landmarks of that expansion and manifestation are, in our days, the Government of India Acts of 1922 and 1935. These two Acts may be called the Acts for Indian *Swaraj* (Self-Government or Independence). It is the post-Plassey British freedoms that have gone on advancing in homoeopathic doses through these contemporary Acts. It is the last stage or dose of that advance that is today the Dominion freedom of 15 August 1947.

The British regime did away with "external" freedom. The Indian people had no status in the international sense. But "internal freedom" was conspicuous so far as the relations between Indians were concerned. The Dominion status is equivalent to the maximum of internal freedom,

British Empire Rationalized

Let us now turn our eyes to the British side of the shield. Did the Empire of the British people decline in 1757? No, it was in expansion. In 1772 also the boundaries and authority of the British Empire did not dwindle, they were en route to expansion. The British Empire was not enfeebled by the grant of *Swaraj* to India in 1935. Even then the international power and prestige of the British people were growing. And so, finally, by granting Dominion freedom to India in August 1947 the British people has not let the Empire factually down. It has not got substantially circumscribed or enfeebled. Its strength has rather been increased. Today also the British Empire is en route to expansion.

In new ways, new patterns and new forms the India of the eighteenth century,—the India of the Marathas, Sikhs and Moghuls,—the India of pluralities, varieties and disunities,—has been revived and restored. The Europe of today also is pluralistic, multiform, disunited and varied like India. On account of these antitheses, conflicts, diversities in India or in Europe the British people has hardly anything to lose. It is in for gain and can derive considerable profit. Post-August 1947 India is the India of Muslim India at variance with Hindus, Hindu India in conflict with Muslims, Muslim India differing from Muslims, as well as Hindu India militant against Hindus. Then there is Pakistan as inimical to Pathans and to Afghanistan. Besides, Congress India is hateful towards Subhas Bose and his lieutenants throughout the country, Bihari India cultivates prejudice against Bengali India, and Hindu-speakers are at loggerheads with Urdu-speakers and non-Hindi speakers, generally speaking, are detesting the eventual domination by Hindi language. And last but not least, employees and workingmen's India is discontented with and perpetually fighting the India of employers and capitalists or the bourgeoisie.

In the *milieu* of dozens of such conflicting and warring Indias, functioning in Southern Asia, the British Empire of today has got before itself in new forms the facilities, openings and opportunities for interference, such as presented themselves before it in the eighteenth century. It is easy for the British people to look for and discover the holes through which it can simultaneously poke its nose and place its fingers on both sides to each of the disputes,—and this both officially as well as in private capacities. While compe-

ting with Soviet Russia, the U.S.A. and other diplomatically wide-awake and power-conscious states, the British Empire is up and doing in the matter of utilizing the new *vishwa-shakti* (world-forces) in its own interest. It is getting more and more equipped and competent with a view to the eventual World-War III of the twentieth century.

Empires are varied. Their patterns are diverse. In 1757 the British Empire appeared in a certain form. In 1947 it has been seeking to develop a new type and manifest itself in a novel pattern. The distinctions or differences between 1757 and 1947 are to be detected mainly in the form, *Gestalt*, configuration, pattern. The power and prestige of the British people have remained the same as before,—in reality they have increased. By granting Dominion freedom to the Indian people the British Empire has become an eyesore to the French and Dutch Empires, and therefore in reality more decent and respectable in the estimation of freedom-loving mankind comprising the Indian people. This psychological and moral fact is itself a source of strength to the British Empire,—although the British people may not choose to call it an Empire.

It was by utilizing the Americans,—youngsters as they are in diplomacy and world politics and kindergarten pupils in imperialism and colonial rule,—during 1939-45 that the British Empire has succeeded in annihilating the German and the Japanese Empires and enjoying the glories of world-conquest. In August 1947 the British Empire has embarked on a new policy adapted to the changed *vishwa-shakti* (world-forces) of the post-war period. By exhibiting new rationalism in keeping with the new times the English people is today capable of manoeuvring like expert athletes in the international arena. This political rationalism has resulted in the “rationalization” of the British Empire, to use a category of contemporary world-economy.

England, the pioneer of imperialism and colonial rule, has become also the pioneer of anti-colonialism and de-imperialization. She is, therefore, morally and spiritually competent enough to lead mankind during the second half of the twentieth century in the domain of liberation, freedom and democracy: In world-political competition the other empire-holding states, old and new, are bound to lag behind, and therefore to exhibit strategic weakness.

The Dominion-freedom of India is but a powerful tool and instrument calculated to render the British Empire strong and efficient in the world-politics of tomorrow. How many Bengalis or

Indians are capable of understanding the significance of and utilizing the Dominion freedom in the interest of their fatherland?

The Social Philosophy of a New Democracy

In modern times the illiterate has hardly anywhere in East or West been treated by the "cultured" classes even of democratic countries as of any worth whether as an intellectual person or as a moral agent. World-War II which compelled the hyper-civilized peoples to march "back to the caves" in which the palaeolithic races had flourished furnishes us with an occasion for re-examining the foundations of this traditional view of science and philosophy regarding the illiterates.

The psychological and ethical values of the human personality deserve to be transvalued in the light of objective realities about men and women based on statistical and comparative investigations. The students of science are called upon to realize that both in East and West,—even in those regions which are used to universal, compulsory and free school systems,—the railway coolies, plantation labourers, mine-workers, factory labourers, peasants, in other words, those occupational groups which constitute the majority of the "gainfully employed" do not necessarily possess an intelligence and moral character inferior to those of the persons who academically, professionally and economically belong to the upper ten thousands.

We are speaking here of those men and women who happen to be "unlettered". It is to be noted that we are not using the word "uneducated". By the word "unlettered" is to be understood a person who cannot read and write. The distinction that we make here is of profound significance in regard to the appraisal of human "values". A man who is unable to read and write is not necessarily uneducated or uncultured. Literacy is an essentially modern phenomenon, but culture and education have been going on in the human race for thousands of years. There were millions of cultured and educated men and women during the primitive, ancient and mediaeval epochs of history even in those regions and among those races where reading and writing were unknown. In other words, human intelligence is not as a rule dependent very much on book-learning and school-going. The natural intelligence as well as practical experience of the teeming millions among the illiterates are, therefore, very valuable intellectual assets.

We may now institute a comparison of these illiterates with those who have acquired "education" in schools and colleges. In other words, let us compare the peasants and mechanics with schoolmasters, lawyers, magistrates, doctors, journalists and political leaders. There is hardly anybody among the so-called educated classes who would venture to assert that as intelligent persons, that is, as men and women of common sense, the cultivators and *mistris* (artisans) do not understand the problems of their daily life, their family requirements, their village surroundings in the same way as do the schoolmasters, lawyers, religious preachers and so on. Those who know the illiterates intimately admit, as a rule, that the fact of being ignorant in regard to reading and writing does not render them incapable of comprehending the interests of themselves, their families as well as their neighbours. On the other hand, it is also necessary to observe that a schoolmaster, a lawyer or a medical doctor is after all an expert in one, two or three things of life. These alleged "educated" persons can claim proficiency only in a very limited sphere of interests. The medical man is not an authority in problems connected with engineering, the engineer in questions involving a knowledge of botany, the chemist in questions of astronomy, and so on. The highest that one can possibly claim for these intellectual classes is that some one is a specialist in a particular line and a certain person in another.

Now, agriculture is also a profession of very great importance. Those men and women of India therefore who are experts in agriculture, that is the illiterate cultivators, therefore, deserve the same consideration from the other members of the community as a lawyer does from the engineer and an astronomer from the chemist. Professions are to be respected as professions. The agricultural profession does not demand less intelligence, less dexterity, less shrewdness, less commonsense, less organizing ability than do the so-called learned professions. The same remarks hold good in regard to the profession of the blacksmith, weaver, potter, and so on. The *mistri* (artisan), the cultivator and others in the so-called manual professions are as educated and cultured, although unable to read and write, as are the lawyers, doctors and the professors.

We are prepared to go a step beyond and assert that as a "moral person", that is, as one who as a free agent discharges the duty of his life in regard to himself, his family and his neighbours, the lawyer, the doctor or the professor is not necessarily superior to the

chashi, coolie, *majur*, *mistri* and all other manual workers. Let the members of the so-called "educated classes" place their hands on their breasts and compare their character as sons and daughters, as parents, as uncles or aunts, as guardians, as nephews and nieces with those of the cultivators, factory workers, independent handicraftsmen. It is impossible to assert that the peasant as a class in his moral obligations and sense of duty towards relatives and kinsfolk as well as to neighbours, is on a lower plane than members of so-called educated class. In regard to other functions of moral life also we can institute a comparison and we shall come to the conclusion that in regard to the activities involving money matters, the engineer, the contractor, the schoolmaster, the land-owner, the factory-director and others do not as a rule enjoy an enviable position such as might give points to the members of the unlettered classes. We can take other items of private and public morality and we shall find that in criminal statistics, the cultivator, the artisan and the industrial workers do not figure oftener and in large numbers proportionally speaking, than do men and women of the so-called superior classes.

These discoveries, based on the experience of a very large number of public workers and scholars, lead us inevitably to the proposition that the illiterate is not a person who deserves to be differentiated from the so-called educated as an intellectual and moral being. And on the strength of this discovery we should be prepared to formulate a doctrine which is well calculated to counteract the superstition that has been propagated in Eur-America and later in Asia as well as of course in India to the effect that literacy must be the basis of political suffrage. Our observations entitle us to the creed that political suffrage should have nothing to do with literacy. The illiterate has a right to political life and privileges simply because of the sheer fact that as a normal human being he has factually demonstrated his intellectual strength and moral or civic sense. The rights of the illiterate ought to constitute in social psychology the foundation of a new democracy. A universal suffrage independent of all considerations as to school going, ability to read and write or other tests should be the very first postulate of social economics. It is orientations like these that democracy needs today if it is to function as a living faith.

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